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Preface
Azerbaijan has experienced robust economic growth during the past seven years, aided
by its oil sector development. Nevertheless, poverty is still pervasive and social indicators have
deteriorated. The oil and gas windfall will be of undoubted benefit to the country and its citizens
if combined with a very careful macroeconomic policy and fiscal stance, as well as steadfast
implementation of the structural reform program and poverty reduction strategy. The experience
of other resource rich countries has often been disappointing and left large strata of the
population in continued poverty. The main challengefor Azerbaijan is to design and implement a
policy agenda that leads to poverty reduction and improves incomes as well as equity, while
maintaining macroeconomic andfinancial stability.
This Public Expenditure Review (PER) focuses on the public expenditure part of the
overall policy agenda. Its main objective is to provide a framework for more efficient use of
public resources and more effective poverty reduction efforts. This framework is designed to be
consistent with the maintenance of overall macroeconomic stability and with sustainable
economic growth in the non-oil sector.
The macroeconomic achievements over the past five years have been encouraging.
Continuing these achievements, however, may present a greater challenge to the authorities in
the coming decade. The relatively speedy accumulation of fiscal revenues related to the oil and
gas windfall will create heavy spending pressures. Using these funds unwisely or out of the
context of a sound vision of the country's sustainable economic development path will create
macroeconomic instabilities, inefficient and non-competitive non-oil activities, or both. The
basic conclusion and simple recommendation of this PER is that Azerbaijan follow a fiscal
strategy consistent with sustainable development of the non-oil sector, while over time mending
institutional weaknesses and structural deficiencies, and investing in its people.
This Public Expenditure Review is designed as a discussion document and guide for the
authorities of the Government of Azerbaijan in weighing difficult policy and spending choices.
In a wider political economy context, it is also intended to inform the broader civil society in the
Republic of Azerbaijan of these important choices. Finally, this document is intended as an
orientation for members of the external donor community. ,
Donna Dowsett-Coirolo
Country Director
For the Republic of Azerbaijan
Europe and Central Asia Region
The World Bank
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. BACKGROUND
1. Azerbaijan has experienced robust economic growth during the past seven years, aided
by its oil sector development. Nevertheless, poverty is still pervasive and social indicators have
deteriorated. The oil and gas windfall will be of undoubted benefit to the country and its citizens
if combined with a very careful macroeconomic policy and fiscal stance, as well as steadfast
implementation of the structural reform program and poverty reduction strategy. The experience
of other resource rich countries has often been disappointing and left large strata of the
population in continued poverty. The challenge for Azerbaijan is to design and implement a
policy agenda that leads to poverty reduction and improves incomes as well as equity, while
maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability.
2. Since independence, Azerbaijan's economy has undergone serious stress and realignment
and the process of structural change is ongoing. Macroeconomic stabilization required
expenditure cuts in real terms. Coupled with less than efficient budgetary and quasi-fiscal
expenditure allocations, as well as a large agenda of strengthening management and
implementation capacity, the cuts have led to decline in social outcomes and quality of public
services. The main objective of this Public Expenditure Review (PER) is to inform policy
choices toward lasting poverty reduction and increasing incomes, while maintaining sound
macroeconomic management. The availability of oil revenue resources jointed with the current
state of transition to a market economy make the future public expenditure challenges for
Azerbaijan unique. It is hoped the PER would be useful for defining a Medium-Term
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) to address these issues, and promoting balanced growth so the
non-oil sector is not left behind.
3. Few countries have
experienced as volatile and precarious Output Performance of Azerbaijan Relative to
an economic performnance as that of Average Output Performance of CIS and CEEC
Azerbaijan during the 1990s. In the ICumulative Index of Real GDP Growth, 1989 = 100)
first half of the decade the country loo
suffered the complex trauma and set of 80 - -
problems associated with the 60 - - -
dissolution of the former Soviet Union 40
(FSUJ), which was further aggravated 20-
by an armed conflict over Nagorno- 0 ,
Karabakh and the associated influx of o a 0f a % t a C > a,
refugees. The second half of the -Azerbaijan - - -CIS, average - - - -CEEC, average
decade witnessed a surge in foreign CIS- Countnes of Independent States
investor interest in the country's oil CEEC- Central and Eastem European Countnes
and gas sector. Actual investmnent Source EBRD Transition report 2000, 2001 and authors' calculations
increased significantly, as did oil and gas output and prices. This, coupled with an array of sound
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macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies from 1996, brought about rapid restoration in
overall growth and monetary stabilization.
4. These macroeconomic achievements must be maintained, and in some respects may
represent a greater challenge to the authorities in the coming decade. Both the transition process
and the booming oil sector will lead to large restructuring of the economy. The economy is
facing a dual macroeconomic challenge: to maintaiin macroeconomic and moDnetary
stability while strengthening competitiveness of the mnoni-oil sector, aRnd to complete the
transition agenda of structural reform, which may see some tradidtonal activities disappear
or stabilze at much lower levels of output and employmenmt.
5. Although the overall
macroeconomic outlook for Azerbaijan is "The Resorce Cure"
very favorable, driven by the rapid oil and The well-documented impact of oil
gas sector development, the non-oil GDP abundance on economic performance cannot be
will grow at a more modest pace. Because ignored: empirical evidence suggests that girowth is
of substantial profit and capital systematicaly lower An countries with large
repatriation outflows of the foreign oil natural resource endowments. Worse, small
companies, there is bound to be a economies with mineral resources tend to be among
compificanies, thergen boundeo be a the worst growth performers.t As the experienuce of
significant divergence between the other countries has shown, strengthenimng
double-digit GDP growth rates on the one implementatdon capacity to spend the additional
hand and on the other, the increase in flscal reveunues wisely is the key factor. There is
resources available for domestic always the risk that public spending designed to spur
absorption. This will translate into more growth or modernization will result in very low rates
modest growth in private consumption per of return or will require continued subsidization in
capita. Herein lies the crrux of the future. In some other countries, a resource boom
macroeconomnc mannagement over the has lead to rent-seeking behavior to garner the
windfall. This occurs in an environment of weak
increasing flow of dresonrces to the institutions. Strategic priority setting and sequencing
pnbrec sectorw ofrge swongs tom the of policy measures taking into account institutionalpublic sector largeswingsin the capacities therefore becomes crucial.
currenDt account balance, and at the
same time maiintain financiafl aznd t See for example Sachs and Warner, "Natural Resource
macroecoinomic stability; and how to Abundance and Economic Growth," 1995, and Auty, "Sustaining
avoid the dreaded "Duntch disease"1 Development in Mineral Economies: the Resource Curse
Thesis,", 1993.
anmd/oir thne misuse anzad waste of public tSee Phillip R. Lane and Aaron Tomell, "Power, Growth and the
resources that manny couintries with a Volacity Effect," Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 1(2), 1995,
resouirce-based windfaDl Dnave experiein- for further discussion of some of these issues.
ced.
6. B3alanced growth betweein the new oil sector anid the traditional non-oil sector is a
major challennge - adapting to Azerbaijan's increasing integration into the world market,
creating productive employment opportunities, and reducing poverty. Excess supply of foreign
exchange may lead to appreciation of the exchange rate, and excessive fiscal spending may lead
to inflation and inefficiency - Dutch disease symptoms that hamper competitiveness and growth
l "Dutch disease" refers to the tendency for large resource revenues to appreciate the real exchange rate, which then
damages the non-oil tradable sector.
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of the non-oil sector. To foster non-oil sector growth and job opportunities, the Government's
agenda is to: (i) maintain financial stability and prudent fiscal policy; (ii) create an environment
for enterprise restructuring based on hard budget constraints and elimination of quasi-fiscal
subsidies, competition, a competitive real exchange rate and reasonable real interest rates; (iii)
complete financial sector reforns to improve financial intermediation and access to credit; (iv)
improve quality of social services to protect vulnerable segments of population from the perils of
the transition process; and (v) improve human capital through education and health sector
reforms.
7. Rapid and sustainable reductionGipvr Rapis the mustainaobjectve overuthn Gains in productivity are key to growth in thein poverty is the main objective over the
non-oil sector. Productivity accelerates as a result of
coming decade. Turning Government resource shifts from less productive to more
oil revenues into sustainable jobs with productive firms, largely due to a more liberal
more equity across the social strata is a business environment, hard budget constraints, better
most difficult task. The 2002 Poverty financial intermediation, and governance under the
Assessment on Azerbaijan estimates a rule of law. Moving rapidly on the Government's
poverty rate of 50 percent and extreme Privatization Program is likely to stimulate more
poverty at 17 percent in 2001 .2 While not efficient resource allocation and thus have positive
directly comparable, the 1996 survey impact on productivity and job creation. A service
found a poverty rate of 68 percent, oriented public sector and the elimination of critical
suggesting that poverty may have infrastructure bottlenecks also contribute to efficient
declined during the last six years. This is resource allocation. Finally, besides investing in
attributed mainly to a decline in income physical capital, human. capital investment in
poverty in the rural areas as a result of entrepreneurial skills and transparent businessDyea espite o practices is an important factor for strengthening the
successful farm privatization. Despite competitiveness of the non-oil sector.
these encouraging results, it is clear that
sustained non-oil sector growth, as well as targeted human development policies in education,
health and social protection are required to bring the poor above the poverty line. The
Governmnent's poverty reduction strategy prioritizes public expenditures towards the following
areas:
8. First, in urban areas poverty is associated with falling employment opportunities
and earnings in the formal economy. The key challenges here are to: (i) improve skills of
urban workers; (ii) increase mobility of the urban labor market; and (iii) implement structural
and administrative changes necessary to foster an environment conducive to investment, growth
and job creation in the non-oil sectors of the economy.
9. Second, in rural areas poverty is rather associated with lack of access to basic
services and adequate infrastructure. The rural poverty reduction strategy aims at:
(i) improving extension services and availability of credit; (ii) improving access to energy, water,
and other public services; and (iii) improving rural infrastructure, especially irrigation systems.
10. Third, there is a need to address the growing extent of "capability" poverty. Given
past expenditure cuts, maintaining poor peoples' access to health and education services is a key
objective. In the education sector the quality of the teaching process need to be improved and
2 For more information see Azerbaijan Poverty Assessment, World Bank 2002.
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the system rationalized. In the health sector, the levels of infant and maternal mortality levels as
well as the incidence of certain infectious diseases are of increasing concern, as is the extent of
malnutrition among poor children.
11. Fourth, the social smfety net needs to better targeted and funded adequately, while
in-kAnd implecit subsidies should be substituted with cash transfers. FurthermoDre, the
internally displaced populaton (IPs) needs to be integrated into the mainDstream society.
12. And importantly, to better monitor the effeciveness of public expenditure and
reforms, the effort to impnrove data collection for the HousehoRd Budget Survey (H135)
shouDd continue. The Government is taking steps to ensure that the collection of data on the
labor market, education and health follow internationally accepted definitions to facilitate
monitoring its progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), and allow better
comparability between the living standards of Azeri people and other countries.
Poverty Comparisons
Rural, Baku City and other Urban Areas im 2000
Urban - -Rural
Baku_city
13. lCh nat EPoery Extreme Poverty Porty Line
8 
7-
6-
e5 5
4-
3-
E 2-
20000 72000 100000 120000 150000 200000
consumption per capita, Manats
Source: Azerbaijan Household Budget Survey, 2001.
13. The nmatoional Poverty Reductoio Strategy (PIRS) is anm importaimt coirnerstonme foir the
futunre development of Azerbaijan. The forthcoming MTEF and the associated Public
Investment Program (PIP), consistent with and based on the PRS, will provide the main elements
for defining how public expenditure can most effectively address poverty while continuing the
good track record of fiscal sustainability within a stable macroeconomic and monetary
framework.
B. THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC EXPENDI[TURE REVIEW
14. This flrst PER attempts to set out the broad framework of issues that the
Government of Azerbaijan would need to address in the next several years, to meet thne
challenge of mannaging the oil windfall to the beneflt of the countiry and its citizens. Given
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the enormous developments to the Azerbaijan economy anticipated during the rest of the decade,
the PER focuses on macroeconomic and fiscal policies to steer clear of the pitfalls ahead.
Prudent budget management and strong institutions for effective and efficient public expenditure
execution are key in order to avoid the disappointing experience of many natural resource rich
countries. While Chapter I sets the stage, Chapters II and III document recent progress with
fiscal consolidation and the building of institutions with accountable management, and then
provide an agenda to address the challenges ahead. Chapter IV, a detailed examination of
macroeconomic and fiscal management issues for the rest of the decade, proposes a public
expenditure envelope consistent with the objectives described above.
15. The sectoral agenda of poverty reduction is summarized in Chapter V from a public
finance perspective. These programs are elaborated in more detail in the concomitant
Poverty Assessment. Likewise, the fiduciary framework is addressed in detail in the
parallel Country Procurement Assessment Review (CPAR) and Country Financial
Accountability Assessment (CFAA). All these activities are designed to support the
development agenda of Azerbaijan. The Government's PRS is well advanced in its formulation,
but more work is needed on costing and prioritization of the components of the agenda. In this
respect, the Government's future PIP plays a crucial role, and the capacity to appraise and
prioritize prospective projects should be supported. More analytical work on public expenditure
is needed in order to advise on the design and execution of the commencing fiscal
decentralization program, which would strengthen local government and give municipalities
more fiscal responsibilities, especially in the social sectors. This could lead to better
empowerment and voice for the poor, but it could also lead to local capture.
16. The PER does not analyze the PRS, the PIP, or sectoral allocations within the MTEF in
detail. This is a natural next step of the public expenditure analysis process as these documents
become available. The PER is meant to inform the strategic agenda on the range of sound
public revenue and expenditure management, within a carefully calibrated fiscally
sustainable macro framework, that would avoid the pitfalls of Dutch disease and provide
for a steady reduction in poverty during the decade. The PER should be viewed as but one
element in the continuous participatory dialogue between the World Bank and the Azeri
Government and society. This dialogue includes the PRSP, an array of sector projects and
economic and sector work (ESW), as well as the Second Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC-Il)
with the associated Second Institution Building and Technical Assistance program (IBTA-II).
C. MACRO-FISCAL FRAMEWORK
17. The Government of Azerbaijan has adopted a pragmatic and measured approach to
the development of the country's oil and gas resources, which has brought international
technical and marketing expertise to bear on oil and gas development and exploitation. The
establishment of the State Oil Fund (SOFAR) provides a financial mechanism for separating
commercial decisions on oil extraction from public spending decisions. It grants the Authorities
considerable flexibility to "smooth" public expenditures over time in a manner that can maintain
monetary stability. It also allows the Government to maintain a degree of continuity in fiscal
programs, especially with regard to the implementation of committed investment projects and
xprograms. Public expenditure decisions, the real exchange rate, competitiveness, and growth in
the non-oil sector are all intimately linked. This section depicts a possible macroeconomic
framework for the rest of the decade, from which some policy rules for maintaining sustainable
balanced growth can be derived.
18. The hump-shaped profile
of the oil windfall will lead to a
concomitant fiscal gain, which is 70000 Azerbaijan Oil Production
expected to last for a relatively m 60,000
short time span (about two o 50 000
decades), if new oil fields are not X 40,000
found. This fiscal gain, however, is 30 000
a result of the depletion of the 3 20,000
country's oil and gas reserves. 10,000_o
Since oin rents are to a large -
extemt concemtrated u the public °°
sector, the question of how the oid aOR Early Oa
oil amd gas revenue should be QACG Phase 1 3ACG Phase 2
spent and distributed across o ACG Phase 3 o Shah Dene Condensate
present and future generations
becomes a cornerstone to sue- Source: World Bank
cessful economic development.
19. During 2002-2005 it is anticipated that approximately US$13 billion (or twice current
GDP) will be invested in the Azerbaijan oil and gas sectors. This includes the Baku-Thilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and upstream oil extraction structures plus development of the huge
Shah-Deniz gas field with a possible gas pipeline to Turkey. By 2005 oil and gas exports start
picking up seriously. The enormous swings in the extemal resource balance of Azerbaijan are
due to these prospects.
20. What are the sources
and uses of these resources External Resource Balance Sources and Uses
durirng the rest of the decade? 6XD
Most of the oil and gas
investments during 2002-2005
will be financed by foreign direct
investment (FDI) of the oil a 31I 
companies and partners. Net -/
factor income (NFI), which is _ _ _ _
primarily outflows in terms of X_
profit repatriation, as well as the O
accumulation of oil profits in the -1 aD
State Oil Fund are expected to be
relatively modest during the
investment period. Once the oil
and gas from the new [ -lR M m
investments start to flow, the Source World Bank projections
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resource balance turns sharply positive. However, even by 2010 only about one fifth of the
profits will go to the Oil Fund. The lion's share of the revenues will leave Azerbaijan in the
form of oil companies' profit repatriation and capital repatriation of the investments, i.e.,
negative FDI. Resources left for other uses of the economy are little affected by the oil and gas
sector developments.
21. Of course the trajectory
for net inflows to the Oil Fund Savings and Investment Balances
depends of the public
expenditure strategy for the rest
of the decade. Although there 5D /o
may be ample room for public 400/o
expenditure increases, capacity 300/o -
and Dutch disease concerns 20rd6
call for an expenditure i 10% /o
envelope that is not overly z 00/.
expansionary. Foreign net -10%
savings inflows to Azerbaijan w -20%"/
are, as noted above, expected to b -3M/o6
swing from massively positive to -4o6/o
massively negative during the 5
decade. The foreign savings are I_ FS k teSe +odd-+NoaS
by definition mirrored in the net Source World Bank projections
savings of the domestic
economy. Private oil and gas sector net savings are negative during 2002-2005, followed by
large positive savings. The consolidated government balance3 is expected to be in deficit during
the next three years but increasing surpluses are projected thereafter. Given the exhaustible
nature of oil-related revenues, the uncertainties surrounding future discoveries, and the volatility
of oil prices, it is only appropriate here to assess the fiscal stance by looking at the non-oil
deficit. The non-oil sector has, and is expected during the investment boom to continue
substantial saving-investment deficits in the order of 20 percent of non-oil GDP. Nevertheless,
this situation is not sustainable forever. Despite the coming oil boom, the non-oil sector should
bring its resource drain to a five percent range in order for macroeconomic stability to be
maintained.
22. Slowing net accumulation to the Oil Fund would release more resources to the
economy. The question is of how much resources can be absorbed without leading to an
appreciation of the manat, and at the same time to internal inflationary pressures, especially
given the development state of institutions. Keeping the resource balance left for the rest of the
economy relatively constant over time contributes to monetary and price stability, and mitigates
the risk of Dutch disease. This is accomplished by gearing the fiscal stance to support
sustainable development of the non-oil sector. At the same time, though, the monetary stance
may stay reasonably accommodating. As monetary instruments currently are limited, the fiscal
3 In the chart the lines are cumulative, that is, the consolidated budget balance is added to the private oil sector
balance to show the cumulative balance of the two sectors together. The difference between the two lines is the
budget balance. Likewise, the non-oil sector balance is added on top, and the balance is read as the difference.
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expansion translates into a gradual increase in the monetization ratio and drop in velocity, so that
by the end of the decade the M2 to non-oil GDP ratio would reach 27 percent. It assumes that the
financial sector is strengthened considerably and the public's confidence in the system increases
so that money demand starts developing to more normal levels. Given the path of international
reserves, this would imply that the credit to the economy relative to non-oil GDP will increase
from 10 percent in 2001 to 15 percent by 2010. This increase in access to credit is a vital
precondition for non-oil sector growth to materialize, given the prospects of fairly limited FDI
inflows in the non-oil sector.
23. In this baseline scenario
GDP is projected to increase Accumulated Growth
alnost 21/2 times between 2002
and 2010. However, in terms of
resources available to the 2
domestic economy, this figure 261
can be misleading. A better 249 /
indicator is "adjusted GNP" in 22 -
which profit and capital 02 -
repatriation is subtracted from 19D 1S
GDP. GNPadjusted will grow with 1-1i
only 95 percent during the 140-
period, and non-oil GDP about 120;
the same -or about 6.3 percent 2M 2M 2M MS =6 2M 2CM 2M 2010
average annual growth. Rapid 1 C NCDP C"Z I
growth fueled by the oil nbA R imms i- CMEnem P&
investment boom is expected to Source World Bank projections
be followed by non-oil GDP
growth of about five percent during the second half of the decade. 4 What is striking is that
private consumption per capita is expected to grow by onlly thiree percemt per annum on
average for the rest of the decade due to the consolidadon of the non-oil sector net savings
balance.
24. While Government revenues (including Oil Fund inflows) are projected to increase by
180 percent in 2010 relative to 2002, a pragmatic formulation of the medium-term public
expenditure envelope follows the trajectory on non-oil GDP. A constraint on the maximum
speed of growth of public expenditures is also imposed by public institutional capacity. This
base case scenario envisages a gradual increase in public expenditure to 35.6 percent of
noni-oil GDP, as compared with 28.4 percent in 2001. Current expenditure is projected to
increase to 26.7 percent of non-oil GDP in 2010, as compared with 23.4 percent in 2001. Capital
expenditure is projected to reach 8.8 percent of non-oil GDP, up from five percent in 2001.
Long-run analysis and simulations indicate that such a fiscal stance would be sustainable for
several generations into the future.
4 The rationale for a potential growth rate of the non-oil sector averaging 5 percent is elaborated in Chapter IV and
Annex 3.
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25. Given the huge social and infrastructure needs of Azerbaijan, why could public
expenditures not grow even faster? The depicted policy stance implies a fiscal stimulus to the
non-oil sector in the order of 13 percent, calculated as the fiscal deficit between non-oil
government revenues and expenditures relative to non-oil GDP. In all experience that is a very
large stimulus at the limit of the absorptive capacity on non-oil sector development. As noted,
sustainability depends crucially on the rapid progress in structural reform and institutional
capacity building. Otherwise this large fiscal stimulus may well result in real exchange rate
appreciation, loss of efficiency, competitiveness and growth, and subsequent unviable public and
private investment projects. International experience has shown that repeatedly.
26. Given this projection
scenario, the potential public Public Expenditures to Non-Oil GDP and its Financing
expenditure envelope increases
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from AZM 5,403 billion in 40%
2001 to AZM 14,185 billion in ° 0 35%/2010. The non-oil sector would 3
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the taxable base. Until oil-
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smoothing out the expenditure 4_
path. Other sources are derived 2-M 2m 20 2n 2 Z 2a 2009 2010
from identified foreign financing ND Rs 0 Ta Rewves DSCFAR U ExtemdFi a Mm I Fb
while there would be no Source World Bank projections
borrowing on the domestic
market in the medium term. Based on these assumptions, the external debt to non-oil GDP ratio
will decline to 26 percent from 30 percent in 2001. The gross assets of the Oil Fund are projected
to reach US$5.1 billion in 2010, as compared with US$491 million in 2001.
27. According to the current Oil Fund regulations, only interest revenues earned on the
Fund's investments can be used for public expenditures. This rule may be overly restrictive.
During the next five years the non-oil private sector has great opportunities to take advantage of
the investment boom in the oil sector. This requires rapid investmnents in the sector in order to
catch up after many years of deterioration in the physical capital base. Given the
savings/investment resource constraints, such investments could lead to zero or negative growth
in private consumption per capita, a situation difficult to sustain given the promise of the oil
riches. Not constraining the accommodating fiscal stance explained above by arbitrary
rules on Oil Fund expenditures may be warranted. Consequently it is suggested to relax this
rule. Later in the decade, oil and gas related tax revenues are expected to grow substantially. At
that point, in this scenario, Oil Fund financing of the deficit would be less than interest revenues.
28. The baseline projections elaborated above, of course, depend crucially on the
assumptions made for the developments in oil and gas prices on the world market. What the
PER is suggesting is not to deviate from the rule of gearing the fiscal stance to the
development of the non-oil sector. Rather, the Oil Fund would act as a buffer to absorb oil
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price shocks, while short-term corrections in the medium-term PIP and MTEF underpinning
poverty reduction and balanced growth of the non-oil sector should be avoided. Again, this
would help to mitigate the risk of Dutch disease. According to the scenario, the oil price could
drop to $15/barrel without necessitating a major correction in the medium-term fiscal stance. On
the otheir hand, to the extenmt that a five percent aDnnual growth potential Din the snoin-oil
sector Rs aZbout right, incremental revenues from oil prices higher than $18/barreD on
average should be saved iDn the COil Fund, and the public epenaditure path should not be
altered in the short-run. Nevertheless, macroeconomic conditions may unravel substantially
differently from the scenario depicted here, in which case the proposed fiscal stance needs to
reassessed. Regular reviews of the long-term strategy are advisable and necessary.
29. From a poDltical Oil Fund Accumulation with different Oil Price Assumptions
economy perspective, the
recommendation is to de-link
oil revenue flows, dictated by
commercial extraction
decisions and world oil prices, 7O
from the annual budget 9 6fl1 /
debates. These are typically 
short-run exercises, focused on _ ,aI I
political and economic c 3 ll)
pressures over the next year (or 2 
the next three years). Planning 1 =
for sound use of oil and gas o
revenues to support sustainable mlm 2r 2 M 2M 17 M o9 Mo
development of the non-oil 1-0'-'C 5 1 ±5
sector requires a longer Source World Bank projections
horizon, one that is well
beyond normal political horizons. The Oil Fund provides a long-term political compact on how
oil and gas related revenues are to be used not just this year, but for years to come. It can protect
some portion of oil revenues for future generations by allowing larger fiscal surpluses in the
short run, and a more desirable path of expenditures over the medium to long run than may
otherwise be politically feasible.' De-linking improves coordination between monetary and
fiscal policy, since this fiscal sterilization of oil revenues means that the monetary authority has
less of a sterilization task confronting it (and its limited intervention tools).7
5 The rationale for a potential growth rate of the non-oil sector averagmg 5 percent is elaborated in Chapter IV and
Annex 3.
6 The Norwegian Petroleum Fund, for example, is designed as a "tool for coping with the financial challenges
connected to an agmng population and the eventual decline in oil revenues, by transferring wealth to future
Venerations," (Norwegian Ministry of Finance).
See Wakemnan-Linn, J., P. Mathieu and B. van Selm, "Oil Funds in Transition Economies: Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan", IMF 2002, mimeo.
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D. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR FIsCAL POLICIES
AND EFFICIENT EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT
State Oil Fund
30. Perhaps the most significant development in public finance in recent years in
Azerbaijan has been the establishment of the Oil Fund. The Government is committed to
exercise considerable caution over the use of the expected oil and gas windfall and to ensure that
the benefits resulting from the exploitation of this natural asset would accrue to all citizens and to
future generations. This cautious approach of the Government is deemed even more essential
given the fiscal institutional reforms presently underway and the need to implement an
appropriate PRS and an integrated PIP.
31. The Oil Fund asset management and budget rules would be strengthened by having
the force of law, with the clarification of the role of the Oil Fund as solely a vehicle for
managing part of the liquidity generated by the exploitation of oil and gas resources. As such the
Fund would be financing the consolidated budget only under the unified control of fiscal policy.
Investment of the Oil Fund's assets should be limited to investment-grade assets, as defined by
internationally reputable rating companies, and placed with the use of contracted professional
portfolio managers. Oil Fund assets would not be invested in domestic projects of purely
commercial nature. An important challenge for the Government and SOCAR is how to
finance equity shares in future very large oil and gas projects such as Shah Deniz, without
resorting to the Oil Fund.
Budget Preparation and Execution
32. The Government has recognized the need for a radical overhaul of the institutional
arrangements affecting public expenditure management. The Treasury system introduced in
1998 is functioning well and represents a significant advance. Its full computerization should be
accelerated. There is a need for a comprehensive and integrated financial system, and the
Treasury Information Management System (TIMS) is a central element of this. The new Budget
Systems Law (BSL) approved by the Parliament will address many of the deficiencies of the
past, including the incorporation of off-budget expenditures as well as monitoring and reporting
requirements, as this law is fully implemented. The external audit framework in the form of the
Chamber of Accounts has been established with appropriate legislation and an independent
institutional structure. The legal framework for the State Procurement Agency (SPA) has been
strengthened.
33. Formulation and implementation of a sustainable public expenditure envelope requires an
institutional framework that would allow for integrated and coordinated fiscal management
based on macroeconomic, sectoral, and budgetary information. While coordination of key
Government agencies - Cabinet of Ministers, MOF, MED and the Central Bank - has been
strengthened, there is a need to empower key line ministries to effectively participate in the
budget preparation process. Investment spending must be a part of the overall public
expenditure planning process.that encompasses both a multi-year time horizon and the recurrent
cost implications of these investments. The BSL should enforce the consistency with PRS, PIP
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and MTEF, with the latter two approved by the Parliament every year, together with the annual
Budget Law.
34. Stronger inks sihouRd be enniade between budgetary flmance allocation decisions and
operationaD outcomes. Moving away flrom allocating resources based on inorms to a
6" program/performance" based budget model is Rey. This requires strengthened financial
analysis capabilities in the line ministries and the Public Investment Appraisal Department of the
MED. State budgets should be much more explicit in defining the responsibilities and
accountabilities of spending units in the implementation of the budget. This will improve clarity
in the delineation of responsibilities for budget execution between the MOF and the line
ministries. Output indicators of performance and the quality of service delivery should be
defined and monitored.
Quasi-Fiscal Operations
35. One of the most important requirements for efficient fiscal policy is reduction and
eliminadon of gunsi fiscal operations, i.e., the reduction of implicit subsidies in the electricity,
gas, and water sectors through a combination of improved cash collection, increased tariffs,
and/or gains in efficiency. The Government is addressing this issue. A firm commitment to a
phased program was made in 2002, with a targeted elimination within five years. This will
require: (i) establishing financial discipline in the utility sectors through enforcing the right of
energy and water companies to discontinue service to non-paying customers, with the
Government monitoring the disconnection program; (ii) delivering services to enterprises with a
history of delinquency only on the basis of advance payments; and (iii) bringing subsidies from
SOCAR to the energy and water companies explicitly into the budget, while compensating
SOCAR through a corresponding tax credit.
36. To eliminate the quasi-fiscal deficit the Government has allocated in the budget
appropriate funds to budget organizations to pay their utility fees. At the same time it is
instituting strict supervision of the payment of these fees and disconnecting or taking remedial
actions for institutions that consume in excess of the budgeted limits. Likewise corporate
governance and accountabifty of SOCAR, Azerenergy, Azerigaz, and the ARWC need to be
improved.
37. Private management contracts for electricity distribution have already led to
improvements of collections in the household sector. In order to, over time, increase utility
tariffs to cost recovery levels, there is an urgent need to decide on the relevant cash transfer
scheme to alleviate the impact of these reform measuires on the poor.
Accountability
38. Azerbaijan has made considerable pirogress in the legae framework surrounding
public procunrement. The new Public Procurement Law (PPL) developed by the State
Procurement Agency (SPA) and based on UNCITRAL8 was enacted in December 2001 with
implementing regulations promulgated by Presidential Decree No. 668 in January 2002. It is the
8 United Nations Comnmission for International Trade Law.
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view of the recently completed CPAR that "in terms of substance and degree of development, the
PPL is one of the better such laws in the region."9
39. The SPA is staffed at the highest levels with able and committed staff and despite the
absence of a sufficiently systematic and appropriate reporting system, has been effective in
identifying and correcting breaches of procurement rules. Significant capacity building of the
institution is now underway. It should include establishing an appropriate review
department, separate from functional departments. This would create more transparent
and formalized review procedures. Furthermore, as the concept of procurement based on
market economy principles is relatively new in Azerbaijan, a countrywide training program
should aim at building a modern corps of procurement officers covering all districts.
40. The supreme audit institution reporting to Parliament was properly established in
2001 with the enactment of the amended Law and Charter on the Chamber of Accounts.
This Chamber is now vested with the necessary authority and rights to enable it to audit all
public sector entities, including all budgetary and extrabudgetary organizations and funds, and to
publish its results. The issue is to support the Chamber to become fully functioning as speedily
as possible.' 0 It is planned to have its 2003 work plan and related financial plan presented to the
Parliament before the end of 2002.
41. The old inspection/central departments were abolished as they represented obstacles to
development. Probity and integrity of public expenditures is gradually being strengthened. The
CFAA as a principle recommends to establish over a longer term the proper intemal audit
departments within all budget organizations, including ministries, local governments, and state
enterprises.' l
Fiscal Decentralization
42. The local public expenditure role of municipalities and districts will be important to
ensure that the objectives and goals set out in the MTEF, the PIP, and the PRS are not
undermined by confusion about the responsibilities for the achievement of their objectives.
This would be particularly dangerous with regard to future public investment activities, which
may involve capital expenditure from a line ministry but a maintenance and operational
expenditure commitment from a different level of public administration.
43. Successful implementation of the public expenditure envelope is possible only with an
appropriately decentralized fiscal system that is transparent and accountable. A Government
body in charge of municipal issues should define the governmental policy on
decentralization and to coordinate and address local matters. A policy and administrative
action plan for municipalities would address: (i) clarification of the functions and
responsibilities between the local branches of the state administration and the municipalities; (ii)
the issues of adequate and homogeneous budgeting systems for municipalities; and (iii) the
establishment of transparent safeguards and controls for municipal budget execution.
9 See "Azerbaijan: Country Procurement Assessment Report," World Bank, 2002.
10 This institution is bemg supported under the recently approved IIBTA-II techmcal assistance.
" See "Azerbaijan: Country Financial Accountability Assessment," World Bank, forthcoming.
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44. The intergovernmenntal fiscal framework between the central Government and the
municipalities would include the creation of a transparent fiscal transfer mechanism and the
finalization of the transfer of state properties to municipalities. Financial, techniical, and
managerial capacity of the inewly created municipalties needs strengthemning, allowing
them: (i) to preserve and invest in local infrastructure and facilities; (ii) to provide reliable access
to basic infrastructure and services; (iii) to foster economic development by removing the
barriers to private sector development; and in the longer run (iv) to have the ability to raise
revenue and apply cost recovery principles to investment.
Civil Service
45. A overarching issue in ineed of attentioin on thne institutional agenda is the structure,
administration, and remuneraidon of the civil service. Not surprisingly, reform in this area
has been somewhat slow, as comprehensive civil service reform takes time to implement.
Progress has been made with the merger of some central ministries and some initial legislative
steps for the regulatory framework of public employment. What has not been fully articulated is
a concept of the type of central government structure that would be suitable for a market
economy in the context of Azerbaijan. This involves setting up the criteria and principles for
existing ministries and state committees and the Cabinet of Ministers on what should guide a
civil service reform strategy that encompasses all aspects of a professional and modem civil
service. While it is recognized that the structure of public administration in the country as a
whole and its institutional capacities cannot be transformed in a short time frame, there ought to
be a guiding blueprint for change with time bound targets. This should include: (i) rationalization
of public sector employment; (ii) a unified and decompressed public sector pay scale; (iii)
avoidance of across the board cuts in the wage bill; and (iv) monetization of in-kind supplements
through integration with the pay scale.
E. SECTORAL AGENDA
46. In terms of overall fiscal management, significant progress has been made in recent
years. However, the main focus of fiscal adjustment has been on public expenditures, and fiscal
compression has affected certain parts of public service much more than others. During the early
years of transition, output contraction and the consequent collapse in fiscal revenues squeezed
public expenditure on education and health as a share of GDP and also in real terms.'2 As
prospects for growth improved, educational expenditure grew from US$1 1.1 to US$25.1 per
capita during 1995-2000, whereas health expenditure remained relatively unchanged at an
average US$5.7 per capita during 1997-2000. During the same period, the share of public
investment in GDP fell sharply. ufn defining a medium-term expeindituore frarmework, social
aspects of public spending should be given priority, and, in the context of public
investment, rural infrastructure should be addressed.
12 The share of education expenditure in GDP was halved from 7 percent in 1992 to 3.5 percent in 1995. The share
of health expenditure m GDP dropped from 2.9 percent in 1990 to 1.2 percent in 1997.
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Selected ECA Countries, Consolidated General Government Spending
by Functional Classification, 2000
Per Capita US$ GPS Defense Education Health SS& W Housing Agro
Armenia 14 8 22 7 19 2 6 0 33 3 9 6 10.4
Azerbaijan 7.3 13.5 25.1 5.7 34.3 2.6 4.7
Belarus 19 0 12 9 62.9 47.3 116.3 27.8 44.8
Estonia 116.6 589 2333 1953 395.8 47.7 30.8
Georgia 9.9 3.4 15.0 4.4 29 8 5.7 1 6
Kazakhstan 15 3 8.9 36.8 23.6 74.4 9 6 5.0
Kyrgyz Republic 7.9 4.8 9 1 5.6 17.2 3.1 4.8
Latvia 84.2 25.9 197.3 107.8 431.3 65 3 44.9
Lithuania 45 7 39 9 179 2 133.5 342.3 15 7 49 6
Moldova 68 1.4 15.9 104 43.3 1.1 37
Russian Federation 43.3 51.1 52.4 35 5 144 1 52.2 13.6
Tajikistan 4.5 1 9 3 7 1.5 3.7 1 5 0 7
Turkmenistan 7.6 0 0 62.6 30.9 42 8 16 4 14 8
Ukraine 17.9 9.6 25 4 18 3 91.3 5.2 3.4
Uzbekistan 3 9 0 0 50.4 14 3 .53 4 0 0 17 9
Source: Kyrgyz Public Expenditure Review
Education
47. Azerbaijan has been endowed with an impressive educational basis. However, this
has weakened over the past decade. Real expenditures in the sector have declined and the
physical infrastructure and necessary supplies of teaching materials have deteriorated.
Furthernore, it has become apparent over time that the system has evolved in a manner that
adversely affects the poorest. Internal operating deficiencies affect the quality of the education
provided and the efficiency of the public resources expended.
48. The essence of the reform agenda is contained in the Ministry of Education's (MOE) plan
approved by the President and Parliament in 1999. This plan needs to be more explicit in
defining appropriate management accountability within the system, particularly as it is planned
to increase decentralization and allow more autonomy to reallocate resources across budget
items. The policies and procedures of the MOE, the MOF, and the Cabinet of Ministers should
be reviewed to clarify authority of the MOE regarding educational policy.
49. Budget funds should be reallocated across expenditure lines to realize cost-savings:
(i) resources for non-wage allocations should be increased in general, with the focus on
providing basic education materials and supplies to primary school students in particular; (ii) the
quality of textbooks can be improved through demonopolization and the promotion of
competition in textbook development and publishing; (iii) there is a need to reduce excess staff
by gradually raising the student/teacher ratio and average class sizes, increasing the teaching
load, and introducing targeted reductions in school admissions; (iv) there is considerable scope
for rationalization of specialized and tertiary educational institutions as some of these are under-
utilised, as well as for consolidation in vocational and technical schools; and (v) budgetary funds
should be allocated on the basis of actual student numbers. On the other hand, proposals to
exempt educational institutions and their suppliers from tax and customs payments would be
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counterproductive, as they would create opportunities for tax evasion and would counter efforts
at simplifying and enforcing tax procedures throughout the economy.
50. Given the Rimited resources, higher and upper secondary education could rely Ress
om the state and instead initroduce elements of cost recovery via user charges, such as
student fees. Targeting of public assistance to the poor should be improved. It may be
considered to provide student loans to all qualified students. Furthermore, the Government would
promote private sector involvement in the education sector by removing the existing barriers to
entry, such as Article 28 of the 1992 Educational Law, which prohibits for-profit private schools.
Health
51. The HIealth sector requires immediate attention. Undoubtedly, there is a need to
progressively increase the budgetary proportions devoted to health care. But what is more critical
is a fundamental realignment of the approach toward the delivery of health services. More
emphasis is needed on primary health care-a basic health care package for all and
improvements in overall public health programs such as immunizations.
52. There is also a clear need to imenrease governmmental spemding on the health sector.
The collapse of public health spending during the last ten years has had a negative effect on
equity in access to services and has impacted health standards. Although the health sector
provides only a fraction of the inputs that affect health outcomes, public expenditure in health is
potentially an important source of equity-enhancing interventions. Without further Government
expenditure in the sector, health service utilization across income groups will become even more
skewed toward the better off.
53. A move toward an outpatient-oriented approach wfith emphasis on prrimary health
care would imprzove efficiency. For this purpose, a reallocation of staff within the sector is
needed, with a substantial retraining program and a reduction in the number of hospital
personnel. There is scope for reduction in the number of facilities and hospital beds, as well as
better integration of specialist and general hospitals. Based on demand analysis, clear targets for
the number of hospitals and hospital beds should be set, as well as targets for reductions in length
of stay. This would facilitate a move away from the current allocation of funds based on the
number of hospital beds toward output-based allocations according to actual services rendered.
54. The development of private sector partficpation in heaRth care should be encouraged
through the introduction of a carefully designed regulatory franmework. Current plans
propose privatizing only unprofitable institutions, but consideration could also be given to
privatizing other institutions in order to improve service delivery and to limit the size of informal
payments. Indeed, the Govermment may consider not building new hospitals and leaving
developments of specialized hospitals to the private sector. In many countries governments buy
services from such private institutions as needed, thereby avoiding the need to take on large
investment commitments.
55. lIt is essential to improve the access of the poor to pirimary heallth care services. One
way to accomplish this would be to provide a basic package of medical services free to all
citizens and to charge for other services. This program would need to be combined with a more
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systematic monitoring of user charges and wages in the public health care system. This would
involve: (i) a merit-based pay scheme for doctors; (ii) a review of the structure of formal fees to
ensure that they do not distort service supply; (iii) a review of the application of fees to ensure
that proper controls are in place to limit informal payments; and (iv) a review of the existing
regulations in order to reform those that encourage informal payments.
56. Accountability of health providers to the Azeri citizens and communities should be
strengthened. This could be advanced by: (i) enhancing the self-regulation of providers through
establishing professional associations and technical standards, rules of ethics, and systems of
accreditation and quality assurance; (ii) strengthening the involvement of clients in monitoring
performance through patients' associations, community-based services, and participatory
approaches; and (iii) providing collective action of monitoring through public expenditure
tracking surveys, and information and media campaigns. Unless such steps are taken, the poor,
in particular, will continue to suffer from the lack of essential services of an acceptable standard.
Social Safety Net
57. The current social safety net system is in need of a serious overhaul. At present, the
multitude of programs are not well targeted, with the result that benefit levels are very low and
those most in need are not being adequately cared for. No real account is taken of family needs.
Furthermore, there is a co-mingling of social insurance and social assistance, again with little
regard to real need. Reformns should focus on the rationalization of the many programs, perhaps
into a single-family benefit system, with explicit targeting to the poorest. It may also be
beneficial to eliminate one-time benefit payments, which are regressive insofar as no allowance
is taken of income levels in determining eligibility for these benefits.
58. The present social insurance system faces some serious sustainability problems,
given the collapse of the contribution base. Labor pensions have become relatively flat and
de-linked from wages. The Government recognizes the need to distinguish between labor and
social pensions. A new pension law is being drafted, and the guiding principle is to remove
existing inequities in the system (e.g., early retirement provisions) and ensure financial
sustainability on the basis of actuarial assessments.
59. The basic principle guiding social assistance reform should be that eligibility is
based on poverty criteria. The social safety net could become better targeted assistance by:
(i) replacing the income-tested child allowance, the nonworking pensioner allowance, and the
allowance for the single elderly by a unified cash benefit for families with children and
pensioners; (ii) replacing social pensions by budget-financed social assistance and reviewing the
minimum pension; and (iii) restructuring the sick leave to include an increase in the cost sharing
of employees and employers.
60. In January 2002, Azerbaijan abolished many non-targeted social privileges,
including on housing and public transport, and replaced these with targeted compensation.
Using the experience of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and in the FSU,'3
'3 "Maintaining Utility Servicesfor the Poor. Policies and Practices in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union, " World Bank, 2000.
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Azerbaijan may introduce one of several mitigating mechanAsms to compensate for the
elimination of utility subsidies. Life-Rine tariffs can be one of the policy options for utility
services with metered or easily estimated consumption (i.e., for electricity, gas, district heat, and
water supply especially as metering becomes more widespread). This would restrict the price
subsidy to the initial block of consumption, i.e., the basic need level. Covering that part of the
utility binl that exceeds a given share of income through earmarked cash transfers is another
form of utility subsidy mechanism that provides selected households with cash earmarked to pay
part of their utility bills. A number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the FSU have
introduced general cash benefits targetinmg poor households. These non-earmarked cash
transfer mechanisms give complete freedom to households in deciding how to use the money
received to compensate for utility tariff increases. It is important to make a strategic decision on
which mechanism would be appropriate for Azerbaijan and develop the detailed design
accordingly.
61. The cost effectiveness of active labolr marrket programs (ALMPs) needs to be re-
assessed, and funds redirected from costly job creation programs to other programs. In areas with
frictional unemployment, counseling and job search assistance are more promising options.
Workers often lack information and confidence about how to look for a job. Also counseling can
be crucial in helping individual job seekers obtain information about education, training, and
alternative job opportunities, in making other employment services more demand-oriented, and
in better targeting expenditures for other employment services. In areas with structural
unemployment, displaced workers need to be re-skilled to compete and re-enter the labor market.
Different types of retraining, including on-the-job training and/or institutional training is needed
in these circumstances. In areas of high unemployment and in mono-enterprise communities
where many workers are laid off, different small business assistance services, as well as public
works programs can assist the workers and their families. However, based on an international
experience, there is a general consensus is that even under best scenarios, payoffs to ALMPs are
modest. It is difficult to address problems of large scale unemployment through these programs.
A better approach is to focus on labor market policies that eliminate obstacles to private job
creation.
Agriculture
62. The agriculture sector in Azerbaijan has experienced signmificant deterioration over
the past decade and a large proportion of the countnry's popuration has become moire
vulnerable to econonic hardship. In the context of the MTEF, the PIP, and the PRS, future
public expenditures should give proper attention to rural environments. The country's irrigation
systems are in urgent need of rehabilitation and repair. That will require both investment and a
system for financing ongoing maintenance. The Government has stated its intent to do this, but
complementary reforms are needed to ensure that over time the ownership and management
structures for these systems provide for better cost recovery and meet maintenance requirements.
The development of rural finance cooperatives should be encouraged, as should the
Government's programs to develop alternative models of agricultural extension services that are
more relevant and financially sustainable.
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F. CONCLUSIONS
63. Three overarching issues need to be carefully addressed in order to determine a future
sustainable stance of public expenditures in Azerbaijan: (i) aggregate fiscal discipline;
(ii) allocative efficiency; and (iii) operational efficiency. In common sense terms the main
messages of the PER analysis are:
Aggregate fiscal discipline
> Manage the public expectations of the so-called "wall of money" very carefully. For
the foreseeable future most of the oil revenues will leave the country in the form of
profit and capital repatriation or, under the current rules, be accumulated in the Oil
Fund. The increase in private consumption per capita is projected to be rather modest
for the rest of the decade.
> Calibrate the fiscal stance of public expenditures towards sustainable development of
the non-oil sector, realizing that the potential long-run growth rate for the sector may
be in the order of 5 percent or less. Total GDP including the oil sector is less useful as
a policy indicator.
> Base the public expenditure envelope on the PRS, MTEF, and PIP and de-link the
annual budget cycle from short-term fluctuations in oil and gas related revenues.
Think medium to long-term instead ofjust one year ahead.
> Monitor carefully: (i) that the macro-policy stance does not lead to a nominal
exchange rate appreciation-stability is feasible as most resources are placed outside
the country through the Oil Fund; (ii) that the fiscal stance does not lead to upward
pressure on the real exchange rate-this is crucially dependent on continuing
implementation of structural reforms at the current pace; and (iii) that the
accommodating monetary stance does not lead to inflation, but slowly brings velocity
down to a, from a cross-country perspective, more reasonable level.
Allocative efficiency
> Bring the house in order in the utility sectors, eliminating quasi-fiscal subsidies, as
detailed in the SAC-II program. Making utility services reliable will alleviate major
constraints to private non-oil sector growth and improve public health. Select the
social safety net mechanism to mitigate the impact on the poorest of the population.
> Prioritize fiscal expenditures in a non-distortionary way in the social sectors and
infrastructure according to the PRS, and make the PIP and MTEF consistent with the
PRS-more analysis needs to be done in this area in terms of costing and prioritization
of the various programs, and the capacity strengthened in order to appraise
prospective public investment projects.
> Be careful with increases in sectoral allocation until institutional and operational
efficiency is strengthened. Allocate resources for this institutional agenda, including
the whole issue of fiscal decentralization and the new role of municipalities, as well
as for civil service reform.
xxiv
> Ensure better financial discipline through the strengthening of public audit and
procurement functions.
(Operational effciency
> While public expenditure allocation should be prioritizing education, health, the
social safety net, and rural infrastructure, rationalization and performance
improvements may have a bigger impact on poverty reduction in the first instance.
Move away from norms to activity based budgeting and performance
monitoring/auditing.
> Strengthen the MOE plan of 1999 for the education sector by explicitly defining
implementation and management accountabilities to allow more autonomy to
reallocate resources across budget items, establish clearer authority of the MOE
regarding educational policy, modernize the public school system, and allow more
private participation.
> Move away from centralized hospital care and toward an outpatient system for
primary health care, and establish a regulatory framework for private hospitals and
health care providers. Render a basic package of immunizations and medical services
free of charge, and strengthen measures to limit informal payments. Reinforce
accountability by enhancing self-regulation of providers through professional
associations, organized patient feedback, and public expenditure tracking surveys,
information and media campaigns.
> Consolidate the current multitude of social safety net programs into a single-family
benefit system based on well-targeted cash transfers with eligibility anchored in
poverty criteria, and allow for compensation to the poor for the elimination of utility
subsidies. Accelerate pension reform on the basis of the adopted concept paper and
draft law, and remove existing inequities. Redesign unemployment insurance and
formulate labor redeployment schemes.
> Rehabilitate rural infrastructure and irrigation system and establish local management
structures for sustainable maintenance and cost recovery. Encourage rural
cooperatives and financing, and strengthen training and extension services.
64. For these developments to succeed, they should be coupled with steadfast implementation
of the general structural reform program of the non-oil sector. That agenda depends on
macroeconomic stability and a sound overall fiscal stance, and is supported by a wide array of
activities of the IMF, the World Bank, other IFIs and donors, including the PRGF, SAC-Il,
institutional capacity building, private and financial sector technical assistance, development of
trade and trade facilitation, as well as sector projects.
I. THE MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE
A. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Few countries have experienced as volatile and precarious an economic
performance as that of Azerbaijan during the 1990s. In the first half of the decade the
country suffered the complex trauma and set of problems associated with the dissolution of the
former Soviet Union (FSU), which was further aggravated by an armed conflict with Armenia
and the associated influx of about one million Azeri refugees. The second half of the decade
witnessed a surge in foreign investor interest in the country's oil and gas sector, with large
increases in actual investment, in oil and gas prices, and in output. This, coupled with an array of
sound macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies from 1996, brought about a rapid
restoration in overall growth and monetary stabilization.
1.2 Following independence in 1991, Azerbaijan experienced massive terms of trade
shocks, a disintegration of marketing and trading systems, and an end of Soviet era fiscal
transfers and subsidies. The economy inherited by the Government of Azerbaijan
(Government) was riddled with distorted relative prices, multiple exchange rates, and patterns of
production that were soon revealed to be unsustainable in a more competitive world market.
Furthermore, the Government's institutional and administrative framework was either
nonexistent or was ill suited to the needs of both sound macroeconomic management and speedy
structural adjustment to a market economy. For example, at independence Azerbaijan
experienced severe repressed inflation as manifested in a large monetary overhang and
widespread supply shortages.' This monetary overhang created excess demand for goods and
foreign exchange which could not be satisfied, given the rigid exchange rate restrictions in place
to support or protect an overvalued currency.2
1.3 Output declines were massive and on average were greater than those experienced
by other transition economies over the same period (see Figure 1.1). Real gross domestic
product (GDP) cumulatively declined by over 60 percent during the period 1989-1995. This
decline in output, together with the collapse of other fiscal mechanisms, resulted in immediate
fiscal pressures, which were met by monetization. The fiscal deficits of the State Budget quickly
moved out of control, reaching a peak of about 12.1 percent of GDP in 1994.3 This excess money
creation coupled with extensive price liberalization during 1992 resulted in a rapid surge in
l For further information on the extent of repressed inflation in the former Soviet Union, see IMF World Economic
Outlook: Focus on Transition Economies, October 2000, Chapter 3. In this particular case, repressed inflation is
measured as the difference between the percentage change in the average real wage less the percentage change in
real GDP.
2 The parallel currency market in Azerbaijan in 1990 recorded a black market prernium over the official exchange
rate of 1,828 percent.
3 IMF Country Report No. 98/83, Table 23, p.7 5.
2prices reaching hyperinflation levels by 1994.4 Despite a rapid depreciation of the exchange rate
(about 1,471 percent in 1994) the balance of payments (BOP) was not stabilized and foreign
reserves had dwindled to almost nil by the end of 1994. Clearly, pervasive action was needed.
Fig. 1.1 Output Performance of Azerbaijan Relative to Average
Output Performance of CIS and CEEC
120 (Cumulative Index of Real GDP Growth, 1989 100)
100
80 -
q 60 __
40 - _
220
O8 0 - rn t m ', rl- 00 a., 0
00 0 ) O i O o0' 0 N ON 0, 0 0
0', 0' 0', 0, 0', 0, 0' 0, 0', Q' , 0 q 0 0
Azerbaijan - CIS, average - - - CEEC, average
CIS Conunonwealth of Independent States.
CEEC - Central and Eastern European Countries.
Sources EBRD Transition Report 2000, 2001, and authors' calculations
1.4 I[n 1995 the Government embarked on a comprehensive stabilization and structural
reform program supported by the Inatermational Mometary Fund (IMIF) and thne
International 1Development Association (flDlA). The key component of this stabilization effort
was a stringent fiscal control program, supported by restrictive monetary policies. These efforts
were complemented by a wide array of structural reforms designed to accelerate the progress
toward a market-driven economy, attractive to both foreign and domestic investment.
1.5 Just prior to the launching of this stabilization effort, the country's prospects for growth
improved significantly with the successful conclusion of a number of Production Sharing
Agreements (PSAs) with foreign oil companies involving investment to develop offshore oil and
gas deposits in the Caspian Sea. These PSAs have been complemented by further agreements for
the construction of new pipeline transportation facilities to Turkey.
1.6 These efforts have brought considerable success. Macroeconomic and financial
stability have been restored and maintained despite some external shocks, such as the Russian
financial crisis in 1998 and the large drops in oil prices in 1998 and 1999. Overall growth has
been restored, with the economy growing at an annual average of more than seven percent over
the period 1996-2001. Impressive success was also achieved through quickly addressing the
country's hyperinflation. As measured by the consumer price index (CPI), the average annual
4 Prices as measured by the consumer price mdex, mcreased by over 20,000 times between 1990 and 1995. The
worst year was 1994, where in December prices rose by nearly 1,800 percent compared to the same month in the
previous year.
3inflation rate was reduced from over 800 percent during 1991-1995 to only 2.9 percent per
annum during 1996-2001. This was achieved through stringent fiscal controls and a tight
domestic .monetary policy that saw the abolition of directed credit by the central bank to
commercial banks and state enterprises. The fiscal deficit was reduced from nearly 12.1 percent
of GDP in 1994 to an annual average of three percent of GDP during 1995-2000, reaching a level
of less than 1 percent in 2000.5
Table 1.1 Macroeconomic Trends, 1991-2001
(Growth rates in real terms)
1991-94 1995-2001 1999 2000 2001
GDP " -16.5 4.7 7.4 11.1 9.0
non-oil GDP 2/ N/A 6.13' 2.1 12.8 9.1
oil GDP 2/ N/A 14.13 30.6 2.3 8.5
Agriculture 4 1 -14.2 5 5.5 7.0 12.1 11.1
Manufacturing 6/ -22.6 -4.9 -9.1 15.0 2.8
Services 7' -16.3 1.7 8.0 8.4 --
Inflation (CPI), % change 8/ 1,2359/ 61.3 -8.5 1.8 1.5
Export FOB, mln USD 1@ 762.0 1,126.0 1,025.0 1,877.0 2,025.0
Oil Export, as % of total export FOB 1/ 30.4'2 73.1 78.1 85.1 90.1
Fiscal Deficit, as % of GDP '3/ -13.7'4/ -2.4 -4.7 -0.6 1.5
MI, % change 151 724.216/ 30.4 17.5 12.9 7.6
Real Exchange Rate (index, 85.8181 104.5'9' 109.0 97.6
1995=100)'/
"Sources: 1991-2000 State Statistical Committee, 2001 IMF Country Report No. 02/40.
2 Sources: 1995-1999. IMF Staff Calculations, 2000-2001: IMF Country Report No. 02/40.
3 Average for 1996-2001.
41 Sources: 1993-1996:IMF Country Report No. 00/121; 1997-2000: IMF Country Report No. 0240; 2001: State Statistical
Committee (SSC).
5/ Average for 1993-1994.
6' Sources: 1991-2000.Statistical Yearbook 2001, 2001: Statistical Bulletin (appendix) Q-IV '01.
7
'Calculated as a residual from GDP by sector numbers of the SSC
a' Sources: 1992-2001 IMF Country Reports Nos. 00/121 and 02/41.
91Average for 1992-1994.
lo/ Sources: 1991-1992: WB Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum,1993; 1993 EBRD Transition Report; 1994-1999.
IMF Country Report 00/121; 2000-2001: IMF Country Report No 02/40.
"' Sources: 1994-1999: IMF Country Report 00/121, 2000-2001: IMF Country Report No 02/40
i2/ For 1994 only.
t31 Consolidated deficit (including Oil Fund). Sources. 1993-1994 IMF Country Report No. 98/83; 1995-1996: IMF Country
Report No. 00/121; 1997-1999: IMF Country Report No. 02/41; 2000-2001: IMF Country Report No 02/40
14 Average for 1993-1994
15 Intemational Financial Statstics.
'
6 Average for 1993-1994.
17/ Source 1994-2000: IMF Staffcalculations.
181 For 1994 only.
19' Average for 1995-2000.
5 There are a number of measures of the State Budget deficit, all of which have their uses. For the purposes of this
PER, we have excluded the inflows from the oil sector into the Oil Fund as we regard this Fund (as do the
authorities) as a separate fundmg mechanism. However, the activities and public investments that are funded by the
Oil Fund will pass through the annual State Budget. This could inflate the deficit measure unless these funds are also
shown as budgetary revenue. This will be elaborated upon further in Chapter 4.
41.7 This fiscal adjustment required both inicreased revennue efiorts and expenditure
cuts. There was a change in the structure of taxation and its administration, which helped
improved state revenues (by about one percent of GDP over the period 1995-2000). However,
the main effort was concentrated on public expenditures, which showed a decline of more than
two percent of GDP from 1995 onward. Nevertheless, aided by the steep economic recovery, this
adjustment did not result in expenditure cuts in absolute terms. On the contrary, total expenditure
increased by 38 percent in dollar terms during 1997-2001. Another key element of this fiscal
stabilization was that the bulk of the deficit in the State Budget was funded from external
sources,6 thereby simplifying domestic monetary and credit policies and assisting in squeezing
inflationary pressures out of the domestic economy. For all this however the joint achievement of
stabilization and resumption of growth would have been much more difficult without the large
oil sector expansion during the last five years.
1.8 During 1995-2000, the oil sector was expanding rapidly as its vaRue added iencreased
from about 15 percent of GDP in 1995 to over 26 percent in 2000. There was also a massive
surge in oil-related investments in 1996-98, reaching about 19 percent of GDP, as the first stages
of the oil development programs were undertaken. As a result, exports of goods and services
grew rapidly with oil and petroleum exports increasing by almost 300 percent over the last five
years of the 1990s. The trade balance became positive in 2000, or, in national accounting terms,
the resource balance moved from a deficit of 20.9 percent of GDP in 1995 to a surplus of seven
percent of GDP in 2000.7 Furthermore, despite profit and capital repatriation, the current account
progressively improved and international reserves reached a much more comfortable 3.8 months'
equivalent of imports by the end of the decade. Throughout this recovery period the manat
money supply remained almost constant as a proportion of GDP with the sole increase in total
money supply originating from foreign assets, which were accumulated as foreign reserves in the
central bank.
1.9 To summarize, Azerbaijan has experienced robust economic growth for the last five
years, aided by its oil sector development. During this decade Azerbaijan is poised to become an
oil-rich economy, provided that its oil potential materializes. The main question, therefore, is
how to utilize this potential successfully, taking into account the three main challenges that the
economy is facing: (i) the macroeconomic management challenge; (ii) the poverty challenge; and
(iii) the balanced growth challenge. Hlilerein lies the crux of the main maciroeconomic
management chaRlenge over the coming decade: how to manage an increasing flow of
resources to the public sector, positive current accoumt baRances, and continued overalH
growth fincreases to maintain the hard-won fimancial and macroeconomic stability; annd
how to avoid the direaded "Dutch disease" and/or the misuse and waste of public resouirces
that many countries with a resource-based windfall have experienced.
6 Using external sources for deficit financing did not result in fast external debt accumulation, as oil bonuses were
the predominant source of deficit financing.
7 From: State Statistical Conmmittee, "National Accounts of Azerbaijan 2001."
5B. THE MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE
1.10 It must be remembered that Azerbaijan faces the dual challenge of the continued
transition toward a market economy (which is still incomplete) coupled with the structural
changes associated with a booming oil sector and the concomitant revenue windfalls. Both the
transition process and the booming oil sector may challenge the competitiveness of the economy,
as there may be strong pressures toward exchange rate appreciation. Thus structural and oil-
related pressures need to be managed appropriately, to allow for sustained productivity gains and
economic recovery. The economy is facing a dual macroeconomic challenge: to maintain
macroeconomic and monetary stability and avoid an excessive appreciation of the real
exchange rate above its long-run equilibrium level to the detriment of the non-oil sectors,
and to move aggressively forward with a continued structural adjustment which may see
some traditional activities disappear or stabilize at much lower levels of output and
employment.
1.11 As the countries in transition, including Azerbaijan, move toward a market system
with price and foreign exchange liberalization, theory suggests and empirical evidence
verifies a strong nominal depreciation of the domestic currency and, hence, the real
exchange rate. The demand for foreign assets exceeds the supply, and the overall
macroeconomic imbalances combine to create this effect. However, after the initial liberalization
and stabilization efforts, the tendencies start to move in the opposite direction with a progressive
appreciation of the real exchange rate toward a true equilibrium. This occurs for a number of
reasons. First, productivity in the traded sectors improves as capital accumulation proceeds.
Second, liberalization of administered prices for nontradables, such as utilities and transport,
increases their prices relative to tradable goods. Third, relatively high returns on capital
investment attract foreign capital inflows. Finally, constrained demand pressures accelerate the
growth of private consumption, which again tends to bid up the relative price of non-traded
goods and services.8
1.12 Maintaining macroeconomic stability may be difficult in the presence of large,
petroleum-related foreign exchange inflows. The main problems resulting from a large and
volatile oil windfall are typically manifested in excessive real appreciation, rising real wages,
and a structural shift toward non-tradable sectors.9 Box 1.1 summarizes the problems related to
the natural resource (oil) boom and provides lessons from the experiences of other countries.
There are two important channels through which these problems will occur: spending effect and
resource movement effect. The first channel operates through a rapid spending of the oil windfall,
which would increase the price of nontradables relative to non-oil tradables, therefore leading to
real exchange rate appreciation. The second channel would draw resources (capital and labor) to
8 For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Chnstoph B. Rosenberg and Tapio 0. Saavalainen, "How to Deal
With Azerbaijan's Oil Boom? Policy Strategies in a Resource-Rich Transition Economy," IMF Working Papers
(WP/9816), January 1998.
9 The classic references that analyze and discuss thus phenomenon are R. K. Eastwood and A.J. Venables, "The
Macroeconomic Implications of a Resource Discovery in an Open Economy," Economics Journal, vol. 92, 1982;
Max W. Corden, "Boorning Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation," Oxford Economic
Papers, November, 1984;, and Alan H. Gelb, et al. Windfall Gains:Blessing or Curse?, Oxford Umversity Press,
1988.
6non-tradable sector and away from the non-oil tradable sector, which may lead to higher
domestic inflation, and unemployment, underdevelopment of the non-oil tradable sectors, and
may undermine external sustainability.°0 Finally, rapid spending of the oil windfall may also lead
to a "waste" of petroleum wealth through unproductive public expenditure.
Box 1.1 Managing the Oil Windfall: Lessons from Other Countries' Experience
There are a number of problems facing macroeconomic management m the presence of sizable natural resource
(e.g., oil) windfalls:
> Fiscal management is complicated because revenue from natural resources is volatile and exhaustible.
> "Dutch disease" types of problems are manifested in excessive real appreciation of the exchange rate
and structural shufts toward non-tradable sectors. These problems originate from two important
channels: spending effect, which can result in overvalued currency, and resource movement effect,
which can lead to underdevelopment of other economic sectors.
B> An important additional by-product is political pressures to misspend revenues from natural resources
(ill-conceived domestic investments, subsidies, price controls). Therefore, poor governance and
corruption are also associated with the misuse of natural resource revenues.
Policy lessons regarding the use of natural resource rents are listed below:
> The use of oil rents to fund subsidies and price controls is harmful to efficiency and economic growth.
> Inadequate accounting for future risks gives rise to problems - the costs of overoptimistic projections
are greater than the costs of overly conservative projections.
> There is a constraint on the absorption capacity - thus a substantial increase in public mvestment is
likely to lower its efficiency.
> Permanent income out of the government's net wealth (including natural resource wealth) can be used
to derive the upper limit of the sustainable non-resource deficit of the government.
> This upper linut then can be corrected by a number of factors, such as population growth, uncertainty,
economic cycles, and financing constraints and their implications for domestic financial sectors, and
should be frequently revisited.
> Excessive investment in large complex macro projects in the natural resource sphere or in infrastructure
is nsky, as it could imply significant costs and time overruns and would not mitigate the nsk of falling
commodity prices.
> Public investment in human and social capital is a successful strategy for the utilization of oil rents as it
increases future labor productivity and will therefore have a positive impact on long-term economic
growth. The key again is to ensure that there is a positive relationship between higher allocations for
social expenditures and social outcomes.
Note: This box is based on a number of studies of other countries' experiences with managing natural resource
wmdfalls, such as Eastwood and Venables. (1982), Corden (1984), van Wijnbergen (1984), Gelb, et al. (1988),
and Ossowski, et al. (2001).
1.13 The empirical evidence for Azerbaijan over the past decade also conforms to the stylized
facts of transition economies. IFoRlowing amn inital decline in the real exchamge rate, there has
been an appreciation and theni a stabiRizatiom over the past thlree yeasrs. Any evidence for
real exchange appreciation is not necessarily bad, and cannot be directly attributed to Dutch
disease." Some appreciation was warranted and even further appreciation is to be expected,
10 It should be noted that this channel assumes that the economy is at its full employment level. However, if a
substantial degree of slack is present, this channel is not likely to be so important.
' At the time of the "price shock" or revenue windfall, most of the analyses of the effects on the rest of the
economy, and as a result of the appropriate macroeconomic policy response to mitigate this shock, assumes that the
7taking into account the stylized path of the exchange in transition economies (see para. 1.9).
Figure 1.2 compares the effective exchange rate for seven CIS countries. Real exchange rate
appreciation in Azerbaijan was much more modest than in other (including the resource-poor)
CIS countries.. There was even some real exchange depreciation during the last three years.
What is not clear, however, is whether this real exchange rate is due to equilibrium or whether it
is undervalued or overvalued.
Fig. 1.2 Real Effective Exchange Rates, year avg.
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1.14 It is also far from clear whether the appreciation that has occurred has undermined
competitiveness in the non-oil sectors. Although the average non-oil growth rate during the
period 1996-2002 was an impressive 6.5 percent, there is evidence that some sectors have not
performed well and have not yet shown any signs of recovery. When discussing their
performance, however, it is important to note that, besides the exchange rate, there are a number
of structural impediments that may have adversely the competitiveness of these sectors. Credit to
affected the domestic private sector has been stagnant with very high real interest rates, which in
part reflects the tight monetary policies that have been followed and the accompanying stringent
fiscal controls. However, the institutional structure of the financial markets in Azerbaijan is still
very weak (this generates a low degree of monetization, which makes monetary policies even
more complex). And, perhaps just as important, the other mechanisms and institutions that
support a market system are still weak. Legal systems, enforceable property legislation, and other
infrastructure constraints exist which inhibits both new investments in the non-oil sector as well
as the necessary restructuring of the traditional traded sectors. Finally, there is one additional
piece of evidence that is reassuring: domestic dollar wages in Azerbaijan are still relatively low,
real exchange rate is in equilibrium. However, this condition does not hold for transition economies given that
external and mternal equilibnum and a functionmng market system are not in place. Many prices are set
administratively, production patterns and systems are not necessarily deternmined by relative prices, and the
exchange rate was not a reflection of the relation between domestic pnces and world prices (m the case of the
transition economies, the nominal exchange rate was set at artificially high levels, resultmg in an overvalued real
exchange rate).
8about 60 percent of the average dollar wage of countries with similar productivity levels.' 2 This
is yet another evidence suggesting that exchange rate is not the major factor, threatening the
economy's competitiveness, especially taking into account the substantial degree of slack in the
economy.' 3
1.15 This macroeconomic challenge is compounded by one otRner major factor. The
existing PSAs focus on development of certain oil and gas fields where there are reasonably
accurate estimates of reserves and likely revenue flows. The output and revenue projections
flowing from this indicate that a clear peak is reached in 2011/12, with a relatively sharp decline
thereafter (a fuller discussion of this is set out in Chapter 4). This is a relatively short timeframe
for a "resource boom". In the absence of further discoveries or refinements to reserve estimates,
Azerbaijan could face a "reverse shock" of declining fiscal and balance of payments revenues.
Needless to say, the existing projections are subject to all the uncertainties associated with future
oil prices and the timing of construction of future pipelines.
1.16 eience, the macroeconomic manmagement task facing Azerbaifan over the coming
decade is highly complex and demainds a cautionary flscga appiroach. The medium-term
monetary policy must take into account a still fragile macroeconomic stabilization and the need
to maintain low inflation. The fiscal policy needs to support this non-inflationary monetary
policy and smooth the domestic absorption patterns over time, but at the same time it must meet
the real challenges of poverty alleviation and the aspirations of the country's citizens. What is
clear is that widespread poverty and alleviating its most perverse side effects is a crucial
challenge for the authorities.
C. THE POVERTY CHALLENGE
1.17 ]Despite favorable macroecoinomic inndicators over the past inve years Azerbainann
continues to have a low income per capita (US$650 in 20011) withD high levels of
unnemploymenat. The increases in real output in the last five years have been due in large part to
the direct and indirect effects of development in the oil sector. Some additional employment has
been generated in construction with the increased demand for services. However, employment
growth in all other sectors has been modest or has declined.' 4 The non-oil industrial sector has
fared particularly poorly. This sector shed over 7 percent of its workforce during 1995 to 2000,
and this followed a decline of about 28 percent in the preceding five years. The decline in non-
oil industrial output since 1990 has affected those jobs that previously had a relatively high value
added per worker. Official unemployment numbers are not accurate, especially when viewed
against the growth in the potential workforce and the large level of "underemployment" in many
sectors. Agricultural sector employment is now back to the 1990 levels. However, value added
12EBRD's 2001 Transition Report (p.62) presents an assessment of whether the exchange rates of transition
economies are threatening their competitiveness. Competitiveness is measured here on the basis of a comparison of
the actual dollar wages to the predicted dollar wages of countries with similar levels of productivity and workforce
skills, and comparable economic structures.
13 It should be noted that the oil and gas sector including all the related activities employs less than one percent of
the total labor force, which means that increased oil production is not hkely to put pressure on the overall wages in
the economy.
14 In 2000 the petroleum sector provided only 0.25 percent of total emnployment in the country.
9per worker in this sector is low which reinforces the need for economic diversification and for
the creation of employment opportunities in other areas if a meaningful reduction in poverty is to
be achieved in the medium term.
1.18 The results of household surveys suggest that little progress was made in reducing
poverty in the last five years of the 1990s. According to preliminary data for the HSB survey,
in 2001 almost 4 million people or 50 percent of the population lived in poverty, consuming less
than AZM 120,000 per capita per month. Among them, a group of 1.3 million persons or 17
percent of the total population lived in extreme poverty with monthly consumption below AZM
72,000 per capita per month. As elaborated further in Chapter 5 there is also considerable
evidence to suggest that both the economic and social infrastructure have deteriorated over the
past decade. This is particularly apparent in the urban areas and the smaller townships, where the
incidence of poverty is higher, as indicated in the preliminary results of the draft Poverty
Assessment Study.
1.19 The social safety net system in Azerbaijan is still fundamentally framed in the
context of the older Soviet systems. Social protection expenditure accounts for a considerable
share of national income (about 7.2 percent of GDP in 1999), the vast bulk of which constitutes
support for pensioners. However, there is a wide array of programs for specific groups and
categories that are predicated more on a particular category definition (pregnant women, for
example) than on measured or perceived need. In general, these benefits are low (in terms of a
proportion of the average wage) and are provided in the form of a specific allowance, which
again takes no cognizance of need.
1.20 Given the declines in real wages for most of the workforce, and the large numbers
working in sectors in which it is difficult to collect social contributions (the service sector, for
example), it should come as no surprise that the social insurance system is facing a financial
sustainability problem. Differences between pension insurance and the social assistance system
are not clear, and social pensioners have been receiving benefits similar to those of most labor
pensioners. This in turn undermines the credibility of the state pension system, as it weakens the
contribution incentives, thereby further aggravating the collection problems. In fact, replacement
rates for all social assistance programs are very low, with limited impact on beneficiaries, and in
many cases may not justify the administrative costs involved in running them.
1.21 Finally, there are large numbers of internally displaced populations (IDPs) and
refugees as a result of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. There are an estimated 784,000 of
these IDPs and refugees, most of whom have been living in rudimentary and temporary
circumstances without basic infrastructure services or access to basic public services.
Furthermore, they tend to be located in areas, with limited income generation or formal
employment opportunities.
1.22 The Government recognizes the need to set priorities to improve the living standards of
the most needy. In March 2001, the Government initiated, under Instruction No. 636 of the
President of the Azerbaijan Republic, the development of a comprehensive Poverty Reduction
Strategy (PRS) and established a special commission for this purpose. In June 2001, an Interim
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) was issued, which articulated the main principles of
this strategy. The more comprehensive PRS is under way and will constitute a specific plan of
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action aimed at the practical implementation of policy and economic measures for poverty
reduction. Within this strategy, priorities for public expenditure will be set, together with the
necessary linkages between specific targeted outcomes and the public expenditure initiatives.
D. THE BALANCED GROWTH CHALLENGE
1.23 Azerbaijan is at a critical juncture in its economic and social development. There is no
doubt that many of the requisite ingredients necessary to propel the country on a self-sustaining
growth path are in place, and considerable successes have already been achieved. However, the
economic management and policy decisions made over the next five years will be critical if this
success is to be augmented. There is now a strong imperative to address an economic, social, and
public expenditure agenda that seeks a more rapid reduction in poverty, which in turn will
require economic diversification and a revitalization of non-oil sector activities. From a fiscal
and public expenditure perspective, this must be accomplished in a manner that will maintain the
monetary stability already achieved. An overly aggressive public expenditure program may not
necessarily stimulate sustainable jobs nor improve the quality of public services. The economy
is therefore facing a balameed growth challenge: ultimately, there must be a balanace
between the needs of a wider ion-oil part of the economy, which require careful
monitoring of appreciation in the real exchange rate, with the need to address poverty
more effectively.
1.24 As the experience of other countries has shown, the ability of the implementation
capacity to spend the additonal fiscall revennues wisely is the key factor. There is always the
risk that domestic absorption through public spending designed to spur growth or modernization
will involve very low rates of return or will require continued subsidization in the future. The
speed with which public revenues increase as a result of a resource boom can lead rent-seeking
behavior to gamer the windfall, and this may occur in an environment that is weak institutionally
and is thus less able to filter out all of the requests.15 All of these issues are relevant for
Azerbaijan. It should also be borne in mind that, given the nature of the PSAs and the volatility
of oil prices, revenue flows from the oil windfall might not be smoothly continuous. If sudden
inflows are treated as if they are permanent, then expenditure commitments can be created or
public expenditure in investment activities started that cannot always be fulfilled smoothly
1.25 Ultimately, there has to be a balance between the needs of a wider non-oil part of the
economy, which require careful monitoring of appreciation in the real exchange rate, with the
need to address poverty more effectively. In the longer term, budgetary surpluses will be
necessary as will measures to stimulate domestic savings, thereby reducing the demand for
foreign capital to fund investment. Finally, continued emphasis needs to be given to improving
the market environment for non-o*il investment and production. This PER focuses on the puble
expenditure part of this overall poRicy agenda, providing a framework for both a more
effeeive attack on poverty and a moire effiecent use of pubRic resources. This framework
will be consistent with the maintenance of overalll ma¢croecononmc stabiflty and the
generation of sustainable growth Bin the non-oil parts of the econiomy.
" See Phillip R. Lane and Aaron Tomell, "Power, Growth, and the Volacity Effect," Journal of Economic Growth,
Vol. 1(2), 1995, for further discussion of some of these issues.
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II. THE EXISTING FISCAL FRAMEWORK
A. OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC FINANCES
2.1 The structure and composition of public finances have undergone a radical change
over the past decade. On the revenue side, tax efficiency declined dramatically in the early
1990s, in part reflecting the massive declines in output, but, more important, reflecting the
collapse of the existing tax regime inherited from the FSU. Total revenues as a proportion of
GDP declined by more than one-half in two years (1993-95) during the time the country was
experiencing hyperinflation (see Table 2.1). During the last seven years there has been a steady
improvement in revenue mobilization; however, this improvement has not been spectacular. For
example, tax revenues rose from 10.3 percent of GDP in 1995 to 14.7 percent in 2001, but the
potential improvement given the large tax arrears associated with the energy and utility sectors is
much larger (see the section on the quasi-fiscal deficit, below).
Table 2.1 Consolidated Government Budget, 1993-2000
As share of GDP (in percent) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total Revenues (incl. grants) 40.6 33.8 17.6 17.6 19.1 19.6 18.5 . 21.2
Total Expenditures 55.8 45.9 22.5 20.4 20.8 23.7 23.6 20.8
Balance (incl. grants) -15.3 -12.1 4.9 -2.8 -1.6 -3.9 4.7 -0.6
Source 1993-1994: IMF Country Report No. 98/83; 1995-1996: IMF CountryReport No. 00/121; 1997-1999: IMF Country
Report No. 02/41; 2000-2001: IMF Country Report No. 02/40.
2.2 There has been a considerable change in the structure of the tax system, with a
strong movement toward indirect taxes, which reflects the introduction of a value added
tax (VAT) and improvements in the trade tax regime (see Table 2.2 and Table 2.3). The
proportion of tax revenues accounted for by profit taxes has fallen by half, reflecting the poor
performance of the traditional non-oil sectors of the economy, and of course the tax arrears from
the utility sectors. The VAT is now the main source of tax revenue for the State Budget.
2.3 In the initial period following independence, the pace of tax reform was gradual;
however, a comprehensive Tax Code was adopted and became effective in January 2001.
This Tax Code represented a major step forward by bringing all tax provisions into an integrated
code.'6 This reform has been accompanied by progressive improvements in tax administration
and a further amendment to the Tax Code that has simplified further tax regulations and
expanded the tax base.' 7 As a result of these developments, tax revenues have been relatively
stable with some strong gains in certain taxes (VAT) in the last year. Problems and anomalies
16 This does not include customs administration, which is common throughout the transition economies of the CIS.
17 Income tax exemptions were reduced and further simplification of the small business tax system and expansion of VAT
liability were the key elements of this fine-tuning.
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remain, however. The prime area for change relates to the energy and utility sectors. Potential tax
collections and tax arrears are high and there is little transparency in these sectors with regard to
their obligations to the State Budget.'8 Finally, attention needs to be given to the issue of wage
taxes, which are high and which discourage employment (at least in the formal sectors) in the
non-oil sectors of the economy.
Table 2.2 Share of Direct and Indirect Taxes, 1994-2001
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Share of GDP (in percent)
Direct Taxes 10.9 7.2 8.2 7.5 6.9 6.7 7.1 6.2
Indirect Taxes 6 3.1 6 8.1 7.0 7.5 7.4 8.5
Share of Total Tax Revenues (in percent)
Direct Taxes 64.5 69.7 57.1 48.2 49.5 47.4 48.9 42.0
Indirect Taxes 35.5 30.3 42.9 51.8 50.5 52.6 51.2 58.0
Note: Direct taxes comprise enterpnse profit tax, individual income tax, and social secunty contnbutions; indirect taxes compnse
sales and property taxes.
Source. 1994: IMF Country Report No.98/83; 1995-1996: IMF Country Report No. 00/121; 1997-2000: IMF Country Report No.
02/41; 2001 (projection): IMF Country Report 02/40.
Table 2.3 Main Tax Revenues as a Share of Total Tax Revenues, 1994-2001
In percent 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Profit tax 30.7 36.7 30.1 18.4 14.2 13.7 18.4 15.8
Income tax 8.8 10.5 10.9 13.5 17.0 16.7 13.9 12.2
VAT 19.6 15.8 24.0 26.6 30.0 29.4 28.0 32.5
Taxes on International Trade 4.0 6.2 10.1 12.3 12.2 11.8 14.5 7.7
Source: 1994: IMF Country Report No.98/83, 1995-1996: IMF Country Report No. 00/121; 1997-2000: IMF Country Report No.
02/4 1; 2001 (projection): IMF Country Report 02/40.
2.4 The main emphDasis of the nmecessary flscal adjustmnent has beenn on public
expenidituires. Total expenditures have more than halved in terms of GDP, from 55.8 percent in
1993 to 22.5 percent in 1995, and were sustained at a level of about 22 percent throughout the
second half of the 90s (see Table 2. 1). A shortfall in financing items (particularly, a delay in the
World Bank SAC-LI and lower than expected privatization revenues) necessitated expenditure
adjustments in 2001, which caused expenditures to drop to about 20 percent of GDP in that
year.'9 Table 2.4 presents trends in total public expenditure in per capita U.S. dollars in
Azerbaijan, compared with other countries in the region. One conclusion that emerges from these
comparisons is that whereas public expenditure cuts during the first half of the 1990s were
dramatic in all the CIS countries, expenditure cuts in Azerbaijan were much more drastic as
compared to the average for these countries. In fact, public expenditure in U.S. dollars per capita
Is SOCAR still pays according to a negotiated tax target that takes into account the substantial quasi-fiscal activities that this firm
undertakes. Negotiated tax targets for other state-owned enterprises were eliminated in 2001. The magnitude of tax arrears is
massive. By January 2001, accumulated arrears were estimated to be AZM 6,932 billion, or about 203 percent of annual tax
revenues and about 29 percent of GDP. The main defaulter was SOCAR with about 60 percent of total arrears; others were
Azerenergy (2.1 percent), Azerigaz (1.8 percent), and the Railways (1.8 percent). While it is unclear how much of the
accumulated arrears could be recovered, and from whom, what is abundantly clear is that the potential to improve overall public
resource mobilization through change in the energy and utility sectors is very significant indeed
19 This share is below that commonly found in low-income countres (about 26 percent of GDP).
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in Azerbaijan dropped tenfold, compared with their pre-transition levels. These drastic
expenditure cuts were necessary to avoid the negative consequence of the collapse of fiscal
revenues: total fiscal revenues dropped from 40 percent of GDP to about 18 percent of GDP
during 1993-95, mostly because of the lost fiscal transfers from the Soviet Union and the output
collapse that accompanied the transition to a market economy.20
2.5 During the second half of the 1990s fiscal adjustment was eased by the steep economic
recovery, which allowed for some increase in public expenditure in per capita U.S. dollar
terms.21 Although public expenditure was roughly constant as a share of GDP, there was some
increase in U.S.dollar per capita terms (from US$99 per capita to US$146, on average, for 1998-
2000). This was a positive development, as the level of expenditure was too low to be sustained.
As Table 2.4 shows, in 1995 there were only two countries that had a more compressed level of
public expenditure-Georgia and Tajikistan-whereas in 2000 there were at least five countries
with a more compressed level of public expenditure than Azerbaijan.
Table 2.4 ECA Countries: International Comparisons of Public Spending in Per Capita US$, 1990-2000
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Armenia 1,000 264 123 127 148 160 151
Azerbaijan 1,000 99 84 118 152 148 137
Belarus 1,541 834 853 1,072 1,148 1,252 1,315
Estonia 2,055 1,353 1,217 1,222 1,432 1,539 1,381
Georgia 1,010 90 118 137 129 106 119
Kazakhstan 1,149 328 351 386 366 250 251
KyrgyzRepublic 1,000 256 247 110 111 81 75
Latvia 2,239 767 837 885 1,068 1,197 1,115
Lithuania 1,608 567 677 841 1,063 1,125 1,042
Moldova 1,296 335 179 227 180 106 107
Russia 1,759 882 1,071 1,291 757 450 626
Tajikistan 1,000 65 28 25 35 28 24
Turkmenistan 1,000 181 75 130 143 123 226
Ukraine 1,000 421 349 439 322 240 225
Uzbekistan 1,000 197 265 177 180 136 112
Source: World Bank, "Kyrgyz Public Expenditure Review," 2002 (mimeo).
2.6 Nevertheless, even the 2000 level of public expenditure in Azerbaijan is still too low
compared with its average for other FSU and CIS countries (see Table 2.5). In terms of share
of GDP, total public expenditure in Azerbaijan is well below the average for 2000-30 percent
of GDP for the CIS countries. These comparisons, however, are not representative, as transition
countries typically opted for the so-called "welfare" state, with sizable commitments of the state
to provide universal education, health care, and social protection. There are other examples
where the state is committed to provide only a low level of public services (e.g., the East Asia
region), where public spending is typically much lower as a percent of GDP (15 percent of GDP
20 See Chapter I for the magnitude of this output collapse.
21 It should be noted that as GDP grew considerably over the penod 1995 to 2001, the actual nominal and real amount of
Government expenditures increased substantially over this penod
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in 199922). However, with the coming oil windfall the society can choose whether to opt for a
welfare state or for a state that provides a relatively lower level of public services. What is clear
is that it is not feasible and not advisable to aim for the pre-transition level of public expenditure.
Table 2.5 Selected ECA Countries: Consolidated General Government Spending
by Functional Classification, 2000
Percent of Other
GDP Total GPS Defense PO Education Health SS& WHousingRecreation Fuel Agro Mining Transport Econ Interest Other
Armenia 23.6 2.3 3.6 1.5 3.0 0.9 5.2 1.5 0.5 0.3 1.6 0.0 0 6 0.0 1.3 1.2
Azerbaijan 20.8 1.1 2 1 1 6 3.8 0 9 5.3 0.4 0.4 0.0. 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.6 2.7
Belarus 45.3 1.9 1.3 1.4 6 2 4.6 11.4 2.7 1.0 0.3 4.4 0.1 3.0 0.9 0 8 5 4
Estonia 38.6 3.3 1.6 2.3 6.5 5.5 11.1 1.3 2.3 0.1 0.9 0.0 2 5 0.5 0 4 0 4
Georgia 17.2 1.4 0.5 1.3 2.2 0.6 4.3 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.8 2.8 0 3
Kazakhstan 22.3 1.4 0.8 1.8 3 3 2.1 6 6 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.4 0.3 1.5 1.2 1.4 0 1
Kyrgyz
Republic 27.7 2.8 1.7 1 1 3.3 2.0 6.1 1.1 0.5 1.2 1.7 03 45 0.2 1.4 (0.3)
Latvia 36.5 2 8 0.8 2.3 6.5 3.5 14.1 2 1 1.3 0.0 1.5 0.0 2 4 0.8 1.1 (2.8)
Lithuania 34.0 1.5 1.3 1.9 5.8 4.4 11.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 1.6 0.1 1.8 0 1 1.8 1.0
Moldova 31.7 1.7 0.4 1.4 4.0 2.6 11.0 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.6 0.2 5.8 2.2
Russian
Federation 35.1 2.4 2.9 1.6 2.9 2.0 8.1 2.9 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.3 2.4 0.2 3.8 2.7
Tajikistan 14.9 2.8 1.2 1.2 2 3 0.9 2.3 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.2
Turkmenistan 28.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 7 4 3.6 5.1 1.9 0.7 0.0 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7
Ukraine 35.7 2.8 1 5 1.6 4.0 2.9 14.5 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.3 2.5 0.5
Uzbekistan 36.1 0.7 0 0 0.0 9.3 2.6 9.8 0.0 0.7 0.0 3.3 3 3 0.0 0.0 0.7 5 8
Average FSU 30.5 2.1 1.5 1.6 4.8 2 7 8.6 1.4 0.8 0.4 1 4 0.5 1.8 0.4 1.7 1.7
Average CIS 28.9 1.9 1.5 1.4 4.3 2.3 7.7 1.4 0.6 0.5 1.5 0 6 1.7 0.4 1.9 2.3
Source: World Bank, "Kyrgyz Public Expenditure Review," 2002 (mimeo).
2.7 This fiscal comprression has not been uniforrm aeross all parts of public servie
delivery or all categories of public expeniditulre. As shown in Table 2.6, expenditures in health
and education have declined relative to other categories, and in the case of health precipitously
so. Expenditures in this sector declined in relative terms to about 0.9 percent of GDP in 2000,
which means they almost halved since the first part of thel990s. Education has also witnessed a
decline of about one percent of GDP over the last five years.
22 World Development Indicators
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Table 2.6 Consolidated Government Expenditures in Per Capita Terms, 1995-2000
US$ per capita 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Education 11.1 20.6 18.1 19.0 24.2 25.2
Health 4.4 8.2 6.2 5.1 5.7 5.7
Social protection and social provision 13.8 21.0 29.4 34.3 31.8 34.3
Housing and communal services 0.1 0.3 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.6
Memorandum Items
Population, mln " 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.0
Nominal Exchange Rate AZM/US$ 2/ 4,414 4,301 3,985 3,869 4,120 4,472
World Bank Development Economics Data Group (DECDG).
2/ IMF International Finance Statistics.
Source Macro-Policy Group.
2.8 Public expenditures are also low in U.S. dollar per capita terms compared with
average spending in the FSU countries (see Table 2.7). Only the four poorest countries of the
CIS (Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic) have lower per capita public
expenditures than Azerbaijan in the above-mentioned categories of functional classification.
Average per capita spending numbers are higher for the CIS than are the Azerbaijan indicators
(1.3 times for education, three times for health and almost twice for total public expenditures).
When compared with the Baltic States, public per capita expenditures in Azerbaijan are about
nine times lower.
Table 2.7 Selected ECA Countries: Consolidated General Government Spending
by Functional Classification, 2000
Per Capita USS GPS Defense Education Health SS& W Housing Agro
Armenia 14.81 22.73 19 17 5.98 33.28 9.60 10.39
Azerbaijan 7 3 13.5 25.1 5.7 34.3 2.6 4.7
Belarus 18.98 12.90 62.92 47.30 116.25 27.83 44.83
Estonia 116 63 58 93 233.28 195.29 395.78 47.66 30.81
Georgia 9 93 3.42 14.96 4 38 29.80 5.69 1.56
Kazakhstan 15.28 8.87 36.84 23.64 74 43 9.62 4 98
KyrgyzRepublic 7.91 4.80 909 5.58 17.15 3.14 4.77
Latvia 84.15 25.88 197.33 107.76 431.30 65 29 44.86
Lithuania 45.69 39.93 179.17 133 46 342.34 15.72 49 57
Moldova 6.78 1.41 15.88 1043 43 25 1.06 3.67
Russian Federation 43.30 51.12 52 39 35.54 144.05 52.15 13 63
Tajikistan 4.46 1 92 3 65 1 48 3.68 1.47 0.74
Turkmenistan 7 56 0.00 62 57 30.85 42.80 16.41 14 84
Ukraine 17.93 9.62 25 42 1826 9133 5 15 3.41
Uzbekistan 3 92 0 00 50.36 14.28 53.43 0.00 17 89
Source World Bank, "Kyrgyz Public Expenditure Review," 2002 (mimeo).
2.9 Not only has the sectoral spending proportion changed; the functional use of public
resources has changed as well. Public investment spending has declined, with the limited
amount actually undertaken (an annual average of about two to three percent of GDP over the
five years up to 2000) related to foreign financed project spending. Public expenditures on goods
16
and services have fallen from about 12.7 percent of GDP in 1997 to 10.7 percent in 2000.23
Transfers to households have remained relatively constant, but subsidies have fallen sharply with
the elimination of the explicit communal services subsidies.
2.10 The implications of the past trends in pubeli expenditure are significant, as
deficiencies Ain key elements of the country's infrastructure have become moire proDnounced.
It is not yet known if this situation is more acute in urban or in rural areas. Furthermore, parts of
the existing capital stock have deteriorated significantly as the amount dedicated to repairs and
maintenance has become negligible. For example, in education in 1999 only 0.9 percent of
education spending was on capital expenditures and only 16.2 percent on goods and services.
Wages accounted for 84 percent of public expenditure in education in 2000 (increasing from
55.0 percent in 1997). This increasing share of wages in education budgetary expenditures in part
reflects salary increases. However, there has been an increase in the number of positions in the
sector, which now accounts for about 24.8 percent24 of all general government employment in
2000.25 According to the education law of 1992, a full-time job of a teacher amounts to 12 hours
a week, or between 450-500 hours annually. This is probably the lowest standard workload for
teachers in the region. A teacher is allowed to work another six hours per week in the same
school. This explains why so many teachers are employed, which has resulted in a highly
compressed salary scale.
2.11 The health sector is the second largest empDoyer in the budget sector, accounmtimg for
about 13 peercent of the gemeral gove¢rnmemt workforce in 2000. Here, too, the composition
of public spending seems inappropriate. Over 53 percent of health spending is dedicated to
wages and salaries, 10.6 percent is dedicated to public utilities and only about 11.8 is percent for
medicines and medical supplies. An extremely low 3.1 percent is devoted to "capital repair and
maintenance" (1999).26 A more complete description of the education and health sectors and the
operational deficiencies therein is contained in Chapter 5. Suffice it to note that in two key areas
of the Government's poverty alleviation agenda (as outlined in its Medium-Term Public
Expenditure Strategy), the past performance of public spending in health and education suggests
that the quality, coverage, and efficiency fall far short of the needs.
2.12 There is considerable scope for some degree of rationalization of pubeic sector
employment. Overall, there were about 1.3 million employees in the general government sector
in Azerbaijan in 2000.27 The 158 employees per 1,000 population is comparable with other CIS
countries but is considerably higher than most other countries regardless of their stage in
28
economic development. There have been ad hoc and sector specific wage adjustments over the
past five years. Overall, however, for the bulk of the general government workforce wages are
23 Macro Policy Group of the Mmustry of Finance of Azerbaijan.
24 State Statistical Committee, "Azerbaijan m Figures 2002," pp.8 2 and 83.
25 This proportion is high when compared with other CIS countries, OECD countries, and developing countries (a
ratio of 39 positions per 1,000 inhabitants in Azerbaijan, about 22 in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, 20 in
OECD countries, and nine in developing countries). Data are drawn from "Government Employment and Pay:
Some International Comparisons," Peter Heller and Alan Tait, IMF Occasional Paper 24, IMF, March 1984. Overall
employment in the budget sector increased by 7.5 percent between 1995 and 1999. See IMF Country report No.
00/121, September 2000.
26 IMF Country Report, No. 00/121.
27 State Statistical Committee "Azerbaijan in Figures 2002," p. 83.
28 The comparable ratios are 58 for OECD countries and 36 for developing countnes.
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low, resulting in a variety of negative repercussions. Many workers in government service hold
multiple positions (particularly in- the education and health sectors) which results in degradation
in operational accountability and efficiency. This has also spawned an increase in the use of
informal user charges for the public to gain access to services, which has a more perverse impact
on poorer households. Finally, the low wages undermine internal personnel structures.
Promotions are often awarded to move personnel to higher salary scales rather than as a true
reflection of experience and competence.
2.13 Past pay adjustments (with a few exceptions) have been across-the-board, and thus
have not altered the compression ratios. The compression ratio (defined as the ratio of the
highest to the lowest salary scale) for teachers and health care workers, for example, is at about
7.4, which is too low compared with the same ratio for civil servants and top officials. The
authorities recognize this and also recognize the need to retain high quality staff and to provide
appropriate incentives for good performance. Therefore, the intent to review the structure of the
civil service and its underlying pay policies exists, but a comprehensive program to achieve this
has yet to be formulated.
2.14 As the following chapter will show, there is a need to streamline and reform the
institutional and administrative structure of general government in Azerbaijan. This reform
should encompass the organizational form, with a staffing and functional framework appropriate
to a market economy. In the interim, however, certain immediate steps can and should be taken.
First, the process of fragmenting the system of government pay scales should be reversed and the
existing different pay scales should be consolidated into a unified pay scale. Second, some
stronger efforts to decompress the pay scale should be made with an avoidance of continued
across-the-board adjustments. Finally, the system of cash and kind pay supplements should be
rationalized through a more transparent integration into the overall pay scale structure, with a
monetization of in-kind supplements.
B. OFF-BUDGET ACCOUNTS
2.15 Until recently, budget system management was highly dispersed among a number of
special funds. And many budgetary organizations maintain their own accounts (often more than
one) outside of the state budget. To allow for better accountability and tracking of budget
expenditures and revenues, certain steps were taken toward greater consolidation of the
budget. First, the Treasury System was created in 1995, followed by the establishment of the
Treasury Department in the Ministry of Finance. The bank accounts of all of the budget
institutions were closed and the Treasury Single Account and the regional Treasury Transit
Accounts were established. The Treasury Transit Accounts cover all receipts and payments of
the local government in each region. The Single Treasury Account has been operational since
1997, when control over liabilities was established and financial planning was introduced.
Quarterly limits on the expenditures and commitments of the budgetary institutions have been
put in place.
2.16 There were four special funds, whose revenues were included in the General Budget but
were earmarked for special purposes: (i) the Road Fund; (ii) the State Fund for Protection of
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Forests and Reforestation; (iii) the State Fund for the Protection of Nature; and (iv) the State
Support Fund for Entrepreneurs. The Road Fund was abolished by 2001.
2.17 Three large extrabudgetary funds, namely the Social Protection Fund, the Disability
Fund, and the Employment Fund were merged into the Social Protection Fund as per the "Law
on the Social Protection Fund" adopted by the Parliament in November 2001. From 2002
onward, all transactions of the Social Protection Fund are to be executed through the Treasury.
2.18 A Presidential Decree of December 29, 1999, set up the fourth extrabudgetary fund - the
State Oil Fund. The preparation of the Oil Fund's budget is now carried out in consultation with
the Ministry of Finance and endorsed by the Supervisory Board of the Fund, prior to approval by
the President. Project-related expenditures of the Oil Fund are now treated as a part of a
consolidated budget approved by the Parliament, and starting from 2003, expenditures and
revenues of the Oil Fund will be executed through the Treasury.
C. THE QUASI-FISCAL IDEFCIIT
2.19 The most intractable fiscal problem in Azerbaijan is the quasi-fiscal deficit that exists in
the utilities sector. Countries experiencing severe fiscal restraints are often tempted to shift some
of their fiscal expenditures off budget, which results in an accumulation of quasi-fiscal deficits.2 9
Quasi-fiscal deficits usually result from the provision of implicit subsidies/transfers, which are
not accounted for in the budget as government expenditures. Although familiar from other
countries, this issue is especially acute in Azerbaijan, as the quasi-fiscal deficit was 14 percent
of GDP on average during 1998-2001.3°
2.20 The quasi-flscal deflcits in the energy and water sectors are substantial. In the
energy sector, World Bank estimates of quasi-fiscal deficits are on the order of 11 percent of
GDP for 1998 and 13 percent for 1999. For 2000 and 2001, the IMF estimates are on the order of
20 and 11.6 percent of GDP, respectively.3 1 In water supply services, the size of the quasi-fiscal
deficit is estimated at US$68.5 million or 1.3 percent of GDP for 2000. The quasi-fiscal deficit
in the energy sector originates from three main sources: (i) implicit subsidies, resulting from
charges for SOCAR's supply of fuel oil and natural gas to Azerenergy and Azerigaz for domestic
consumption that are below market prices; (ii) non-payments for gas and electricity supply; and
(iii) an excess of technical losses and thefts. Inadequate financial discipline, non-payments for
goods and services received, explicit and implicit subsidies, all combine to create large quasi-
fiscal deficits in the electricity (Azerenergy), gas (Azerigaz), and water (Abspheron Regional
Water Company [ARWC] for Baku) sectors.
29 Easterly, W., "When is Fiscal Adjustment an Illusion?," 1999.
30 See World Bank, "Azerbaijan Republic Energy Sector Quasi-Fiscal Deficit Assessment," Novemnber 2000
(nmmeo).
31 The drop in the size of the quasi-fiscal deficit between 2000 and 2001 in tenns of both absolute value and percent
of GDP can be attributed to several factors, such as a lower oil price, a change in the composition of SOCAR's
export, and a modest increase in collection rates. See Annex 1 for a detailed estimation of the quasi-fiscal deficit in
the energy sector for 2001.
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2.21 In the water sector, collections in 2000 dropped substantially from previous years,
reaching 36 percent of billings.32 The excess of technical losses for the same year amounted to
more than 50 percent of water production. This deterioration is closely linked to deferred
maintenance of the network and the absence of metering of domestic consumption. Tariff
differentials between household and non-household domestic customers remain very high, as
tariffs for industrial customers are 12 times higher than those for household customers. Finally,
in the case of explicit subsidies, ARWC has been required to provide water to privileged
categories of customers without the corresponding budget transfers.
2.22 This array of implicit and explicit subsidies has high social and economic costs,
manifested by frequent system breakdowns and poor quality of services that cause
consumer losses and have negative health and poverty implications. For example, among
residents of Baku, 87 percent of those surveyed perceive piped water to be unsafe and 81 percent
consider the water shortage problems severe or very severe. On average, water is available to
individual households of Greater Baku about 22 days per month for four hours per day. The
population copes through various costly strategies that can be as high as seven percent of income
for the poorest segments of the population. 33
2.23 The burden of quasi-fiscal deficits is even greater, but is less quantifiable, in terms
of the negative fiscal impact resulting from a less efficient utility structure and a
deteriorating infrastructure due to under investment. First, there are potential destabilizing
macroeconomic effects and the opaque pricing structures make it all but impossible to encourage
private sector participation in the provision of utility services. Second, the quasi-fiscal deficit
results in the accumulation of sizable energy-related government-guaranteed debt, which creates
budgetary pressures. In 2000 the additional debt accumulated by the utility suppliers to finance
needed additional expenditures and foregone fiscal revenues amounted to US$531 million in the
energy sector and to US$74 million in the water supply sector in Baku. Third, the quasi-fiscal
deficit erodes fiscal revenues, as it creates large tax and other budget payments arrears. In 1999,
the tax arrears of SOCAR, Azerenergy, and Azerigaz increased to US$865.3 million (19.0
percent of GDP) as compared with US$603.4 million (13.6 percent of GDP) in 1998. Similarly,
the ARWC accumulated tax and other budget payments arrears (including arrears to Azerenergy)
of about US$110 million in 1999.34
2.24 The underinvestment in infrastructure has a particularly devastating effect.
Systems breakdowns have caused significant losses to existing customers and have deterred
potential investors in the non-oil sectors of the economy. Furthermore, there is a high cost
resulting from the need to replace equipment long before the end of its original design life.
Although the cost of deteriorating infrastructure is very high, it is hard to provide an exact
estimate of the economic cost associated with infrastructure replacement plus the second round
effects on the rest of the economy.
2.25 The Government has designed a reform strategy to eliminate quasi-fiscal deficits in
the utility sectors. As a part of this strategy, the Government adopted a comprehensive program
32 The reason for this was the recent policy change to eluninate non-cash forms of payment.
33 World Bank, "Improving the Effectiveness of Public Expenditure Strategy," April 2001 (draft).
34 It is noteworthy that the total of accounts receivable for the water comnpany is almost the same at US$105 million.
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to strengthen financial discipline and improve service delivery. This program aims at
establishing financial discipline in the energy sector and largely eliminating the quasi-fiscal
deficit in the sector within five years. In order to strengthen financial discipline, key elements of
the program include: (i) enforcing the right of energy and water companies to discontinue service
to non-paying customers, with the Government monitoring the disconnection program; (ii)
allocating in the 2002 budget, appropriate funds to budget organizations to pay their utility fees,
providing strict supervision of the payment of these fees, and disconnecting institutions that
consume in excess of the budgeted limits; (iii) providing adequate compensation in the state
budget for utility fee subsidies to poor households; (iv) delivering services to enterprises with a
history of delinquency only on the basis of advance payments; and (v) bringing subsidies from
SOCAR to the energy and water companies explicitly in the budget, while compensating a
corresponding tax credit to SOCAR. However, the Government has yet to design a relevant
allowance scheme to alleviate the impact of the reform measures on the poor.
2.26 The phased program to eRiminimate the quasi-fiscal defliits inm the untulity sectors
targets a reduction of implicit subsidies in the eRectricity, gas, and water sectors by at least
30 percent overall from the basenine formula established, and by at least 30 percent in each
individualDsector inm 2002. This will be achieved by a combination of improved cash collection,
increased tariffs, and/or gains in efficiency. To achieve this, it is planned to increase collections
to 45 percent in the electricity and gas sectors and to 60 percent in the water sector.
2.27 To support the reform program in these sectors, the Goveranment is committed to
provide access to the relevant fimancial and operational iinformatidom. In this context, the
Government has instructed SOCAR, Azerenergy, Azerigaz, and the ARWC to deliver and also to
share with the IMF and the World Bank: (i) monthly accounts receivable statements arranged by
user groups; (ii) monthly statements of non-technical losses; (iii) monthly statements of historic
and projected cash flows; (iv) annual financial statements prepared in accordance with LAS as
well as an audit opinion thereon from a reputable internationally recognized auditor of having
performed the audit in accordance with IAS; and (iv) a plan to upgrade the financial management
arrangements of these bodies, including the design and implementation of appropriate accounting
procedures and internal controls, to facilitate the production of reliable, relevant, accurate, and
timely financial and management accounting information.
2.28 In addition to strengthening financial discipline, the Governmenmt is undertaking a
numben r of reform measures to eliminate quasi-fiscal deficits and improve public service
delivery. First, the Government is embarking on a utilities restructuring and privatization
program as part of its efforts to eliminate the root causes of these deficits and the operational
inefficiencies in the energy and utility sectors. The basic aim is to enhance efficiency by bringing
in the capital needed to maintain service, monitor consumption (meters), and improve
management, and last but not least, to engage private operators with incentives to improve
collections. Second, the Government has started to formulate an appropriate framework for
regulating the natural monopolies. Third, while eliminating implicit and extrabudgetary subsidies
and introducing explicit budgetary subsidies, it is also important to put in place a better social
safety net and to reformulate tariff policies.
2.29 All of these reform efforts, the elimination of the quasi-fnscal deficts, and adheirence
to an overall fiscal policy framewor3k that maintainns monetary stabiDity will set the stage for
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a more effective public expenditure policy that is consistent with the stated intent of the
Government's Medium Term Public Expenditure Strategy. Progress has already been made
in improving transparency and public expenditure management with the elimination of the
multitude of "off-budget accounts". It is also recognized that future public expenditure patterns
must respond to the need to alleviate poverty and ameliorate the economic and social plight of
the poorer households. What is also needed is a reform of the general government institutional
framework that will create a public service that can deliver these needed public services in a
more efficient and fiscally transparent manner. This institutional agenda will be addressed in the
following chapter.
III. THE PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. THE EVOLVING FISCAL AND BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
3.1 This review of the Govenunent's institutional framework is undertaken from the
perspective of public expenditure management. To function efficiently, the budgetary system
must satisfy four major requirements. First, the budgetary system should be transparent and
easily monitored, and should lend itself to a multi-year budgeting framework that is linked to the
objectives set out in the PRS. Second, the budgetary system should be well structured so that
continued monetary and macroeconomic stability and management of the oil wealth will be
ensured. Third, the budget systems should ensure the probity and integrity of public expenditures
and of internal and external audit procedures, and the efficient procurement of the necessary
goods and services. Finally, the institutional arrangements and administrative structures of
general government should be consistent with its relevance for a market-based economy and its
cost-effectiveness in the delivery of public services. This section reviews recent reform efforts
in public expenditure management and the budgetary system and outlines the remaining
challenges to the efficient functioning of the budgetary system.
3.2 Azerbaijan's Government inherited a public expenditure management system that was ill
suited to an emerging market economy and a changing role of government. The budgetary
structures of a planned economy had a sectoral and "economic article" approach to budget
development and formulation. The budget, driven by standardized service production norms
and controls, was overly mechanical and was cumbersome as a mechanism for setting
priorities in the allocation of public resources. The Government recognized these deficiencies
and embarked on the reform of public expenditure management throughout the 1990s. Initial
progress, however, was very slow.
3.3 The Budget Systems Law (BSL) No. 391 was adopted in late 1992, but was inadequate as
a framework for planning and policymaking as it provided little or no incentive for the efficient
use of resources, and resulted in weak accountability and control functions. The major problem
was inadequate coverage of the state budget. There were many special funds that received
resources from the budget, but with limited knowledge, either a priori or ex post, of the use of
resources. Furthermore, there were many extrabudgetary funds that received revenues from the
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budget and other sources (user fees, for example). This profusAiom of spending units outside of
the unified Treasury system resulted in weak accountability and Rack of transparency 9 and
impeded an evaRuation of the poRicy impRlieatioms of public spending and the prioritizatfiom
of sectoral policy.
3.4 The budgetary approach was mot linked to a smedium-terrm empenmditure or
macroecounomic framework. Line ministries received little specific guidance for programmatic
spending priorities and conformed to rigid reliance on outdated and detailed norms for the
calculation of expenditure requests which resulted in spending patterns that were ill-suited to the
current situation. In many instances, if a ministry wished to adjust spending pattems according to
perceived needs, the regulatory framework made this impossible.3 5
3.5 IFor 2 large part of the 1990s, budget executionm was defiieent, with very large
deviationis and variances between plan anda executionm (as much as -36 percent in 1995
compared with +22 percent in 1994). In part, these wide variations were a reflection of the
highly inflationary and unstable monetary environment prevailing at the time. Furthermore,
within the annual budget cycle overcommitment was endemic resulting in arrears. These arrears
were sometimes cleared through netting arrangements that often involved barter transactions
between organizations and ministries. Obviously, transparency and operational accountability in
such a situation is impossible.
3.6 Public investments are a crucial part of public expenditure. As noted in the previous
chapter this aspect of public spending has witnessed a considerable fall over the past decade.
The expected increase in available resources over the coming decade is expected to reverse this
trend. As this occurs, some key institutional changes will be needed. At the most fundameintal
level, investmemnt spending must be part of ann overall public expemnditure planning process
that encompasses a multi-year time horizonn and the recurrent cost implications of these
finvestments. This was absent in the 1990s. There are also severe weaknesses in the
institutional capacity to evaluate projects and investments and also their implementation.
3.7 The structuire of central goverrnment in Azerbainan has also had a significant
negative impsct oRn public expeinditure policy and thne implemenntatiozn of the state budget.36
This structure is a reflection of the FSU period. The executive branch is headed by the President
with an appointed Prime Minister and Cabinet of Ministers. The legislative branch has relatively
weak oversight of the executive branch and of public expenditure policy formulation. The
administrative structure is complex, opaque, and fragmented. Decision-making has tended to be
highly centralized even in very minor matters. The overwhelming dominance of the President's
Office and Cabinet of Ministers has prevented or undermined the development of policy
formulation and decision capacity at the ministry level. This inhibits the development of a
medium-term budgetary framework, given that ministries often simply become implementing
35 For example, given regulations regarding the number of staff per hospital bed, in order to alter the deployment of
personnel for health services the Ministry of Health must first reduce the number of hospital beds supported m that
area.
36 This section of the PER draws heavily on "Azerbaijan: Pubhc Sector Strategy," (draft), World Bank Report No.
18660, January 1999.
37 For the beginning of 2002 there were 20 mninistries and 10 state committees.
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agencies and decisions lack transparency and formal procedure. Accountability also suffers
under this organizational arrangement.
3.8 Structurally, there is no defined core civil service. Similar to that in other FSU
countries, the civil service regime is more "open," and each entity recruits and manages its own
personnel. Civil service management is not centralized, except for the supervisory actions of the
Cabinet of Ministers with respect to the top grades. As a result, the institutional checks and
balances that normally promote transparency, accountability, and initiative are absent.
Furthermore, within this type of institutional context budget development and execution can
proceed in an ad hoc manner that has little linkage to a longer-term policy approach.
B. THE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AGENDA
3.9 The authorities have recognized the obstacles to efficient public expenditure
management associated with the above administrative structure and have initiated some
reform efforts. A single account Treasury System was introduced in 1998 and has proved
successful. This system provides a monthly warrant to allow short term managerial planning by
spending units and to control the disbursement of cash. This approach, and the priority given to
wages, salaries, and social contributions, has eliminated the accrual of wage arrears.
Furthermore, adjustments in budget execution are undertaken through adjustments in the level of
monthly expenditure warrants issued to spending units. This warrants system has been effective
in allocating resources across the budget year, and the process is an orderly one.
3.10 The reporting systems for budget execution have improved substantially. Monthly
estimates of cash availability and authorizations for warrants based on Treasury estimates are
provided by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The other important development is that a large
number of the off-budget operations of both ministries and local governments have been brought
into the Treasury framework. Since these budget and off-budget items are subject to the same
economic and functional classifications, this consolidation has proceeded quite smoothly.
3.11 What remains is the need to computerize the entire Treasury System. The processing
of transactions is still relatively slow and the timeliness of information could be improved. This
would also facilitate the progression toward commitment accounting. Overall, however, the
Treasury System that has been introduced represents a solid foundation that will improve the
budgetary process in general and multi-year programming in particular. Currently, the Treasury
System covers expenditures of all extrabudgetary funds, including the Oil Fund.
3.12 Periodic amendments have been made to the BSL, introduced in 1992, with perhaps the
most comprehensive being undertaken in 1999. However, it was realized that more needs to be
done to broaden the coverage and the transparency of the BSL. Hence, the Government of
Azerbaijan drafted and enacted a new BSL in 2002 that provides a legal framework to
make the budget process a more effective tool in policy formulation. This new law clearly
delineates the core responsibilities of the Treasury and involves the line ministries far more in
strategic priorities. A key element of the new BSL is that it incorporates regulations governing
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all extrabudgetary operations (including the Oil Fund), defining the need for all general
government revenues and expenditures to be included in the consolidated budget.
3.13 Another key contribution of the new BSL is that it will allow for a more effective multi-
year budgeting framework. Thus, it will provide the necessary link with the ongoing PRS
exercise, the PIP (which will encompass a medium-term implementation cycle), and the MTEF.
Annual budgets can thus be made consistent with the multi-year objectives of poverty reduction
and infrastructure development. This new law wilR ensunre that funture state budgets pirovide
far more detail oun expenditure allocationms and is much More expicict ini defining the
responsibilities aind accountabilities of spending units in the impljementatioln of thnis budget
The first budget affected will be that for 2003, which will be prepared according to the BSL's
provisions. The Government has already issued directives to all line ministries to ensure that
early budgetary preparations are fully consistent. The drafting of implementing rules and
regulations is presently under way with technical assistance from the donor community.
3.14 Unfortunately, inistitutAionaR weaknesses rem2an. Some lack of clarity remains in the
delineation of responsibilities for budget preparation between the MOF and the line ministries.
This is particularly apparent with regard to state budget institutions located in the regions, for
which the controlling line ministries assume no oversight responsibility. Financial analysis
capabilities in the line ministries should be strengthened and there is a need to strengthen the
Project Appraisal Department in the Ministry of Economic Development (MED), which will
undertake technical, financial, and cost-benefit analyses of investment proposals in support of
other line ministries.
C. FIINANCIAL CONTROLS, AUDIT, ANID PROCUREMENT
3.15 Over the past year there has beenn coinsiderable impirovemennt in the structure of
finaencial controls and audit of public expendAture.38 Enactment of the new BSL, together with
further refinements to the Treasury System, will improve the coverage and transparency of
public expenditure monitoring, evaluation, and accountability. Implementation of a modem
Treasury Information Management System (TIMS) is under way with technical assistance from
the IMF that includes a new budget classification structure, a chart of accounts, and the
development of operational and regulatory guidelines. 39
3.16 The framework is now in place to provide an improved management of public
expenditures and to link this to the goals set out in the MTEF. This framework now needs to be
fully implemented. The first real test of this implementation will occur in the 2003 budget year.
What remains unclear is the public expenditure framework fTor local authorities ansd
municipaRities. There is a stated intent for a degree of administrative decentralization as
enshrined in the Constitution. A clear division of responsibilities between different levels of
38 A Country Financial Accountability Assessment was comnpleted for Azerbaijan in 2002 and has been used
extensively m the assessments made in this section.
39 Technical assistance is also being provided under the recently approved Azerbaijan Second Institution Building
Technical Assistance (IBTA-II) of the World Bank.
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government is emerging. However, these responsibilities and their fiscal implications have yet to
be defined. A draft Law on Municipal Property is under preparation to define the property that
will become municipal property (primary and secondary schools, for example). The implication
is that these definitions will have to be maintained by the municipalities. This situation would
add to the burden on local budgets and is worsened by the absence of a clear strategy on the part
of the Government on key infrastructure and the absence of an implementation schedule for this
law.
3.17 The Law on Financial Principles (Status) of Municipalities of 1999 suggests that there
could be considerable scope for local public expenditures encompassing social protection, socio-
economic development, and environmental protection. This law further specifies 17 taxable
activities that will provide revenues for the municipalities, which will be collected locally.
Currently, the municipalities receive ad hoc transfers from the central state budget, and
there is no systematic process in place for fiscal transfers from the central government to
the municipalities. However, the long-term objective would be that municipalities would
become independent of the state budget. This has important ramifications for the medium-term
expenditure strategy and the PRS.
3.18 Local municipalities have recently been given responsibility for the repair and
maintenance of facilities and infrastructure located in their areas. This has created certain serious
anomalies that must be rectified. Buildings such as schools, hospitals, and clinics were formerly
built and owned by the relevant line ministries, but the municipality was responsible for their
upkeep. Under past budget formulations there was a structural weakness whereby the financing
of these maintenance and operating activities was focused in the district offices of the MOF with
no line ministry oversight. The most glaring example of this disconnect between functional
responsibility and financial accountability is in the health sector. The legislation on
municipalities provides for the transfer of the ownership and management of these assets from
the local representatives of the central government to the municipalities. However, both
ownership and transfer often remain incomplete, leaving a vacuum in terms of responsibility.
3.19 The Ministry of Health (MOH) has hospitals throughout the country, but the budgets of
the hospitals and other medical establishments located in the districts have hitherto been neither
controlled nor influenced by the MOH. This is the case despite the fact that these facilities are
under the administrative control of the MOH and are accountable to the MOH for the quality of
service provided. The direct participation of the MOF district office in budget formulation of all
agencies at the district level means that the MOH has played a very limited role in the
preparation of budget proposals other than to provide a check on the budgetary norms applied.
The new BSL is designed to address some of these issues, but the future linkages between
accountability for service delivery and the allocation and the use of resources remain unclear.
This confusion could increase as the municipalities become more independent financially. This
situation also raises the question of social equity, as undoubtedly there will be "richer"
municipalities (i.e., those with a stronger tax base) that are able to afford higher standards of
service delivery. There is an urgent need to clarify and specify more rigorously the public
expenditure role of municipalities and districts and to ensure that the objectives and goals
set out in the MTEF, the PIP, and the PRS are not undermined by confusion over the
responsibilities for the achievement of these objectives. Such confusion will be particularly
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dangerous with regard to future public investmennt actvidies, which may involve capital
expenditure from a line ministry but a maintenance alnd operational expendituire
commitmennt from a differeant leveR of public admdniAstration.
3.20 There is no transparent formula to determine central budget transfers to the
municipalities. This makes it difficult for municipalities to prepare budgets and plan future
activities. The legislation on municipalities does not provide explicit safeguards for financial
management of municipal budgets. Furthermore, local taxes and user fees are the main source of
revenue for municipalities, but these are still set by the central government, which constrains the
ability of municipalities to raise revenue and apply cost recovery principles to investments.
Under the Second Structunral Adjustmeint Credit (SAC 11) the Government has established
a Tariff Regulatory Council, with the participationu of reRevant the Government
institutions. The Government should publish a time-boumnd planm to move tariffs to economic
prices and implement appropriate countrywide tariff changes.
3.21 With regard to the externnal audit functions of public expenditulres, there has been
some administrative confusion in the past. The Chamber of Audits (CA) was formed in
1994.40 Although this entity was envisaged as the supreme audit institution it did not really fulfill
this role. It had no obligation to review the Government's financial operations systematically and
report its findings to the Parliament or the President, and its audit mandate was confined to
property and privatization. The primary function of the Chamber of Audits was to develop and
regulate the audit function and profession in Azerbaijan.
3.22 This omission regarding sounid public expenditure management was remedied inm
1999 with the enactment of the Law oun tDne Chamber of Accounmts, which estabMishes thuis
Chamber as the supreme audit institutioni reportuing to Parliament. This law was amended in
the following year and the Parliament also approved the Internal Regulations (Charter) of the
Chamber of Accounts. This Chamber is now vested with the necessary authority and rights to
enable it to audit and make public the results of its audits of all public sector entities, including
all budgetary and extrabudgetary organizations and funds. The Chairman of the Chamber of
Accounts was appointed by the Parliament in June 2001 and the resources for the full staffing
and proper functioning of the Chamber were included in the 2002 budget. The issue now is to
have this vital institution fully functioning as speedily as possible.41 It is planned to have the
Chamber's 2003 work plan and related financial plan presented to the Parliament before the end
of 2002.
3.23 The recently completed Country IFinancial Accoumtability Assessment (CFAA) also
believes that there are weaknesses in the internma audit systems for budgetary
organizations. Two presidential decrees have effectively abolished all internal
inspection/control departments of ministries, committees, and other central executive power
bodies, except for the Main Department of Public Finance Control (MDPFC) in the MOF in
respect of public finances; the Ministry of Taxes in respect of matters within its jurisdiction; and
4 0 Regulatons for the organization and functioning of the Chamber were promulgated in September 1995.
41 This institution is bemg supported under the recently approved IBTA-IH.
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the National Bank of Azerbaijan (NBA) in respect of its role as banking supervisor.4 2 The
Government took this action as part of its strategy to reduce obstacles to private sector
development, as it was felt that these departments unduly harassed the budget organizations and
companies under their jurisdiction, leading to both widespread inefficiencies and corruption.
3.24 The result is that no ministry, committee, or other central executive power entity has a
proper internal audit function that can, among other things, examine, evaluate, and monitor the
adequacy and effectiveness of the accounting and internal control systems. The CFAA also
believes that the MDPFC is not fully able to fulfill this function and thereby recommends the
establishment of proper internal audit departments within all budget organizations,
including ministries, local governments, and state enterprises. It is believed that with proper
operating regulations and internal structures, and with appropriate oversight, the past abuses and
harassment can be avoided.
3.25 Azerbaijan has made considerable progress in the legal framework surrounding
public procurement. Two early legislative texts addressed public procurement issues, and a
State Procurement Agency (SPA) was established in 19 9 8.43 These early efforts contained
deficiencies and had many internal inconsistencies and contradictions. This was recognized and
the SPA developed more effective legislation based on the UNCITRAL model law.4 A new law,
the Public Procurement Law (PPL), was adopted by the Parliament and signed by the President
in December 2001 with implementing regulations promulgated by Presidential Decree No. 668
in January 2002. These measures abrogated the earlier legislation. It is the view of the recently
completed CPAR undertaken by the World Bank that "in terms of substance and degree of
development, the PPL is one of the better such laws in the region."45
3.26 The SPA is staffed at the highest levels with able and committed staff and, despite the
absence of a sufficiently systematic and appropriate reporting system, has been effective in
identifying and correcting breaches of procurement rules. The main issue now remains for
some significant capacity building of the institution, which includes an appropriate review
department, separate from its functional departments, and a more transparent and
formalized review procedure. The concept of procurement based on market economy
principles is relatively new in Azerbaijan; hence, there is a need to build a corps of procurement
officers, which will require a countrywide training program. This need is particularly acute in the
districts.
42 Presidential Decree No. 462, On Compliance of Rules in Controlling the Industry, Service and Finance-Credit
Activities, June 17, 1996, sought to reduce the number of dual, parallel, and unwarranted inspections which were
considered as negatively affecting the development of the market economy. However, it was felt that the measures
introduced by the Decree did not go far enough and thus Presidential Decree No. 69, On Improvement of Public
Control System and Addressrng the Artificial Obstacles in the Development of Ownership, January 7, 1999, was
also enacted.
43 Decree 524 of December 19, 1996, and the Law on Tenders of February 11, 1997, set out regulations on the
procurement of goods, construction, and services of budget organizations.
44 United Nations Comnussion for International Trade Law.
45 See "Azerbaijan: Country Procurement Assessment Report," World Bank, 2002.
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lD. THE OIL FuND
3.27 Perhaps the most sAgmificant development An public fiaance in recent years in
Azerbgaian has been the establishment of the OiR Fund. In recognition of the need for a
mechanism to manage the revenue flows resulting from the large increases in oil output, the State
Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOFAR) was established by Presidential Decree on
December 29, 1999 (a sketch of the Fund's institutional setting is presented in Box 3.1) and
became effective in early 2001. The Government has made a commitment to exercise
considerable caution over the use of this expected windfall and to ensure that the benefits
resulting from the exploitation of this natural asset would accrue to all citizens and to future
generations. This cautious approach was deemed even more essential given the fiscal
institutional reforms presently under way and the need to develop an appropriate PRS and an
integrated PIP.
Box 3.1 Institutional IFramework for the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOFAR)'
Supervision and Control
)> The ultimate authority over all aspects of the Oil Fund's activities rests with the President, who is empowered
to liquidate and re-establish the Fund, approve the Fund's regulations, identify its management structure, etc.
> The three level management structure consists of the President, Executive Director, and Supervisory Board.
Members of the Supervisory Board and the Executive Director are appointed and dismissed by the President.
> The Board consists of key government officials (Prime Minister, ministers), two parliamentary members
(nominated by the Speaker), and academia. It is entrusted with the functions of internal supervision to oversee
the composition of the Oil Fund's assets and compliance with the expenditure rules.
Investment Strategy and Operational Management ofAssets
)> The investment strategy is annually approved by the President based on recommendations of the Executive
Director, taking mto account recommendations of the Supervisory Board.
S> Operational management is delegated to the Executive Director, who chairs the Investment Board (internal
structure of the Fund).
> Professional portfolio managers may be contracted for a certam portion of the Fund's assets.
> Investment portfolio guidelines determine currency composition, the balance between liquid (up to 40 percent
of the portfolio) and long-term investments, and fixed and equity income instruments. Preference is given to
fixed income instruments, while equity mcome instruments (corporate secunties and stakes) are banned unless
a highly reputable professional investment manager is hired to handle them.
Transparency, Accountability, and External Oversight
> The President selects a highly reputable intemational auditor to conduct an annual audit of the Oil Fund's
accounts. The results from the annual report on the use of the funds and the external audit report are published
in the mass media. Pursuant to the Azen laws, the Chamber of Auditors may also audit the Fund.
> Quarterly reports produced by the Executive Director shall be submitted to the Supervisory Board and the
President.
> The annual report is prepared in coordination with the MOF. After recommendations of the Supervisory Board
are incorporated, it shall be submutted to the President. The annual report 2001 is posted on the official
website.
Governance of RevenuesExpenditure Rules
> Ultimate decision-making capacity rests with the President.
> Consolidation with the state budget is ensured by close coordination with the MOF through the joint Budget
Coordmation Comnuttee co-chaired by the Executive Director of the Oil Fund and the Minister of Finance,
and based on the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Fund and the Ministry.
> All investment expenditures are to be executed through the Treasury.
> Use of the funds is subject to the State Procurement Law, which governs all budgetary expenditures.
> Investments should be made in projects of national importance; while critena for project selection are still to
be developed, project mvestments have to be part of the governmental PIP and MTEF and consistent with the
PRS.
Annual Report 2001, State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and wwu odlfund.az.
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3.28 The institutional setting of the Oil Fund, underpinned by a comprehensive set of
operating procedures, represents a major step toward improving transparency and
accountability. A supervisory board was established in December 2001 and was drawn from a
wide cross-section of Azerbaijan society, including the Parliament, the Government, public
organizations, and civil society. An annual budget will be drafted and submitted to the
Parliament as part of a consolidated annual budget procedure ensuring public scrutiny of the use
of the Oil Fund. The Oil Fund currently produces quarterly reports on revenues, expenditures,
and assets, which are made readily available to the public. Internationally reputable accounting
firms audit the Oil Fund accounts annually. Its accounts as of end-2001 have been audited, and
the results were made public through the publication of the auditor's report in July 2002. In
addition, the Oil Fund's spending is carried out through the state's Treasury System, and the use
of funds is subject to the State Procurement Law (SPL) and the provisions therein, which govern
other budgetary expenditures. Finally, the Oil Fund's spending should be consistent with the
Government's MTEF, PRS, and PIP.
3.29 Under Presidential Decree No. 592 of October, 2001 a draw-down of eligible funds
totaling AZM 16.7 billion manats (or about US$3.6 million) was authorized for 2001 to construct
housing and other infrastructure requirements necessary to improve the living conditions of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, who hitherto have been living in makeshift
accommodations without basic utility services. Expenditures for the same purposes are also
envisaged in the Oil Fund budget for the year 2002: initially they were planned at the level of
AZM150.3 billion,4 6 but after the first meeting of the Oil Fund's Supervisory Board (July 2002),
the President authorized the withdrawal of an additional AZM182.6 billion, which brought the
total amount to be spent out of the Oil Fund (together with the operational expenditures) by the
end of 2002 to AZM336.1 billion (US$69 million). This expenditure program will occur during
2002 and is consistent with the poverty alleviation principles documented in the I-PRSP and the
evolving PRS.
3.30 The IMF and World Bank staffs are working on reaching an understanding with the
Government on the submission to Parliament of a new legal framework on the Oil Fund, which
would give the asset management and budget rules the force of law. Concrete proposals address
the following issues. First, the role of the Oil Fund should be clarified as solely a vehicle for
managing part of the liquidity generated by the exploitation of oil and gas resources, until the
government decides to spend a portion of those resources. Second, the Fund should maintain a
unified control of fiscal policy and should facilitate expenditure coordination. The MOF should
be put in charge of preparing and executing a consolidated budget, consisting of the state and Oil
Fund budgets. To help alleviate poverty and to support the Government's medium-term
development objectives, this consolidated budget should be consistent with the PRSP, the
MTEF, and the PIP, and the MTEF and PIP should be discussed formally on Parliament every
year. Third, the investment of Oil Fund's assets (prior to their expenditure) should be limited to
investment-grade assets, as defined by internationally reputable rating companies. To that end,
the Fund would not be permitted to invest in domestic commercial projects under the new law,
with a view to protecting its assets from undue exposure to risk.
46 Presidential Decree No. 604, "Budget of the State Oil Fund of The Azerbaijan Republic for the Year 2002,"
December 21, 2001.
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E. AGENDA ITEMS
3.31 l[n conmcusion, considerable progress has been achieved un developing the
institutional arrangements underpinning public expenditures in Azerbaijan. Weaknesses
remain and these relate mostly to capacity building and implementation capacities rather than to
structural or systemic weaknesses. For example, there is an urgent need to develop a project
appraisal capacity together with an ability to forge stronger links between budgetary finance
allocation decisions and operational outcomes. This includes developing more effective
monitoring and evaluation capabilities that will go beyond mere control and tracking of
expenditures but will encompass output indicators of performance and the quality of service
delivery. This is necessary not only to improve the efficiency of public expenditures but also to
provide a more effective frame for accountability by public servants.
3.32 However, certain caveats are associated with the above. The funetional and budgeting
systems for district and municipal pubiDc expenditUres meed to be furtheir clarifed. The
role envisaged for these subnational entities will be crucial in realizing the goals of the PRS and
allowing for an integrated nationwide PIP. Fiscal decentralization has many benefits, especially
when it brings beneficiaries much closer to service providers, thereby improving accountability.
However, this must occur within a framework in which responsibilities are clearly and
unambiguously defined and this is linked to a clear revenue source. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that all districts and municipalities will develop their autonomous fiscal systems at the same
pace. It is therefore likely that some municipalities will be more dependent on state budget
resources than others as the decentralization process evolves. This would raise incentive issues,
not to mention equity issues, especially in the provision of basic health care, primary education,
and potable water.
3.33 There is no single model of a fiscal decentralization system. There are a variety of
revenue sharing methodologies as well as a variety of service responsibilities. What is needed in
Azerbaijan is the development of a model that fulfils the public policy intent, merged in a
transparent and accountable fiscal system. The present arrangements fall far short of this.
3.34 A finall area nmeeding attention is the overall civll service structure. Reform in this
area has been slow. Comprehensive civil service reform takes time to implement. Some progress
has been made with the merger of some central ministries and some initial legislative steps for
the legal framework of public employment. What has not been fully articulated is a concept of
the type of central government structure that will be suitable for a market economy in the context
of the country. This requires setting up the criteria and principles for civil service reform for the
existing ministries and state committees and the Council of Ministers, which will guide a civil
service reform strategy that encompasses all aspects of a professional and modem civil service.
While it is recognized that the structure of public administration in Azerbaijan and its
institutional capacities cannot be transformed in a short time frame, there must be a guiding
blueprint for change with time bound targets.
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IV. THE FISCAL OUTLOOK AND RESOURCE ENVELOPE
A. THE MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOK
4.1 The overall macroeconomic outlook for Azerbaijan is positive and is driven by the
development of new oil production and the construction of transportation links to bring
this increased output to market. Projections of the likely increases in output, together with
their associated investment activities, are drawn from the estimates of the participating oil
companies and the Government. These estimates provide one component of the projected GDP
growth path. For the other sectors this projection becomes more problematic. The recent positive
performance of agriculture is encouraging, but there is considerable uncertainty about all other
sectors of the economy. Table 4.1 presents the projected key economic indicators.
Table 4.1 Key Economic Indicators, 2001-2010
Key Indicators 2001 2002 2003-05 2006-10
(Annual percentage change)
GDP at constant prices 9.9 7.9 9.3 16.9
Oil GDP atconstantpnces 18.1 5.6 13.8 33.6
Non-oil GDP at constant prices 6.4 9.0 7.5 5.0
(Ratios to non-oil GDP, percent)
Investment 29.3 61.2 74.5 44.9
Public sector' 5.0 8.6 6.3 8.4
Private sector 24.3 52.5 68.2 36.5
Oil sector 5.4 31.1 41.0 13.4
Non-oil sector 18.9 21.4 27.2 23.1
Consolidated government balance 1.6 -3.1 -1.8 9.5
Revenues 30.0 32.1 30.4 44.8
Expenditure 28.4 35.2 32.3 35.3
Current account -1.8 -25.4 -38.4 22.8
Oil sector 25.3 1.1 -10.3 42.9
Non-oil sector -27.2 -26.6 -28.1 -20.1
Total DOD 31.2 31.3 30.4 27.7
Memorandum Items
OilpriceUS$perbbl 24.3 23.0 21.3 18.0
Exchange rate, av. AZM/1 US$ 4.77 4.92 4.94 4.94
l Public investment in 2002 includes a BTC loan of AZM 576 billion (2.7 percent of the non-oil GDP)
Source: World Bank staff estimates.
4.2 Given careful macroeconomic management of the oil windfall and assuming that
structural reforms accelerate, non-oil sector growth is projected at an annual average of 7.5
percent during 2003-05. Once the oil-related FDI dries, the non-oil sector growth rate is
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projected to moderate to 5 percent per annum by the end of this decade. 47 The non-oil growth
projections have taken into account the following factors: (i) the starting base for the non-oil
sector is low following the severe contraction in the early mid 1 990s; (ii) although the oil-related
foreign direct investments will have a high import content, some share of these investments will
be invested domestically (e.g., in such sectors as construction and services), which will allow for
somewhat higher growth rates during 2003-05; and (iii) non-oil sector growth will be based on
gains in total factor productivity that result from ongoing reforms and economic restructuring
and will increase the level and efficiency of public expenditure (see Box 4.1).
Box 4.1 Prospects for Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Growth in Azerbaijan
> High total factor productivity growth is essential for sustained growth in the non-oil sectors and increasing
standards of living in Azerbaijan.
> The experience of more advanced transition economies shows that in the shorter term substantial
productivity gains are possible (V-shaped pattern of TFP is one of the major stylized facts of a successful
transition to a mnarket economy).
V-shaped TFP Pattern in Advanced Transition Economies
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic
Transitory recession*
Average TFP decline -4.5% -7.1% -7.5% -6.8%
Cumulative TFP declmne -12.9% -13.7% -14.4% -24.6%
Recovery period"4
Average TFP growth 1.0% 2.2% 3.8% 4.2%
Cumulative TFP growth 5.9% 16.3% 29.6% 23.1%
t Czech Republic 1990-1992, Hungary 1990-1991, Poland 1990-1991, Slovak Republic 1990-1993.
** Czech Republic 1993-1998, Hungary 1992-1998, Poland 1992-1998, Slovak Republic 1994-1998.
Source: Own calculations based on De Broeck and Koen (2000a).
> Azerbaijan has the potential to experience higher TFP growth rates because the recorded output and
productivity losses during first years of transition were much deeper (accumulated loss in TFP of 61 percent
between 1990 and 1996) than those experienced on average by other transition countrnes.
> Accordingly, in our framework we assume that TFP growth rates would average 5.2 percent between 2003
and 2005 and decline gradually to an average of 3.1 percent between 2006 and 2010.
> In the longer tern, TFP improvements are driven by technological progress, therefore chances for sunilarly
high rates of growth beyond 2010 are limited.
> Even in the short term, a TFP recovery will only be possible if structural reforms are implemented to
stimulate enterprise restructurnng and entry of de novo firms.
lDe Broeck and Koen (2000b), p. 23.
4.3 Gains in total factor produetdvity are the key to sunstainable growth in the mon-oil
sectors and economic developmenL48 Annex 3 presents an illustrative growth accounting
framework, which links the sustainable non-oil GDP growth to optimistic but plausible
assumptions about TFP growth rates before 2010. This framnework is based on the aggregated
47 See Annex 3 for more details and illustrative calculations about the required capital accumulation and TFP
growth.
8 See Measuring Growth in Total Factor Productivity, PREM Notes, No. 42, and Easterly, William and Ross Levine
(2001).
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production function with assumptions about the share of capital and labor, the initial stock of
capital, and the projected path of investments. Box 4.1 presents the experience of other more
advanced transition economies. In these countries TFP growth rate was quite substantial at the
beginning of transition process and moderated later on; accordingly we predict a similar pattern
in Azerbaijan. Accelerated structural reforms, combined with increased levels and efficiency of
public expenditure, will underpin gains in TFP during this decade. Despite these substantial
productivity gains, the private non-oil investment would increase to 27 percent of non-oil GDP
during 2003-05, and would moderate to 23 percent of non-oil GDP on average during 2006-10.
Fig. 4.1 Azerbaijan Oil Production
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4.4 The outlook over the next decade is affected substantially by the unusual "shape" of the
projected oil output (see Figure 4.1 above). Despite the country's rich endowment of oil and gas
resources, technical estimates suggest that without a major new oil discovery, and given the
current schedule of the four major oil and gas projects, oil production will peak in 2011 at about
65 million tons followed by a relatively short plateau of peak production and thereafter by a
decline in 2013.49 This decline will be quite rapid-with production dropping to less than half
its peak level in about six years (2018) and to about a quarter of its peak level in 2024. This
obviously has important ramifications for a long-term public expenditure program and conditions
a medium-term expenditure framework that needs to be cautious. In particular, it will be
crucial not to develop a public expenditure framework that incorporates a high "fixed
cost" element that will be difficult to adjust in later years.
4.5 Developments in the oil and gas sector will have a substantial impact on the balance
of payments and the overall economy. During this decade and the next, oil sector development
will undergo through three main phases: (i) the period of capacity increase, during which a
sizable investment is taking place; (ii) the second phase, during which the main investment
projects are completed and production volumes increase rapidly; and (iii) the mature phase,
during which production volumes will decline rapidly.
49 These technical assessments are drawn from the participating oil companies' own estimates.
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4.6 During the initial phase of capacity increase (2002-05) it is anticipated that approximately
US$13 billion (or twice current GDP) will be invested in the Azerbaijan oil and gas sectors. This
includes the Baku-Thilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and upstream oil extraction structures, and
development of the huge Shah-Deniz gas field with a possible gas pipeline to Turkey. The
planned investments in the oil and gas sector will push the private investment to GDP ratio to
about 68 percent of non-oil GDP on average during 2003-05. These plrojections suggest that
during the same period the current accoumnt deficit wilR increase to about 38 percent of non-
oil GDP onn average, as a result of the high import content of the oil and gas related
investments. By 2005 oil and gas exports starts picking up seriously, while oil related imports
will decline rapidly, resulting in massive current account surpluses. The enormous swings in the
external resource balance of Azerbaijan are due to these prospects.
4.7 What are the sounrces
and uses of these resouirces Fig. 4.2 External Resource Balance: Sources and Uses
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resource balance turns sharply positive (Fig 4.2). However, even by 2010 only about one fifth of
the profits will go to the Oil Fund. The lion's share of the revenues will leave Azerbaijan in the
form of oil companies' profit repatriation and capital repatriation of the investments, i.e.,
negative FDI. Resources left for other uses of the economy are little affected by the oil and gas
sector developments.
4.8 All the outflows related to the oil and gas sector activities are self-financing, so while
there may be substantiaD cuurrent account deficits duirfing the fnirst stage, they wfil be
financed by the oil sector FD2, whereas substantiaR capital and profit repatriation outflows
will be fnnanced out of the oil export earnings. Table 4.2 presents the contribution of the oil
and gas private sector to the balance of payments. According to World Bank estimates, oil and
gas exports are expected to decrease from US$1.61 billion (equivalent to 31 percent of GDP) in
2000 to US$1.5 billion in 2004 due to the expected decline in world oil prices and capacity
constraints on exports.50 In 2005 exports are projected to reach US$2.2 billion thanks to larger
production volumes offsetting the, effect of lower projected oil prices. As the Baku-Tbilisi-
50 These projections are based on the assumption that the oil pnce will decline from US$28.3 per bbl in 2000 to
US$22 per bbl in 2003, and to US$21 per bbl m 2004.
35
Cheyhan (BTC) pipeline is completed, oil-related exports are estimated to increase between
US$4.7 and US$6.8 billion in 2007 and 2010, respectively. Growing exports, however, will be
associated with growing capital and profit repatriation. Furthermore, the Oil Fund's assets will
be invested abroad to avoid the negative consequences of a large and volatile oil windfall on the
domestic economy; this will further lower the oil and gas contribution to the overall balance of
payments.
Table 4.2 Oil and Gas Sector Impact on the Balance of Payments, 2003-2010
(US$ million)
Oil and Gas BOP 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
I. Current account -716 -793 47 1381 2167 3323 4064 4618
Exports 1667 1551 2209 3375 4770 5843 6458 6812
Imports GNFS -2102 -2096 -1833 -1183 -1391 -993 -742 -473
Interest earnings on SOF 33 45 49 36 53 78 116 159
Profit repatnatlon -314 -293 -472 -848 -1265 -1607 -1768 -1879
II. Capital account 1815 1992 1380 -266 -1028 -2314 -3059 -3689
FDI 2474 2532 2312 1527 1682 1242 868 474
Capital repatnation -538 -497 -816 -1387 -2069 -2616 -2861 -3017
SOF assets invested abroad -121 44 -116 -406 -641 -941 -1066 -1147
III.Overallbalance 1098 1199 1332 1115 1139 1008 1005 929
Memorandum Items Percentage
Oil CAB to non-oil GDP -15.0 -15.0 -0.8 22.5 33.2 47.5 54 1 57.3
Oil BOP contribution to non-oil GDP 22.9 22.7 23.0 18.2 17.4 14.4 13.4 11.5
Total CAB to non-oil GDP 44.4 -43.1 -27.7 -0.6 11.8 27.6 35.4 40.0
BOP - Balance of Payments; CAB - Current Account Balance; FDI - Foreign Direct Investment
Imports GNFS - Imports of goods and non-factor services; SOF - State Oil Fund
Source. Authors' calculations.
4.9 Given this path of the oil sector balance of payments, what are the trends in the non-
oil saving-investment balance? Because oil rents are to a large extent concentrated in the public
sector, there is a paramount role for the government in the redistribution of oil resources to the
non-oil sector.51 The extemal support by the oil sector, therefore, will mostly materialize through
increasing the govemment's saving-investment deficit (or the non-oil fiscal deficit), which is a
key variable in determining the non-oil current account deficit.52 It is furthermore assumed that
any oil revenue in excess of the revenues spent domestically through the budget will be
deposited abroad, thus avoiding the negative impact of rapid domestic absorption of the oil
revenues. Table 4.3 shows a breakdown of the non-oil current account balance by non-oil private
and public saving-investment balances. The Govermnent non-oil deficit is projected to increase
from 8 to 12.6 percent of the non-oil GDP during the projection period and will stabilize at this
amount thereafter. The non-oil private sector saving-investment deficit, however, would have to
improve from 21.5 percent of the non-oil GDP in 2003 to about 5 percent of the non-oil GDP by
the end of the decade. This improvement is required because: (i) the oil-related FDI will decline
5i According to production sharing agreements, profits from oil and sales are divided among the Government (the
Oil Fund), the foreign oil companies (for profit and capital repatriation), and SOCAR (the state-owned oil
company) Thus, the only significant share of oil revenues accrues to the Government as fiscal revenues (Oil Fund
inflows, and oil-related state budget revenues).
52 See Annex 4 on the theoretical underpinnings of the optimal fiscal strategy for oil exporting countries and Section
B of this chapter for the empirical application for Azerbaijan.
36
substantially after 2006;53 and (ii) the flows of non-oil FDI are not projected to increase
substantially.
Table 43 Projected Trends in Non-Oi Current Account Balance, 2003-2010
(in percent)
Current Account Balance to
Non-Oil GDP Ratio 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Overall -44.4 -43.1 -27.7 -0.6 11.8 27.6 35.4 40.0
Oil sector -15.0 -15.0 -0.8 22.5 33.2 47.5 54.1 57.3
Non-oil sector -29.4 -28.0 -26.9 -23.1 -21.4 -19.9 -18.7 -17.3
Non-oil deficit -7.9 -9.2 -9.8 -11.7 -12.2 -12.4 -12.6 -12.6
Non-oil private sector -21.5 -18.8 -17.2 -11.4 -9.2 -7.5 -6.1 -4.7
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 4.4 Projected Balance of Payments, 2003-2010
(US$ million)
Balance of Payments 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
I. CurrentAccount -2119 -2275 -1603 -37 768 1930 2662 3227
Trade Balance -829 -1042 -299 1011 2221 3405 3905 4291
Service Balance -1077 -1067 -963 -320 -327 -36 319 564
Income (net) -291 -241 -416 -810 -1210 -1524 -1649 -1717
Current Transfers (net) 78 75 75 83 84 86 87 89
II. Capital Account 2169 2325 1715 101 -640 -1901 -2619 -3203
FDI (net) 2062 2170 1638 307 -193 -1151 -1740 -2256
Public Sector M&LT
borrowing 127 129 131 100 95 90 87 100
Other ST Capital 101 70 62 100 100 100 100 100
Oil Fund Outflow -121 -44 -116 -406 -641 -941 -1066 -1147
III. Overall Balance 49 50 112 64 129 29 43 24
IV. Financing -50 -111 -133 -64 -129 -29 -43 -24
Change in NFA (increase) -50 -111 -133 -64 -129 -29 -43 -24
V. Financing Gap 0 60 21 0 0 0 0 0
Memorandum Items
Gross official res. in months
of imports 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5
Current account balance to
non-oil GDP, (%) -44.4 -43.1 -27.7 -0.6 11.8 27.6 35.4 40.0
Source: Authors' calculations.
4.10 Dluinring the projected period, the overall current aceount to non-oil G]DP wfil swinag
from a deficit of 44 percent of inon-oil GDIDlP to a surplus of 40 peercent of Inon-olD GDP. The
"baseline" balance of payments projection scenario is presented in Table 4.4. However, this is
combined with growing capital outflows, reaching on average 38 percent of non-oil GDP during
2008-10, compared with 15 percent of non-oil GDP in 2000. In part this reflects the fact that
53Tlus means that the domestic component of the oil-related FDI will no longer be available to finance private non-
oil saving-investment deficits.
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with the growing oil and gas exports there is increasing capital and profit repatriation.54 But it
also reflects certain key assumptions that have been made in creating the baseline projection
scenario. Most prominent is the assumption that besides the budgetary spending out of the Oil
Fund, excess oil fund revenues will be deposited abroad as financial assets. From the balance of
payments perspective, therefore, the net inflow in the Oil Fund is becoming a key variable.
4.11 Of course the trajectory Fig. 4.3 Savings and Investment Balances
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expenditure strategy for the rest 5 _O/o
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by definition mirrored in the net
savings of the domestic
economy. Private oil and gas sector net savings are negative during 2002-2005, followed by
large positive savings. The consolidated government balance (added on top in chart of Fig. 4.3)
is expected to be in deficit during the next three years but increasing surpluses are projected
thereafter. Given the exhaustible nature of oil-related revenues, the uncertainties surrounding
future discoveries, and the volatility of oil prices, it is only appropriate here to assess the fiscal
stance by looking at the non-oil deficit. The non-oil sector has, and is expected during the
investment boom to continue substantial saving-investment deficits in the order of 20 percent of
non-oil GDP. Nevertheless, this situation is not sustainable forever. Despite the coming oil
boom, the non-oil sector must bring its resource drain to a five percent range in order for
macroeconomic stability to be maintained. Thus, a prudent Government fiscal stance is called
for towards the non-oil sector.
54 The amounts of profit and capital repatriation are determined by the terms and conditions of the Production
Sharmg Agreements (PSAs). Capital repatriation, as determned by the currently functioning PSAs, is calculated as
50 percent of the profit oil, whereas the rest of the profit oil is divided among the foreign investors, SOCAR (the
state oil company), and the Government, as specified in the agreements.
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4.12 In this baseline scenario, Fig. 4.4 Accumulated Growth
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Table 4.5 Projected Trends in Consumption, Investment, and Resource Balance, 2003-2010
Real Sector, % of Non-OlIGiDP 2003 2004 2905 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDPbyFinalUse 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Consumption 99 96 94 93 92 90 88 87
Private 78 76 74 74 73 72 70 69
Public 15 15 15 14 14 14 13 13
Investment 32 34 34 32 31 31 32 32
Private 27 27 27 24 23 23 23 23
Public 5 6 7 8 8 9 9 9
Non-oil Resource Balance -31 -30 -28 -24 -23 -21 -20 -18
Non-oil Exports 13 12 12 15 17 18 18 18
Non-oil Imports 44 42 41 40 40 39 38 36
Memorandum Items
Private consumption growth per
capita, (%) 7.3 3.2 2.9 3.3 4.1 1.9 2.4 2.4
Non-oil GDP per capita m US$ 577 633 687 722 761 809 861 916
GNPpercapitainUS$ 753 811 919 1038 1177 1296 1390 1480
GNP adjusted pc in US$ 688 751 822 875 936 994 1063 1138
Source: Authors' calculations.
4.13 Within the projection framework, a modest growth of non-oil foreign direct investment
has been assumed, reflecting in part further structural reforms to improve the overall business
climate. It has been further assumed that the official debt to non-oil GDP ratio will decline over
time. Azerbaijan's total external debt outstanding and disbursed at the end of 2001 is estimated at
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US$1,269 million or about 31 percent of non-oil GDP; whereas the Oil Fund assets for the same
year are estimated at US$491 million or 12 percent of non-oil GDP. The net asset position of the
Government will continue to improve as the Oil Fund assets to GDP ratio is projected to grow
from 16 to 63 percent of non-oil GDP during 2003-10. Debt service payments in 2001 amounted
to 4.7 percent of export earnings and are projected to increase to 6 percent in 2004 and to
decrease beyond 2005, as exports will be growing more rapidly than debt.
B. THE FISCAL OUTLOOK
4.14 Rapid development of the oil sector in Azerbaijan will result in a massive increase in
fiscal resources available to the Government. Furtherrnore, this will occur within a relatively
short time frame. Since the oil rents are to a large extent concentrated in the public sector, the
question of how to allocate these oil revenues across generations is of key importance to
determining the fiscal outlook and the public expenditure envelope. As discussed in Chapter 1,
this poses some complex management issues for the authorities. This section presents two
illustrative scenarios for the optimal intertemporal allocation of the oil windfall.
4.15 First, the development of these oil and gas reserves by definition represents a depletion
of the country's natural resource endowment. Obviously, the country receives something in
return. However, from a long-term sustainability perspective this reduction should ideally be
compensated by the accumulation of other asset forms such as physical or human capital. The
decision on the fraction of oil revenues to be saved as financial assets, therefore, requires the
policymakers make explicit decisions about the intergenerational distribution of revenues related
to the extraction of exhaustible oil and gas resources. Second, the value of these resources is very
sensitive to oil price changes. This implies that the fraction of oil revenues to be saved as
financial assets will also exhibit substantial sensitivity to oil price changes. A prudent approach
to the fiscal framework, therefore, would require very conservative oil price projections. Third,
when thinking about the fiscal envelope during this decade, it is important to remember the
hump-shaped profile of oil-related fiscal revenues and the fact that they will decline rapidly
during the next decade (see Figure 4.5). Herein lies the crux of the projected fiscal envelope
presented in this PER-the need to utilize these increasing fiscal resources in a productive
and sustainable manner.
4.16 The legitimate needs for increased public spending are many; nevertheless this
spending must be accomplished in a manner that is consistent with sound macroeconomic
management. In particular, a rapid expansion of public expenditure could result in an excessive
real exchange rate appreciation, with all of the highly negative consequences for the rest of the
economy. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 3, while the Government has embarked on an
institutional strengthening program to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the use of
public resources, this program is still in its infancy. Public expenditure systems need to become
more transparent and systemic reforms are needed in a number of key areas such as health care,
education, and social assistance.
4.17 Based on Word Bank projections of production volumes and prices, and taking into
account the profit sharing agreements between the Government and the foreign companies,
oil and gas related fiscal revenues are projected to increase nearly sevenfold during the
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period 2000-13. The creation of the Oil Fund and the cautious approach that has been adopted
for its use is therefore considered as a positive step. An important advantage of the Oil Fund is
that it separates the commercial decisions associated with oil extraction from public spending
decisions and provides an effective and convenient way to prevent the adverse effects of
excessive raid-volatile transfers of oil revenues to the domestic economy.55 Figure 4.5 plots the
revenues from oil and gas extraction and their distribution among operating costs, profit and
capital repatriation by contractors and related fiscal revenues. These last consist of the Oil Fund
revenues and state budget oil-related collections, such as oil-related profit taxes. It is noteworthy
that while total revenues peak in 2011, fiscal revenues peak in 2013 when profit and capital
repatriations are less substantial.
Fig. 4.5 Distribution of Revenues from Oil and Gas Entraction
(US$ million)
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4.18 What is apparent is that the economny will experience a massive windfalla with a
concomitant fiscal gain duaring the second half of this decade and thirounghout the next
decade. This fiscal gain, however, is a result of the depletion of the country's oil and gas
reserves. Long-term sustainability requires that a part (or all) of the resource rents have to be
reinvested productively, to compensate for this reduction in natural resource capital by the
accumulation of other forms of assets, such as physical capital or human capital. Since oil rents
are to a large extent concentrated in the public sector, the question of how the oil and gas
55 The Oil Fund inflows consist of oil signature bonuses, the Government's share of profit oil, acreage fees, transit
fees, rental fees and interest accrumg to the Oil Fund's assets.
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revenue should be spent and distributed across present and future generations becomes a
cornerstone to successful economic development.
4.19 Table 4.6 presents the gross oil and gas fiscal revenues divided into three periods: (i) the
initial phase when the oil potential is still to be realized (before 2007); (ii) the accelerated
production phase (between 2008 and 2018); and (iii) the phase of declining production (2019 to
2024). This division is arbitrary with oil revenues accounting for more than 25 percent of
projected non-oil GDP56 in the period of accelerated production and below that threshold
otherwise. According to World Bank estimates, oil resources will be fully depleted before 2025.
Table 4.6 Projected Revenues from Oil and Gas Extraction, 2002-2025
Initial Full Potential Decline No Revenues
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 after 2025
Average government revenues from oil
and gas extraction, US$ mln 541 2176 1,176 0
Of which: Oil Fund 384 1529 748 0
Of which: State Budget 157 648 428 0
Average revenues from oil and gas
extraction, % of non-oil GDP 11 42 21 0
Of which: Oil Fund 8 29 13 0
Of which: State Budget 3 12 8 0
Present value of future oil and gas
extraction revenues at beginning of
period, % of non-oil GDP 460 452 92 0
Note: Non-oil GDP shares of oil revenues are evaluated under the conservative assumption of flat non-oil GDP per capita.
4.20 Because the oil windfall is projected to last about two decades, defining a public
expenditure envelope for the projected period requires making a choice about the inter-
temporal allocation of the oil-related fiscal revenues. The government's objective should be
to maximize the welfare of its citizens, both those living today and today and in the future. It is
therefore important to ensure that future generations are not negatively affected by excessive
current spending. In particular, future generations will be worse off if the oil related revenues are
spent too quickly, without leading to improved long term non-oil growth prospects. Thus, if the
per capita non-oil GDP will be constant over time, the Government should save most of the oil
revenues to offset the depleted natural capital and to keep the wealth constant over time. In this
case, if the oil wealth is fully replaced by net financial assets, then future generations will be as
well off as the current generation. In this case the additional oil-related spending will be equal to
the implicit interest earned on the oil wealth.57 However, if future productivity gains are to be
expected, then the non-oil income per capita will increase over time, making future generations
richer. In this case, the best strategy is to allow for a more rapid increase in public spending,
which implies that the oil wealth will decrease over time, to compensate the non-oil per capita
income of the current (poorest) generation.
4.21 In designing an optimal fiscal strategy for Azerbaijan, we recognize the limited
institutional and economic capacity to absorb rapid increases in government expenditures.
56 Non-oil GDP is assumed to grow at a I percent annual rate for purposes of this classification.
57 This is a solution given by permanent income hypothesis.
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Therefore our methodology combines the above-mentioned optimization principles with
constraints to public expenditure increases, to reflect the low implementation and absorptive
capacity of the economy. Annex 4 derives the optimal allocation of oil and gas fiscal revenues
for various growth and oil price scenarios in the presence of adjustment costs, by building on the
work of the optimal fiscal strategy for oil exporters by Engel and Valdes (2000). Below we
present major findings from these calculations.
4.22 Our central scenario is based on the average annual non-oil GDP growth rate of 5.9
percent during 2003-10 (in line with Section A). In this scenario, public expenditure will
increase gradually to 35.0 percent of non-oil GDP at the end of this decade and stabilize
thereafter (see Figure 4.6 and see also Table 7 in Annex 4).58 This implies that the non-oil budget
deficit will increase gradually to 12.0 percent of non-oil GDP in 2010. Such a deficit can be
sustained forever, as beyond 2010 this scenario implies that the oil revenues are distributed
equally across generations. The oil wealth, therefore, will remain constant forever at 343 percent
of non-oil GDP. This scenario offers the prudent approach to the issues of fiscal sustainability for
Azerbaijan and minimizes the risks of future policy reversals.
4.23 Our second scenario is built on the assumption that future productivity gains are to be
expected, thus leading to increasing non-oil income per capita beyond 2010. In such case public
expenditures reach 36 percent of non-oil GDP in 2010, however they will continue to grow.
Figure 4 in Annex 4 shows that public expenditures should actually increase to 43 percent of
non-oil GDP in 2021 but will be declining gradually afterwards. Oil assets would be depleted
and budget will reach balance in 2049. Such a policy would make sure that oil wealth will be
distributed to those with biggest need.
58 A key assumption in the derivation of total public expenditure as a share of non-oil GDP is the share of the non-
oil revenues to non-oil GDP. In this scenano, we assume that the non-oil revenues are 23 percent of non-oil GDP
over the projection horizon.
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Fig. 4.6 Sustainability Scenario:
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and Stabilization of Non-oil GDP per Capita Thereafter
in the Presence of Adjustment Costs, 2002-50
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Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5
percent afterward, maximum annual increase in government expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP: 0.7
percent. Time preference rate: 4 percent, interest rate: 4 percent, effective tax rate on non-oil GDP: 23
percent. International oil price is US$18 per bbl after 2006.
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4.24 To conclude, the results from our aznaysis suggest that there is room for a public
expenditure fincrease dunring thns decade. The precise increase in public expenditure hinges on
the long-term productivity gains in the non-oil sector. Based on conservative assumptions about
the long term non-oil GDP growth rate, public expenditure can gradually increase to 36 percent
of non-oil GDP by the end of this decade. 59 It should be noted, however, that the optimal fiscal
strategy is highly sensitive to oil price assumptions, which determine the size of government
revenues from oil extraction, and to interest rates that determine the return on accumulated oil
assets and the net present value of the oil wealth. This sensitivity is discussed in the next section,
while results of the detailed sensitivity analysis are reported in Annex 4.
C. ]FISCAL POLICIES AND IJNCERTAI[NTY
4.25 The blessings of rapid developmenit in the oil annd gas sector in Azerballa.n do not
come without a price-namely, , the greater dependency and vulnerability of the economy to oil
price changes, given the significant part that oil and gas exports play in the balance of payments
and the fiscal accounts.6 0 Similarly, a sizable accumulation of financial assets implies higher
sensitivity to world interest rate movements. To illustrate the sensitivities of optimal fiscal
strategies to these extemal factors, two other oil price projections and two other interest rate
projections have been considered within the framework of fiscal sustainability as outlined in
Section B.
4.26 To illustrate sensitivity to oil pruces, we reproduce ouir results from Section I with
two alternative assumptions about futunre oil prices. We first assume a negative permanent oil
price shock of 20 percent, which implies a permanent drop from US$18 per bbl (baseline
assumption) to US$14.4 per bbl after 2006. Table 4.7 illustrates the impact of this negative
permanent oil price shock on the optimal fiscal policies as outlined in our central scenario,
presented in Section B.61 Lower oil prices implies lower oil wealth by about 115 percent of non-
oil GDP and, consequently, a drop in the permanent sustainable non-oil deficit and total
allowable expenditure by 3.4 percent of non-oil GDP. Thus, what seemed to be a prudent path of
public expenditure under baseline oil price projections now results in excessive deficits. On the
other hand, a positive permanent oil price shock of 20 percent (implying an oil price of US$21.6
per bbl after 2006) results in a larger non-oil deficit and higher allowable public expenditure. Oil
wealth is increased by around 115 percent, and the permanent sustainable non-oil deficit and
expenditures are increased by 3.4 percent of non-oil GDP.
59 Higher spending is possible if effective taxation of the non-oil GDP is increased, but we do not see rationalization
for such policy.
60 Owing to the modalities of profit sharing agreements, relationships between oil prices and government revenues
are highly non-linear with a number of oil price thresholds tnggering sizable changes in fiscal revenues.
Consequently, our results about the impact of oil price changes tend to be asymnmetncal.
61 We remind you that this scenario assumes an average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent during 2003-10 and a
constant non-oil GDP per capita afterward.
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Table 4.7 Oil Price Sensitivity:
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and Stabilization of Non-oil GDP per Capita Thereafter
in the Presence of Adjustment Costs, 2002-2025
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 after 2025
Govermnent revenues from oil
extractions, share of non-oil GDP, % 9.4 28.5 14.1 0.0
Low prices, change -1.6 -9.1 -4.0 0.0
High prices, change 1.5 9.4 2.9 0.0
Disposable income per capita, US$ 634 806 815 815
Low prices, change 0 -24 -28 -28
High prices, change 0 23 29 29
Public spending, share of non-oil
GDP, % 30.7 32.6 32.8 32.8
Low prices, change 0.0 -2.7 -3.4 -3.4
High prices, change 0.0 2.7 3.4 3.4
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-
oil GDP -7.7 79.6 -9.8 -9.8
Low prices, change 0.0 2.7 3.4 3.4
High prices, change 0.0 -2.7 -3.4 -3.4
Overall budget balance, share of non-
oil GDP, % 1.6 23.5 15.6 3.3
Low prices, change -1.6 -8.3 -4.6 -1.2
High prices, change 1.5 8.8 3.7 1.1
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non- 0 137 300 330
oil GDP, %
Low prices, change -2 -54 -107 -115
High prices, change 2 64 108 114
Assumptions: Annual non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and on percent
afterward, maximum annual increase in governmient expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP: one
percent, all other assumptions as in the base scenano except for various oil pnce assumptions. Baselme
projections are based on international oil prices at US$18 per bbl after 2006; low price projections
assume intemational oil prices are lower by 20 percent (US$14.4 per barrel) after 2006; and high price
projections assume international oil pnces are hlgher by 20 percent (US$21.6 per barrel).
4.27 We also performed an interest rate sensitivity analysis to find the impact on oil wealth
and the sustainable non-oil deficit. For this purpose, two additional simulations to the central
case presented in Section B have been performed: one assuming a higher interest rate of five
percent per annum, and the other assuming a real interest rate of 3 percent per annum, as
compared to the baseline assumption of four percent.6 2 Unlike changes in oil prices that have
62 For illustrative purposes we want to maintain an optimum fiscal strategy consistent with the permanent income
hypothesis under higher interest rates. Accordingly, time preference is also modified so that the interest rate is again
equal to a time preference of 5 percent, as compared to the baseline assumption of 4 percent. Similarly, time
preference is reduced to 3 percent in the low interest rate scenario.
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obvious effect on public expenditures, changes in interest rates have two contradictory effects,
which make analysis more complex. Higher interest rates have a negative effect on expenditures
because they reduce the net present value of future oil extraction, but also have a positive effect
as they increase return on financial assets. The overall effect of an interest rate increase on
expenditures proves to be positive as return on oil-related financial assets is the source of
revenue for the Government for much longer period of time than revenues from oil extraction.
Table 4.8 shows that for the central scenario, a higher interest rate implies an increase in the
permanent sustainable non-oil deficit and allowable total expenditure by 2.6 percent of non-oil
GDP. On the other hand, lower interest rates imply more restrictive optimal fiscal policies.
Sustainable non-oil deficit and expenditures are reduced by 2.9 percent of non-oil GDP.
Table 4.8 Interest Rate Sensitivity:
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and Stabilization of Non-oil GDP per Capita Thereafter
in the Presence of Adjustment Costs, 2002-2025
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable income per capita, US$ 634 806 815 815
Low rates, change 0 -20 -24 -24
High rates, change 0 18 23 23
Public spending, share of non-oil
GDP, % 30.7 32.6 32.8 32.8
Low rates, change 0.0 -2.3 -2.9 -2.9
High rates, change 0.0 2.2 2.6 2.6
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-
oil GDP, % -7.7 -9.6 -9.8 -9.8
Low rates, change 0.0 2.3 2.9 2.9
High rates, change 0.0 -2.2 -2.6 -2.6
Overall budget balance, share of non-
oil GDP, % 1.6 23.5 15.6 3.3
Low rates, change 0.0 1.4 0.6 0.1
High rates, change 0.0 -1.4 -0.5 -0.2
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-
oil GDP, % 0 137 300 330
Low rates, change 0 8 17 17
High rates, change 0 -7 -16 -16
Assumptions: Annual non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and one percent
afterward, maximum annual increase in government expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP: one
percent, all other assumptions as in the base scenario except for various oil price assumptions. Baseline
projections are based on international interest rate of four percent, alternative projections assume it at
three percent and five percent. For illustrative purposes time preference is modified and kept equal to
the interest rate in each case in order to maintain the optimum fiscal strategy consistent with permanent
income hypothesis.
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4.28 All of the presented scenarios are ex ante sustainable, as they are consistent with the
inter-temporal budget constraint. They point, however, to two important shortcomings of the
approach. First, too optimistic assumptions would lead to a choice of a path that ultimately could
prove unsustainable when less favorable outcomes would undermine the fiscal stance of the
Government (for example, if the projected non-oil growth rate did not materialize, or if there
were a negative oil price shock or lower interest rates). The optimal fiscal path of the non-oil
deficit and, consequently, the path of total fiscal expenditure are subject to significant
uncertainty, as oil prices are very volatile. This calls for a fiscal envelope that is based on
conservative oil price projections, as well as for the building up of precautionary savings during
the years when oil production is still low. Second, while large overall deficits during the next few
years are consistent with an optimal (and sustainable) fiscal path, such a path requires overall
substantial surpluses in the longer-term perspective. As the ability of the current government to
commit future govermnent to actually run large surpluses is very low, the political risk arises.
This means that the fiscal path that is optimal (and sustainable) ex ante may prove to be
unsustainable ex post, when future governments might be systematically avoiding fiscal
adjustment.
D. THE OVERALL FISCAL BALANCE AND ITS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IMPLICATIONS
4.29 As is shown by the framework in Section B, developing the public expenditure
envelope for Azerbaijan requires making a decision about the inter-temporal allocation of
the oil windfall, which is expected to be of a temporary nature.f63 A crucial requirement of
this framework is to separate fiscal revenues into oil (windfall nature) and non-oil (permanent
nature). Within the "baseline" projection framework, total non-oil fiscal revenues are projected
as a roughly constant share (23 percent) of the non-oil GDP during 2003-10. This is a cautious
assumption given that improvements in tax administration will occur and, in particular, income
based taxes for both households and firms should increase in importance. Oil-related (windfall)
revenues are coming directly from the oil model and are related to oil and gas production
volumes and prices. Furthermore, assumptions about the non-oil GDP growth rate, the real
interest rate, and the path of oil prices are also important for the design of the public expenditure
envelope. As shown in Section B, the ratio of total public expenditure to non-oil GDP will
depend crucially on-the non-oil fiscal deficit (the current income component of the oil windfall),
and on the share of the non-oil revenues in the non-oil GDP ratio.64
4.30 This public expenditure envelope also takes into account the adjustment costs
associated with rapid expenditure increases. These adjustment costs are related to the limited
institutional and economic capacity to absorb the windfall expenditure.6 5 As shown in the
previous section, an optimal fiscal policy would be consistent with a fairly rapid transfer of oil-
related fiscal revenues in the economy in order to improve the welfare of the worst off generation
(that is, the current generation), as future generations will be better off if the non-oil growth
materializes. However, such a path would require running substantial surpluses when the rapid
63 Current estimates suggest that the oil wmdfall is expected to last about two decades.
64 It should be recalled that in Section B we assume that the non-oil revenues are spent entirely in each period, so
that only the oil-related (windfall) revenues may be shifted across time.
65 See footnote 95.
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oil extraction takes place, which may not be politically feasible. In addition, expectations about
future growth in the non-oil sector may fail to materialize, and the net present value of the future
oil wealth is uncertain and subject to oil price volatilities. Therefore, although there may be
ample room for public expenditure increases, the above-mentioned concerns call for an envelope
that is less expansionary.
4.31 While the Government
revenues (including Oil Fund Fig. 4.7 Public Expenditures to Non-Oil GDP and its Financing
inflows) are projected to increase
by 180 percent in 2010 relative
to 2002, a pragmatic formulation ____
of the medium-term public , 4o
expenditure envelope follows the 3
trajectory on non-oil GDP. A e
constraint on the maximum c
speed of growth of public
expenditures is also imposed by a
public institutional capacity. 5% ?E--
This base case sceneario 4-
envisages a gradual iucrease ini mm 2 2 a 2s6 2om 2o 2o oos
public expenditure to 35.6 INON R 0m ms =Rvem SUAR 0 E0e [lon D 
percent of non-olD GD]P, as Source World Bank projections
compared with 28.4 perceint of
noni-oil GD]P, in 2001 (Fig 4.7). Current expenditure is projected to increase to 26.7 percent of
non-oil GDP in 2010, as compared with 23.4 percent of non-oil GDP in 2001. Capital
expenditure is projected to reach 8.8 percent of non-oil GDP, as compared to 5 percent in 2001.
Long-run analysis and simulations indicate that such a fiscal stance would be sustainable for
several generations into the future.
4.32 The resulting consolidated governmenmt balance is expected to be in deficit duuring
2002-05, but increasing suirpluses are projected thereafter. Given the uncertainties
surrounding future discoveries and the volatility of oil prices, discussed in Section C of this
chapter, it is only appropriate to assess the fiscal stance by looking at the non-oil deficit. The
non-oil deficit is increasing moderately, reaching 12.6 percent of non-oil GDP in 2010, which is
consistent with the permanent non-oil deficit to non-oil GDP ratio that can be sustained beyond
2010. Furthermore, this public expenditure envelope does not take into account the contribution
of public investment to rebuilding the country's physical capital and human capital stock, which
is a prudent assumption, validated from the experiences of other resource-rich economies.6 6
4.33 As seen from Table 4.9, the potential pubRic expenditure envelope innereases moire
than twofold in 10 years, firom AZM 5,403 billion in 2001 to AZM 14,185 billion iin 2010.
The non-oil sector would maintain its current tax contribution with no erosion of the taxable
base. Until oil-related tax revenues pick up the Oil Fund would play a role of smoothing out the
expenditure path. Other sources is derived from identified foreign financing while there would be
no borrowing from the domestic market in the medium term. Based on these assumptions, the
66 See Gelb, et al. (1989).
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external debt to non-oil GDP ratio will actually decline to 26 percent of the non-oil GDP
(compared with 31 percent in 2001). The gross assets of the Oil Fund are projected to reach
US$5.1 billion in 2010, as compared with US$491 million in 2001.
Table 4.9 Projected Public Expenditure Envelope, 2001-2010
Consolidated Budget,
AZM billion 2001 2002 ' 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total Revenues incl. Grants 5713 6748 7249 7727 8865 11349 13905 16296 17856 19229
Oil Fund revenues 1001 850 800 804 1255 2816 4095 5123 5756 6221
Total Expenditure 5403 7398 7431 8403 9471 10515 11351 12266 13209 14185
Current 4460 5581 6133 6708 7481 8170 8719 9317 9966 10662
Capital 943 1817 1298 1695 1990 2345 2632 2949 3243 3523
Consolidated Balance 310 -651 -182 -676 -606 834 2554 4030 4647 5044
Financing -310 651 182 676 606 -834 -2554 -4030 -4647 -5044
Foreign 675 775 703 558 805 1171 616 619 622 624
Domestic -984 -124 -521 118 -198 -2006 -3170 -4650 -5269 -5668
Oil Fund -1107 -705 -599 -215 -573 -2006 -3170 -4650 -5269 -5668
Banking system 74 479 26 26 28 0 0 0 0 0
Non-bank 19 133 150 250 250 0 0 0 0 0
Other 30 -31 -98 57 97 0 0 0 0 0
Memorandum Items
Consolidated deficit to non-
oil GDP (%) 1.6 -3.1 -0.8 -2.6 -2.1 2.8 7.9 11.7 12.5 12.7
Oil Fund revenues to non-oil
GDP (%) 5.3 4.0 3.4 3.1 4.4 9.3 12.7 14.8 15.5 15.6
Public expenditure to non-oil
GDP (%) 28.4 35.2 31.5 32.2 33.1 34.7 35.2 35.5 35.6 35.6
Non- oil deficit to non-oil
GDP (%) -6.3 -10.7 -7.9 -9.2 -9.8 -11.7 -12.2 -12.4 -12.6 -12.6
GDP, AZM billion 26620 29480 32218 34636 40304 47603 55873 62952 68144 72924
Non-oil GDP, AZM billion 19038 21047 23602 26111 28581 30306 32264 34582 37137 39867
'Expenditure on public mvestment m 2002 mcludes AZM 576 billion BTC loan.
Assumptions: (i) SOF's revenues are treated as a financing item, but only mterest earnings on SOF's assets are
available for deficit financing; (ii) no monetary financing; and (iii) external financing is restricted to only identified
financing from BOP.
Source: Authors' calculations.
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4.34 According to the current Oil Fund regulations, only interest revenues earned on the Oil
Fund's investments can be used for public expenditures. This rule may be overly restrictive.
During the next five years the
non-oil private sector has great Fig. 4.8 Oil Fund Expenditures Relative to Interest Revenues
opportunities to take advantage
of the investment boom in the oil
sector. This requires rapid X lQM/.
investments in the sector in order V
to catch up after many years of 7-7/o -
deterioration in the physical e
capital base. Given the Z M/J/o-
savings/investment resource
constraints, such investments a
could lead to zero or negative 
growth in private consumption a/0
per capita, a situation difficult to mn am mm 4 m mm s w6 mm 2 1m9 21O
sustain given the promise of the ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
oil riches. Not constralinmg the Source World Bank projections
accommodating fiscal stamce I_I
explained above by arbitrary rules on ¢il IFund expenditires may be warranted.
Consequently it is suggested to relax this rule (Fig. 4.8). Later in the decade, oil and gas related
tax revenues are expected to grow substantially. At that point, in this scenario, Oil Fund
financing of the deficit would be less than interest revenues.
4.35 The baseline projections
elaborated above, of course, Fig. 4.9 Oil Fund Accumulation with Different Oil Price
depend crucially on the Assumptions
assumptions made for the
developments in oil and gas
prices on the world market. ___
What the PER is suggesting is 7m
not to deviate from the rule of / 
gearing the fiscal stance to the
development of the non-oil _'
sector. Rather, the Oil Fund * 4f
would act as a buffer to absorb tD _ _ _
oil price shocks, while short-term ______D ____
corrections in the medium-term 1G _
PIP and MTEF underpinning 0D m 2Cu 2W m 2 2M 205 2210
poverty reduction and balanced I- (flPNwfite C0 d515 tfr
growth of the non-oil sector Source World Bank projections
should be avoided. Again, this I_I
would help to mitigate the risk of Dutch disease. According to the scenario (Fig. 4.9), the oil
price could drop to $15/barrel without necessitating a major correction in the medium-term fiscal
stance. On the other hand, to the extent that a fnve peercemt anuual growth potential in the
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non-oil sector is about right,67 incremental revenues from oil prices higher than $18/barrel
on average should be saved in the Oil Fund, and the public expenditure path should not be
altered in the short run.
4.36 From a political economy perspective, the recommendation is to de-link oil revenue
flows, dictated by commercial extraction decisions and world oil prices, from the annual budget
debates. These are typically short-run exercises, focused on political and economic pressures
over the next year (or, the next three years). Planning for sound use of oil and gas revenues to
support sustainable development of the non-oil sector requires a longer horizon, one that is well
beyond normal political horizons. The Oil Fund provides a long-term political compact on how
oil and gas related revenues are to be used not just this year, but for years to come. It can protect
some portion of oil revenues for future generations by allowing larger fiscal surpluses in the
short run, and a more desirable path of expenditures over the medium to long run than may
otherwise be 'politically feasible.6 8 De-linking improves coordination between monetary and
fiscal policy, since this -fiscal sterilization of oil revenues means that the monetary authority has
less of a sterilization task confronting it (and its limited intervention tools).
4.37 A further note of reassurance that this "baseline" public expenditure projection is robust
comes from the monetary parts of the projection model. The level of monetization and financial
development in Azerbaijan is extremely low by international standards. In our monetary
projections, therefore, we assume that provided all structural reforns are on track, velocity will
decline by about 33 percent during this decade. This drop in velocity is plausible, given the
experience of other transition countries, as well as the very low initial level of monetization (see
Table 4.10).
Table 4.10 Money Velocity in Selected CIS Countries
Cumulative
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 % change
1995-2000
Azerbaijan 9.4 10.8 11.4 11.7 13.2 15.2 13 6* 62
Armenia 15.7 13.8 12.8 10.0 9.1 7.6 7.5 -52
Georgia 48.6 26.2 14.0 14.9 13.7 10.7 10.3** -78
Moldova 7.9 5.0 4.6 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.0 -42
Kazakhstan 11.3 10.2 9.7 11.5 7.4 6.5 -42
Russia 8.9 8.3 7.4 7.3 8.1 6.8 -24
* September 2001.
** June 2001.
Sources: IMF Red, various issues; De Broeck, M., Krajnyak, K., Lone, H. (1997), "Explaining and Forecasting
Volatility of Money in Transition Economies," with special reference to the Baltics, Russia and other Countries of
Former Soviet Union, WP/97/108.
67 The rationale for a potential growth rate of the non-oil sector averaging 5 percent is elaborated in Chapter IV and
Annex 3.
68 The Norwegian Petroleum Fund, for example, is designed as a "tool for coping with the financial challenges
connected to an aging population and the eventual decline m oil revenues, by transferring wealth to future
generations," (Norwegian Ministry of Finance).
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4.38 The projected monetization ratio, therefore, is assumed to increase gradually, reaching 27
percent by the end of this decade.6 9 This assumption will also imply that credit to the economy to
non-oil GDP ratio will increase from 10 percent in 2001 to 15 percent by 2010. Note that access
to credit is a vital precondition for the non-oil sector growth to materialize, given the prospects
of fairly limited FDI inflows in the non-oil sector. Based on these assumptions, inflationary
pressures will be minimal, as broad money growth is only slightly higher than GDP growth
during 2002-05 (see Table 4.11). Beyond 2005, the double-digit growth rate of broad money is
explained by the double-digit growth rate of GDP during the period 2005-08. Hlowever, the
authorities need to carefully monitor the trends Mnn velocity and money demand and will
have to adjust their monetary policy stance accordingly.
Table 4.11 Monetary Trends, 2003-2010
(in percent)
Monetary Summary 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Broad money growth 16 14 16 15 18 12 10 10
NFA growth 7 1 1 12 4 11 2 4 2
NDAgrowth 13 2 5 18 15 18 12 14
NFA contnbution to MS growth 7 13 14 5 10 1 2 1
NDA contribution to MS growth 9 1 3 10 8 11 7 9
M2 to GDP 19 19 20 22 24 26 26 27
Source: Authors' calculations.
4.39 There are many ways in which the pubeic sector eain channel the additionao
resources from oil depletion into the non-oil sector, to reduce poverty and to inerease the
productivity of the non-oil sector. Transfers to the private sector, if targeted appropriately, will
have a direct impact on increasing private consumption and thus alleviating poverty. An
increased and efficient level of expenditure on health and education will lead to human capital
accumulation, which is crucial to non-oil sector development. Increases in public investment in
key areas with a high social rate of return will be required to sustain non-oil sector growth in the
long run. (Chapter 5 defines in more detail sectoral public expenditure priorities.) Furthermore,
access to credit has been singled out as a structural bottleneck that has a negative impact on non-
oil sector development. Because small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are typically credit-
constrained, the Government may consider ways to co-finance micro credits to SMEs in
agriculture or in labor-intensive light industries. Finally, a tax cut is yet another way to transfer
resources to the private sector.
4.40 To illustrate the implications of a tax cut, one additional scenario for tDne public
expenditure envelope is presented below. This scenario assumes that a permanent tax cut takes
place in 2006 and that this results in 10 percent lower non-oil tax revenue in nominal terms.
Furthermore, we assume that this tax cut is offset by an equal public expenditure cut (in
particular, by a public consumption cut), so that the fiscal deficit (consolidated and non-oil) is
left unchanged. The tax cut will obviously lead to an increase in private sector disposable
income. The public expenditure cut, if it results in cuts in transfers to the private sector, may
offset the gain resulting from the tax cut. If, however, public consumption is assumed not to
69 Note that for the case of Azerbaijan, the monetization ratio is defined as M2 to non-oil GDP. The reason for
exclusion of the oil GDP is that a large part of it will not enter the country as it accrues to foreign oil companies as
profit and capital repatriation, whereas the Oil fund assets will be also sterilized abroad, to avoid spending pressures.
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contribute to disposable income, a cut in public consumption will allow for some increase in
private consumption. The net effect of a permanent tax cut that is offset by a public consumption
cut will result in a once-off increase in the private per capita consumption growth rate from 3.3
to 5.8 percent, which would fade away by 2010. Table 4.12 provides the public expenditure
envelope for this scenario.
Table 4.12 Tax Cut Scenario: Projected Fiscal Revenue, Expenditure, and Financing, 2001-2010
Consolidated Budget,
AZM billion 2001 2002 ' 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total Revenues mcl. Grants 5713 6748 7249 7727 8865 10805 13327 15675 17189 18511
Oil Fund revenues 1001 850 800 804 1255 2816 4095 5123 5756 6221
Total Expenditure 5403 7398 7431 8403 9471 9971 10772 11645 12542 13467
Current 4460 5581 6133 6708 7481 7626 8140 8696 9299 9945
Capital 943 1817 1298 1695 1990 2345 2632 2949 3243 3523
Consolidated Balance 310 -651 -182 -676 -606 834 2554 4030 4647 5044
Financing -310 651 182 676 606 -834 -2554 -4030 -4647 -5044
Foreign 675 775 703 558 805 1171 616 619 622 624
Domestic -984 -124 -521 118 -198 -2006 -3170 4650 -5269 -5668
Oil Fund -1107 -705 -599 -215 -573 -2006 -3170 4650 -5269 -5668
Banking system 74 479 26 26 28 0 0 0 0 0
Non-bank 19 133 150 250 250 0 0 0 0 0
Other 30 -31 -98 57 97 0 0 0 0 0
Memorandum Items
Consolidated deficit to non-oil
GDP (%) 1.6 -3.1 -0.8 -2.6 -2.1 2.8 7.9 11.7 12.5 12.7
Oil Fund revenues to non-oil
GDP (%) 5.3 4.0 3.4 3.1 4.4 9.3 12.7 14.8 15.5 15.6
Public expenditure to non-oil
GDP (%) 28.4 35.2 31.5 32.2 33.1 32.9 33.4 33.7 33.8 33.8
Non- oil deficit to non-oil
GDP (%) -6.3 -10.7 -7.9 -9.2 -9.8 -11.7 -12.2 -12.4 -12.6 -12.6
Real growth m Pnvate per
capita consumption (%) 2 0 0 1 7.3 3.2 2.9 5 8 4.1 2.0 2 4 2 4
l Expenditure on public mvestment m 2002 includes AZM 576 billion BTC loan.
Assumptions: (i) SOF's revenues are treated as a financing item, but only interest earnings on SOF's assets are
available for deficit financing; (ii) no monetary financing; and (iii) extemal financmg is restricted to only identified
financing from BOP.
Source Authors' calculations
4.41 There is always the possibility of a more aggressive increase in public spending over
the next decade. In addition to the obvious macroeconomic dangers of such a fiscal policy
stance, one should keep in mind the actual implementation capacity of the Government. Massive
institutional and legal reform has already been identified. However, the pace of implementation
thus far has been slow (as discussed in Chapter 3). The use of Oil Fund resources earmarked for
IDPs identified by Presidential Decrees in mid-2001 and early 2002 have yet to be utilized and
key elements of the multi-year budgeting framework for the line ministries have yet to be
implemented.
4.42 What is perhaps the most important conclusion that emerges from this public
expenditure framework is the need for the Government to establish effective multi-year
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budgeting and monitoring system. Public sector capital expenditures normally have a multi-
year implementation cycle and will have recurrent cost implications. It is therefore important that
the public expenditure framework projections presented here are updated annually as a guide to
refinements in the multi-year and annual budgeting exercises. This is even more crucial given the
inherent volatility oil prices.
Recommendations
The hump-shaped profile of the oil windfall, and uncertainties surrounding this windfall require
prudent macroeconomic management summarized by the following:
> A robust macroeconomic framework, which distinguishes between oil and non-oil
sectors is essential for designing a sustainable public expenditure envelope. As
chapter 4 has shown, growth in total factor productivity in the non-oil sector, and
resulting projected increase in the non-oil GDP per capita assumptions are essential in
designing the optimal fiscal strategy and public expenditure path.
> This however, needs to be supported institutionally, by holding regular consultations
between key ministries, agencies, and academic society. What is also needed,
however, is an evaluation and monitoring capacity that will coordinate effectively the
various agencies of Government and brings together macroeconomic, sectoral, and
budgetary information on a relatively frequent basis and in the context of a flexible
macroeconomic projection framework. The key agencies are the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), the Ministry of Economic Development (MED), and the Central Bank.
> When evaluating the fiscal stance in the presence of rapidly increasing oil windfall
revenues, the non-oil deficit concept should be used as a starting point in the
economic analysis. Furthermore, this will also require an emphasis on the preparation
of a consolidated budget, consistent with the macroeconomic framework, MTEF and
PIP.
> A clear distinction between the oil windfall revenue and the non-oil revenue is needed
to design a robust public expenditure envelope that can address the macroeconomic
challenges summarized above. The framework presented in chapter 4 shows that there
are two main determinants of the overall public expenditure, expressed as a share of
the non-oil GDP: (i) the non-oil fiscal revenues to non-oil GDP ratio; and (ii)
sustainable non-oil deficit to non-oil GDP ratio, which determines the net asset
position of the country.
> In view of the hump-shaped profile of the oil windfall, it is prudent to save a
significant share of the oil windfall during the peak years, which will allow future
generations to benefit from the oil windfall, and at the same time will insulate the
economy from the negative impact of rapid oil windfall absorption; On the contrary,
during the initial years, when the oil production volume is still low, there is a case for
spending of a somewhat higher fraction of the oil windfall revenues, or alternatively,
to borrow, which means that a part of the future oil windfall revenues will be
redistributed to the benefit of the current (worst off) generation to implement the
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poverty reduction strategy. This therefore calls for revisiting the current constraint on
the Oil Fund expenditure and perhaps, replacing it by a constraint on the non-oil
deficit.
' To avoid excessive real exchange rate appreciation and waste of oil resources, it is
prudent to increase public expenditure only gradually towards their sustainable levels,
allowing for somewhat lower redistribution of the future oil windfall revenues, thus
taking into account the presence of significant adjustment costs;
> Because a part of the oil windfall accrues to the state budget, it is necessary to change
the focus from designing an Oil Fund spending rule, to an oil windfall spending rule,
including the windfall state budget revenues. This therefore requires revisiting the
current restriction of limiting deficit financing out of the Oil Fund to its investment
income. The reason for this is that what matters for a country is its net asset position,
therefore, once the sustainable level of the non-oil deficit and public expenditure has
been estimated, the Oil Fund spending is just a residual from the required deficit
financing and the level of state budget oil revenues.
V. THE SECTORAL AGENDA
A. The Medium-Term Public Expenditure Strategy (MTPES)
5.1 The Government of Azerbaijan issued an MTPES in December 2001 that sets out the
policy intent of the Government regarding the use of public resources. It documents the
Government's priorities for a more speedy alleviation of poverty in the country and is intended
to guide the completion of the PRS and the PIP, and to guide the line ministries as they develop
their annual budgets. The Government has clearly stated that the key determining factor for
inclusion of a project activity or current allocations in a ministry's budget will be whether these
public expenditures meet the Government's poverty reduction objectives as articulated in the
PRSP and the MTEF.70
5.2 Beyond creating and maintaining an appropriate legal, regulatory, and taxation
environment, the Government also recognizes that it has a responsibility to ensure that public
expenditure reflects the needs of the very poor in improving the provision of public services and
investments that are supportive of private sector growth, job creation, and economic
diversification. In particular, the Government recognizes that the social sectors have
experienced significant relative declines in real expenditures. Within the MTPES, it is the
Government's intent to remedy this and, within the context of maintaining the appropriate fiscal
prudence, to increase public expenditures on the social needs of the country. The draft MTEF
70 At the time of the preparation this report, the finalization of the PRSP and the MTEF was scheduled for October
2002.
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indicates the Government's intention to increase public expenditures on social needs as a
proportion of the consolidated budget from 46 percent in 2002 to about 51 percent by 2005.7
5.3 This increase in social sector expenditures will be further reinforced in its impact on
poverty and social conditions over the medium term by the planned institutional and budgetary
implementations that are under way, which will improve the efficiency of public expenditure and
the quality of public service delivery (as discussed in Chapter 3). lis part of the report will
discuss these sectoral priorities, identifying key reforrm issues to he addressed in each sector
and the role that public expenditure can play An overcong some of the idennStied
deflciencies.
B3. lEDUCATIION7 2
Overview
5.4 llndependeint AzerbaiUan has inherited a well-developed educational system with
relatively high standalrds of educationnal outcomes for a couRntry of its nuncome leveL.73 As
with other FSU countries, Azerbaijan had an extensive network of education institutions at all
levels with a large number of well-trained teaching staff across the country (even though the
institutions were inefficient and p oorly managed). The state financed the provision of free
textbooks and teaching materials. Free meals and clothes were provided for orphanages and
special boarding schools for children with disabilities. The 1989 census indicated an overall
literacy rate of 99.6 percent.
5.5 During the early years of tiranstioni, output coMtractioD and tDne consequent sharp
drop inn fiscal revemues squeezed public expenditures both as a proportion of GDP and in real
terms, to the point where there was a danger of severe erosion in human capital. Between 1992
and 1995, the share of the education budget as a share of GDP fell from approximately seven
percent to 3.5 percent (see Figure 5.1). In 1995, in real terms, government spending on
education was only 27 percent of its level in 1992.75
7' Government of Azerbaijan, State Program on Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth (draft), and MTEF, 2002.
72 The section is drawn from "Azerbaijan: Continuing Public Expenditure Reform," IMF, June 2000; "Education and
Poverty Report of the Azerbaijan Poverty Assessment," World Bank, 2002 (draft); "Report and Recommendation on
Azerbaijan Education Cost and Financing Study," World Bank, May 2002 (blueprint).
73 According to the Education Law of 1992, the education system of Azerbaijan consists of: (i) general education programs; and
(ii) vocational and professional programs. General education consists of. (i) preschool education (in kindergartens and other
institutions for children 3-6 years of age); and (n) general education (grades 1-11). General education is compulsory and free of
charge in public schools. It consists of primary education (grades 1-4); basic education (5-9); and upper secondary education
(grades 10-1I 1) Most general education schools generally contain students from grades I - 11, and children are in the same school
building for 11 years. Vocational and professional programs include: (i) vocational programs; (ii) secondary professional
education programs (technicums); (iii) higher education programs, and (iv) post-graduate education programs.
74 Practice of free text books provision was suspended in the first years of independence and resumed again in 1995 in prmary
schools only.
75 World Bank, "Azerbaijan Poverty Assessment Report," Vol. I, p. 38.
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Fig. 5.1 Dynamics of Education Expenditures, 1992-2001
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5.6 After the initial sharp drop in public spending on education, considerable efforts were
made to protect education expenditures. As the prospects for growth improved, educational
outlays grew in absolute terms between 1995 and 2001, but remained relatively stable at about
3.5 percent of GDP. Public expenditure on education is roughly in line with the world average of
about 3.8 p~ercent of GDP, but it is much lower than the average for OECD countries (5.9 percent
in 1999).7
5.7 However, the real increase in public expenditures during the second half of the last
decade did not result in improvements in the quality and efficiency of education services.
This is evident from the increased perception that private tutoring is essential to good education:
67 percent of secondary schools graduates stated the necessity of training with private tutors.77
Equally important is the unproductive use of resources, notably crowding out essential
expenditures for textbooks and other school supplies. In addition, the unit cost in general
education has been progressively increasing from US$78 in 1999 to US$139 in 2000 and was
planned at US$145 in 200 ,7 which can be a sign of the worsening efficiency of expenditures,
since enrollment rates do not show a trend for decline.7 9 This, together with the growing direct
and indirect costs of education, has hampered access to education for the poor.
76 OECD countries indicate considerable variations amnong countries with respect to percentage of GDP spent on education. The
range Is from 3.8 percent or less in Greece, Turkey, Japan, and Korea to over 6.5 percent in the Nordic countries (OECD, 1998).
77 State Statistical Commrittee, Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaujan 2001, p. 148. Survey is dated November 2000.
78 Data relate to general secondary students The source for average expenditures per student is MOF, converted to U.S. dollars as
per the IFS exchange rate, and not adjusted for inflation.
79 Statistical Yearbook ofAyzerbagyan 2001, p. 138.
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Main Issmes and Challenges
5.8 Four mitainm reasons can be cited for the overalE deterioradton of the quality of
education: (i) expenditure allocations are inefficient and lead to an unproductive use of
resources; (ii) there is over employment in the sector; (iii) the links between financial
considerations and policy formulation are weak; and (iv) management coordination is poor.
5.9 Expenditure allocations are Anefficient and lead to am unproductive use of resources.
The share of expenditure on education in Azerbaijan in 2001 is 17.3 percent of the consolidated
budget (see Table 5.1), larger than the average for the OECD countries (13 percent).80 The bulk
of these expenditures, however, consist of teachers' salaries, which have risen steadily, reaching
nearly 82.5 percent of total education expenditures in 2001 (see Table 5.2). The relatively high
share of wages and social security contributions, foods, and utilities in the education budget has
crowded out other essential inputs such as textbooks, teacher training, educational materials,
maintenance, and operation of schools.
Table 5.1 Trends in Education Expenditures, 1992-2001
Indicator 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total Public Education 1.6 11.9 91.8 376.0 509.0 563.9 581.5 795 1 906.0 928.1
Expenditures, AZM bin
Total Public Education 6.4 7.1 4.9 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.4 4.2 3.8 3.5
Expenditures as share of
GDP
Total Public Education 13.4 12.8 10.2 13.0 17.5 17.3 14.8 17.9 18.5 17 3
Expenditures as share of
Consolidated Fiscal
Expenditures
Per Capita Education 4.1 15.9 7.7 11.1 15.2 18.1 19.0 24.2 25.1 24.5
Expenditures, US$
Memo
GDP, AZM binI 247 157.0 35,44.3 10,669.0 13,662.3 15,791.1 17,202.9 18,875.0 23,566.2 26,619.8
Exchange Rate, penod 54 2 100.0 15,70.2 4,413.5 4,301.3 3,985.4 3,869.0 4,120.2 4,474.2 4,656.6
average
Population, min3 7 4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.1
' Statistical Yearbook for Azerbaijan 2001, p. 272, Azerbaijan in Figures 2002.
2 IFS.
3 World Bank.
Source: 1992-1994: Azerbayan Poverty Assessment Report, v I, p.38; 1995-2001: Macro-Policy Group.
80 As expected, countries also differ widely with respect to the relative share of public funds devoted to education. For example,
Italy (8.8 percent), Germany and the Netherlands (9.4 percent) had the lowest share of the educational budget in the total
govemment budgets vs Mexico (26 percent), South Korea (17 percent) and Canada (13 9 percent) (OECD, 1998, p.66). Some of
the difference in the share of the education budget in total public spending simply reflects differences among countries in the
division of responsibility for financing education between the public and pnvate sector. In some countries, such as the United
States and Japan, about 20-25 percent of educational funding comes from pnvate sources (NCES, 1996).
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Table 5.2 Proportional Allocations in Education Expenditures by Economic Classification, 1997-2002
(in percent)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Allocation Allocation
Current Expenditures 92 3 96.6 99 2 99.1 97.8 98.1
Personnel emoluments 664 750 81.1 83.8 807 813
Wages and salanes 65.8 75.0 60.6 63.6 62.1 63.0
Employers contnbutions 0.6 0.0 20.5 20.2 18 6 183
Expenditures on other goods and services 25.9 19.2 16.2 13.6 15 6 15 1
Food products 2.5 2.6 4.8 4.4 4.7 4.4
Utilities 5.8 4.0 5.2 3.7 5.4 5.5
Stationary goods, and matenals 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3
Linen, bedding, unifonns and clothing 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
Current repairs of fumiture, plant, and 1.7 1.7 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0
equipment
Repairs of buildings 0.4 0.3 0 2 0.2 04 0.3
Other current expenditure 11.2 8 5 2.3 2.1 2.2 2 1
Stpends 2 9 2 4 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.7
Capital expenditures 4.8 2.1 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.0
Other 1.3 0.0 0 0 1.1 0.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source. 1997 IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/121, 1998-2002 MOE.
5.10 As a result, public spending on textbooks is less than one percent of total public
spending on education, and most basic education students have limited access to textbooks
and learning materials. Starting 1995, the Government has been providing free textbooks to
students in the grades 1-4, initially covering 40-60 percent of students, but gradually extending
this policy to all students at this grade levels. However, only about 30 percent at this grade level
receive new free textbooks, while the rest received used textbooks. The available textbook
supply is not only scarce, but the quality of the textbooks also requires attention. Despite recent
measures aimed at revision of curricula for certain subjects, content is often outdated and,
especially at the general education level, the number of required textbooks is limited to one per
subject.
5.11 The squeeze of non-wage allocations was accompanied by a dramatic decrease in
outlays for capital expenditures. Capital equipment accounted for only 1.1 percent of total
education spending in 2001 compared to 4.8 percent in 1997. Despite the common problems of
under-provision of non-wage items, however, the situation is not uniform throughout the
country. The problem is more acute in urban areas, especially in the capital city, Baku (where
schools operate in up to four shifts) and is further exacerbated by the large inflow of refugees
and IDPs. Schools in rural areas experience low levels of both student-teacher ratios and average
class sizes, which creates a clear need for rationalization, substantial rehabilitation, and
refurbishment. 8 1
5.12 Budget allocations are insufficient to cover utility needs. Starting 2001, budget
allocations for education could adequately meet part of the utility needs, without covering
heating expenses. This leads to large and growing arrears to utility companies. Schools have
been subjected to frequent power, heating, and water shortages. In rural areas the available data
indicate that schools are able to pay for only the most basic needs (e.g., salaries) and receive no
81 Statistical YearbookofAzerbayan 2001, p.141.
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additional funds for other key educational inputs. Most schools, especially in rural areas, do not
have proper heating systems or do not receive any public funding for utilities.
5.13 The inefilneiences in resource allocation can also be seen in the folRowing areas: (i)
the share of non-teaching staff in the sector is high relative to intemational standards; (ii) there is
no flexibility allowing shift of spending allocations across line items and between budget years
without relevant decision of the central govemment; (iii) the existence of narrowly specialized,
small-scale vocational and technical education schools, higher education institutions, and
research institutions results in a considerable loss in economies of scale, although certain
measures have been implemented recently to consolidate vocational and professional programs
through merger or liquidation of some secondary professional education schools; (iv) there is a
state monopoly in textbook publication; (v) the output mix in the sector is inappropriate for an
emerging market economy; and (vi) the cost recovery in tertiary education remains low.
5.14 The excess employment im the general education sector leads to a high wage
compression and resuRts in low average wages in the sector. The excess employment is
caused by the low teaching load (12 hours per week) and the narrow teacher specialization,
especially in the upper grades, where teachers tend to teach only one subject. Another reason for
overemployment is the allocation of funds based on notional class sizes rather than on actual
number of students, which is a particular problem in rural schools, which do not have a sufficient
number of student in upper grades. Existing low wages are often complimented by income from
private tutoring, which may affect teachers' incentives to teach to the full capacity in schools,
and in some cases may also result in incentives for accepting unofficial payments. The average
wage for January-December 200182 was AZM 165,600, or 63.7 percent of the average wage in
the formal economy, or 54.7 percent of the average wage in manufacturing, and 15.3 percent of
the average wage in mining and quarrying (the oil sector). Furthermore, the average wage in the
education sector is only 75 percent of the average public sector wage and about 60 percent of its
private sector counterpart.83 In January 2000, a 25 percent wage increase was granted across-the-
board for the education sector.
5.15 The formulation of education policies is detached from flkanmciaR considerations. The
Ministry of Education (MOE) has direct control over educational policies and management
issues. The share of centralized expenditures, i.e., those executed through the MOE, in the total
expenditure allocated from the state budget for education is about 11.5 percent, while local
expenditures, i.e., those executed through local education departments, account for 88.5 percent
of that amount. As such there is little accountability mechanism that can enable the MOE to
monitor/evaluate the use of resources at the level of local (rayon) departments of education.
Because educational decisions remain detached from financial considerations, there are
incentives to maximize "education inputs" based on a set of norms, especially at the local level of
rayon departments of education. At the same time, the MOF has no information about the cost
of education with which to analyze productivity in the education sector (e.g., unit cost) or the
effectiveness of education policies. For example, teachers are hired on the basis of a set of
curriculum and classroom size norms, without any consideration of the fiscal impact of an
increase in the number of classrooms. The MOE decides on the norms (e.g., curriculum and
82 These are preliminary data
83 State Statistics Committee, Azerbaijan in Figures, 2000 (p. 78).
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classroom size, which are also specified in the Law on Education), whereas the local education
departments and schools determine the number of classrooms based on these norms. They have
incentives to maximize the number of classrooms so that they can hire more teachers, who are
paid on the basis of the normative teaching load (12 hours per week). The MOF is responsible
for the financing of teacher salaries on the basis of these norms and an estimated budget. The
MOE has no information about the cost and finance of education, including the unit cost per
student in general education, since it assumes that this is the responsibility of the MOF and local
governments.
5.16 The management of the education system itself continues to be fragmented. The
MOE is responsible for the overall management of preschools, general education schools, higher
education institutions, and about half of the vocational and technical schools. There are
ministries and state companies that are responsible for the remaining vocational and professional
schools, mostly in specialized fields. These bodies include the Ministries of Health, Culture,
Youth and Sports, National Security, Caspian Shipping Company and Azerbaijan Airlines
Company. Rayon education administrations manage preschools, general education schools, and
out-of-school programs. Greater consolidation of the management system in education would
help enhance the formulation and implementation of educational policy, preventing duplication
of activities, particularly in vocational and higher education.
5.17 With regard to the equity implications, there is an increasing concern about access
to education for the poor. Although primary and secondary education receive a significant
share of the total education budget of about 73 percent (see Table 5.3), there is evidence that
enrollment rates are lower among the poor, whose children are more likely to have prolonged
absences from school.8 4 The data from the HBS show little disparity in enrollment rates in
primary and secondary education by household income quintiles, but there are large disparities in
enrollment at the higher levels of schooling, especially for specialized secondary and higher
education. For example, in higher education about 30 percent of students came from the richest
quintile, while only 12 percent came from the poorest quintile. In vocational education, the
poorest 20 percent accounted for about 28 percent of total enrollment, while the richest 20
percent accounted for only 12.5 percent.
5.18 To offset the sharp increases in the direct costs of education, student financial support
programs could play a critical role in providing incentives for students coming from poor
households to continue their education, especially at the upper secondary and higher education
levels, since there is a widespread system of informal payments and private tutoring, which puts
poor children at a disadvantage. Available financial aid programs are not targeted to the poor,
since all students in higher education receive "financial support" from the state. It might be
advisable, for example, to allocate more funds per pupil in poor school districts where schools
cannot rely on parents' contributions.
84 Since the budget includes grades 1-11, it is not possible to estimate public spending on pnmary education. When public
spending on other secondary schools (e g, lyceums, vocational schools, and boarding schools) is included, public spending on
primary and secondary education accounted for approximately 73 percent of total public spending on education in 2001.
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Table 53 Actual Education Sector Expenditures by Paragraphs, 1998-2001
Budget Paragraphes Percentage
(Level and types of education) 1998 1999 2000 2001
Pre-school educational institutions 9.9 9.1 7.7 8.2
General secondary schools 67.8 69.5 65.8 65.8
Evening and part-time secondary educational institutions 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6
Boarding schools 3.3 3.1 2.8 2 7
Special regime boarding schools 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1
Technical schools 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Lyceum and vocational schools 2.8 2.8 2.4 2 2
Special technical and vocational schools and lyceums 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Secondary educational institutions 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.3
Higher educational institutions 5.9 5.3 6.0 6.0
Training and qualification upgrading 0.4 0.5 0.4 0 6
Other educational institutions for training 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3
Extra cumcular measures with children 4.1 3.2 7.7 7.6
Methodical works and other measures 0.9 1.5 1.2 1.2
Orphanages 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3
Education Trust 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Centralized Accounting Maintenance 0 7 0.8 1.4 0.8
Maintenance of centralized Economic Groups 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Total Education Sector 100 100 100 100
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Governmental Agenda
5.19 As in other transition countries, the Governmennt's initial response to the sharp
compressaon of public empenditure wsas to focus on reducnmg expenmditure needs and
diversifying the sources of fnaneing. Education financing was diversified through three
actions: (i) decentralizing the responsibility for financing and managing most education
programs from central to rayon governments; (ii) requiring parents to purchase textbooks that
were formerly provided by the MOE, except for grades 1-4, where they continued to be provided
free; and (iii) instituting a cost recovery program for students in specialized secondary education
and higher education.
5.20 The Education Reform Program approved by the President in 1999 provides a
comprehensive treatment of the education sector, which acts as a strategic document and as an
outline for an implementation plan. The Reform Program served as a general guideline for
development of the new Draft Law on Education prepared for discussions in the Parliament.
5.21 The main features of the Governnment's reforrm plan include: (i) curriculum reform
and teacher training; (ii) the provision of educational materials including textbooks; and (iii)
educational management and finance. The goal is to maintain high enrollment rates in basic and
secondary education, while providing equal education opportunities for the poor at the post-
secondary education levels. Particular attention will focus on the quality and relevance of
education in matching future demand in the labor market.
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5.22 The first stage involving the preparation of a reform plan has already been completed.
This is to be followed by a pilot stage to be implemented during 2000-03, under which 20
schools will be entirely repaired and re-equipped, curriculum reforms will be introduced, and
teachers will attend special training courses. The third stage involves an evaluation of the pilot
stage followed by implementation of the reforms across all levels of the Azerbaijan educational
systems. Significant reforms in curriculum hours have already been achieved in Azerbaijan as
part of the country's curriculum review. This has included reduction in the number of
compulsory subjects, with a resulting saving in textbook requirements.
5.23 In response to the inadequacy of financial resources for education, the program
proposes an increase in budgetary and non-budgetary resources, including a cost recovery
policy to introduce charges for textbooks and private tutoring fees. In addition, the proposal
includes tax and customs exemptions on the incomes of education enterprises and education
sector suppliers.
5.24 From a public expenditure perspective, the Government's intent is to give priority
to the rehabilitation and refurbishment of schools in rural and impoverished regions.
However, a thorough need-based evaluation is required to confirm the soundness of this priority.
Consideration is also being given to the provision of school meals in the poorer regions of the
country. More funds per pupil will be allocated in school districts in poor areas.
5.25 The exact nature of the public expenditure strategy in education is articulated in the
context of the ongoing PRS and PIP exercise, the guiding principle of which is not to require
additional funds from the state budget, but to improve the existing network and increase
effectiveness as a result of costs saving. Thus, between 2002 and 2005, education expenditure
will fall from 17 percent to 16 percent of total expenditure, and from 3.8 to 3.4 percent of GDP.
This cut will occur at the expense of the downsizing of teaching staff, allowing for a greater
share of non-wage expenditure. As a result, spending on goods and services will increase from
15 to 18 percent of total expenditure on education during the same period. In 2003 the
Government will provide free textbooks for grades 1-5 for all students, and for all years for IDPs.
In 2004 the program will be expanded to include years 6 and 7, and in 2005 all students will
receive free textbooks. The developed expenditure strategy envisages a constant share of I
percent of capital expenses in total educational expenditure throughout 2002-05. As indicated in
the PRSP, this will still allow for sufficient funds to be allocated for the repair of 200 existing
schools and the construction of 28 new schools.
Recommendations
5.26 The focus should be on improving the quality of education in. public institutions,
particularly at the primary level, as this will have the greatest impact on the poor, since they have
less access to instructional materials, qualified teachers, private tutoring, and private secondary
and higher education. As follows from the analysis above, there is no solid basis for increasing
education expenditures; therefore, the main recommendation is to use the existing funding
base more productively to achieve an overall improvement in the quality of education
services. The main strategies involved would include the following.
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o Reallocating of fumds across expenditure limes and cost-savinngs
5.27 Resources for non-wage allocatfions shouRd be increased in general, wfith the focuns om
providing basic education materials and supplies to primary school studemts in particular.
School rehabilitation and minor repairs should become a priority, because of the considerable
future cost of deferred maintenance and the danger of unsafe buildings. To better address the
priorities, a nationwide school rationalization plan should be prepared at all levels prior to any
physical improvement work.
5.28 The quality of textbooks can be fimproved through demonopolization and the
promotion of competition in textbook development and publishing, which are now monopolized.
Monitoring of the academic and material quality of new books should be in place. New strategies
should be adopted for school libraries/learning resources, and cost-effective options should be
available for the provision of learning materials (e.g., mobile school libraries, book rental
programs, IT approaches to accessing information).
5.29 Reducing excess staff should be a major pridority. Hiring policies could be
differentiated across regions and school types. There is a need to gradually raise the
student/teacher ratio and average class sizes by reducing the number of teachers (the current
normative load of 12 hours per week per teacher is too low), increasing the teaching load, and
introducing targeted reductions in admission to teaching schools. The teacher re-training
program should prepare teachers to handle several subjects. The most substantial improvements
can be achieved by reducing the number of support staff. All together it would allow for an
increase in compensation levels for the educational staff based on a merit assessment. The
estimated effects on teacher staffing (and non-teaching stafi if the student per teacher
ratio increases from 1:10 to 1:1§ are summarized in Table §.4. Thus, increasing the number
of students per teacher will permit reducing the cost per student, even if teachers are granted a
double salary as a trade-off for the larger class sizes.
Table 5.4 Model Showing interactions on Staffing and Cost per Student
Staffing ('000) Cost per Student ('000 manat)
Students/Teacher Teaching Non-teacher Constant Double Salary Size of Effect
Positions Staff Salary
10 158 95 503 789 +286
11 145 87 468 730 +227
12 133 80 437 677 +174
15 106 64 370 562 +59
Change (%) -33 -33 -26 -29
Note: The model assumes a constant 1.592 million students, each teacher has 2 teaching loads, there are 0.6 adnuistrative-
technical personnel per teacher, only the teacher salary is doubled, and non-salary expenditure is 20 percent of the total local
expenditure. The effect is relative to current 503000/student. This table is only an example. It is not a recommendation. The
effects will change if teachers average fewer than two loads, and if salaries increase by less than the assumption and depending
on AHP staffing and salaries. The model could be further refined to include number of schools, so that non-teaching staffing and
expenditure on heating/utilities would show savings where any rationalization of schools occurs.
Source: World Bank, "Report and Recommendation on Azerbaijan Cost and Financing Study," 2002 (blueprint).
5.30 Consideration needs to be given to merging or elminating speciAiazed an$1d tertiiary
educational institutions that are underutilized or whose responsibilities overlap with other
institutions. Owing to the drop in demand for specialized secondary education there is substantial
scope for consolidation.
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5.31 It is a sound principle to allocate budgetary funds on the basis of actual student
numbers. Linking budgetary allocations to the number of actual students would promote
efficiency by strengthening the relation between the input and the output of the public education
system.
5.32 Proposals to exempt educational institutions and their suppliers from tax and
customs payments would leave room for tax evasion and would counter efforts at simplifying
and enforcing tax procedures throughout the economy.
* Introducing cost-recovery measures
5.33 The education sector in higher and upper secondary education should opt for less
reliance on the state and should introduce elements of cost recovery via user charges, such
as student fees. Azerbaijan has already shifted the cost of education to parents through tuition
fees and other direct expenditures at all levels. Public institutions now accept a proportion of
their students on a fee-paying basis, while government-assisted places are allocated to those who
receive qualifying scores from the university entrance examinations (see Table 5.5). If a well-
targeted program is in place to support the poor, who cannot afford the increased costs, there is
the potential for expanded cost recovery in higher education and greater reliance on selective
user fees, even in secondary education at grades 10-11.
Table 5.5 Post-Compulsory Education Enrollments: Total "Paid" and Proportion "Paid"
1999/00 1999/00 "Paid" as 2000/01 2000/01 "Paid" as
Intake "Paid" %Total Intake "Paid" %Total
PTU/Lyceums 17,316 4,265 24.6 16,750 3,810 22.7
Teknikum 14,025 3,059 21.8 14,342 4,513 31.5
Higher Education 21,973 9,705 44.2 22,915 10,839 47.3
Source: MOE Statistical Booklets (but PTU - professional-technical school - intake shown as 1998/99 not 1999/2000)
5.34 Student loans should be available to all qualified students for use in any accredited
public or private institution of higher education. A major advantage of this policy is that it will
increase competition and student choice significantly, at little cost to public resources. The
targeting of public assistance to the poor should be improved. There is a strong need for well-
targeted financial support for poor families. As part of this effort, universal student stipends
should be eliminated for all students with the introduction of targeted scholarships in higher
education based on needs and academic merit.
* Enhancing the management process
5.35 The MOE should be granted a clear authority over education. The policies and
procedures of the MOE, the MOF, and the Cabinet of Ministers should be reviewed to establish
the clear authority of the MOE regarding educational policy. The education system clearly needs
improved financial management processes and skills. The Government should consider
strengthening the MOE's policy function (through transfers from the Presidential
Administration), strengthening the MOE's financial management function (through transfers
from the MOF), devolving educational management to regional departments, and providing
greater autonomy for directors. Even without such radical reforms, the Ministers of Education
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and of Finance should examine the duplication of enrollment and financial data collection in
their ministries.
o Promoting pirivate sector participation
5.36 There is a need to allow for pirivate sector entry in education. The Government could
promote private sector involvement in the education sector by removing the existing barriers to
entry, such as Article 28 of the 1992 Educational Law, which prohibits for-profit private schools.
Policy actions should focus on refining and reforming the framework for private sector
participation, including setting minimum standards in accreditation, quality assurance, and
admission procedures.
C. IHEALTH8 5
Overview
5.37 At independence, Azerbaijan inherited the Soviet health care system with centralized
state financing and service delivery. The strengths of the Soviet health system were the wide
coverage of health services for the population, the availability of health care facilities even in
small villages and remote areas, a strong immunization program, emphasis on specialized health
services, and free access to health care. Following independence in 1991, the MOH had to build
up management capacity, since decision making had previously been largely undertaken in
Moscow. Pharmaceutical and other supply routes were also disrupted in the post-independence
period, as the country had previously used the Soviet health network system of medical supplies.
In particular, the severe lack of funding for the health system and the resultant informal charging
of patients have resulted in a lack of access to health care for many of the poorest people in the
country. Although a number of reforms have taken place and some innovative primary care
strengthening projects have been initiated in recent years, the health system structure remains
largely that inherited from the Soviet health system. Therefore, considerable strengthening and
restructuring are needed.
5.38 lHIeaRth Outcomes. Some disturbing health problems surfaced during the first half of the
1990s, but the magnitude of these problems as reflected in the MOH statistics differs from that in
various surveys that have been carried out. For example, the infant mortality rate was officially
reported to be 12.8 in 2000 (see Table 5.6). However, survey estimates87 suggest that it was four
times higher than the official estimate in 1996. According to the survey results, maternal
mortality rate was almost nine times higher than the official number in 1990. Since the mid-
1990s, the official statistics show an improvement in the main health indicators, but this
conclusion should be treated cautiously. The inconsistencies in the data are illustrated by the
official figures showing a marked improvement in the infant mortality rate and an improvement
in life expectancy, while at the same time showing a marked deterioration in the maternal
85 This secton draws heavily on "Azerbaijan Health in Transition," European Observatory on Health Care System, 2002 (draft),
World Bank, "Azerbaijan Poverty Assessment," August 2002 (draft), and IMF, "Continuing Public Expenditure Reform," June
2000
86 Azerbaijan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), State Statistical Committee and UNICEF, 2000.
87 Azerbaijan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), State Statistical Committee and UNICEF, 2000
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mortality rate. Most of the official health statistics are based on facility-based information; but
the rising cost of health care services, through official fees and under-the-table payments, has
reduced the utilization of the health care facilities. This is one of the major reasons for the
increasing discrepancies between the survey estimates and administrative statistics. In particular,
the major deviation in maternal mortality estimates between official statistics and surveys is
probably due to the increasing number of home deliveries.
Table 5.6 Selected Official Statistics on Health Status and Health System Performance
1989-2000
1989/90 1995 1999/00
Infant mortality rate, per 1,000 live births 26.2 23.3 12.8
Under 5 mortality rate, per 1,000 live births 45.5 43.2 31.7
Maternal mortality rate, per 100,000 births 28.5 37.0 48.2
Total fertility rate 2.8 2.3 2.0
Average life expectancy at birth: 71.0 69.0 71.0
Male 67.0 65.2 68.1
Female 74.8 72.9 75.1
Abortion rate (#per 1,000 women 15-44) 23.4 15.5 10.3
Percent of women who received pregnancy 95.6 97.8 97.5
consultations
Percent of births attended by trained personnel 97.3 99.7 99.7
Percent of women at term with anemia 8.3 14.5 15.6
Sources: State Statistical Committee Yearbook 2001 MOH 2001, World Health Organization (WHO)
Regional Office for Europe Health for All Databases.
5.39 The main recorded cause of ill-health in Azerbaijan is respiratory disease. Bronchial
problems, including pneumonia, account for about half of all children's respiratory illnesses.
This is likely to be related to the relatively high levels of child malnutrition in the country. In the
latest UNICEF and State Statistical Committee MICS survey, just over one-fourth of children
under five years were found to be underweight or severely underweight. The mortality burden is
largely associated with Western type health conditions, but an important share of the burden of
disease in the country is also due to conditions more typically associated with a low-income
country, such as diarrhoea, malaria, and malnutrition.
Main Issues and Challenges
5.40 Four major challenges are confronting the health care sector: (i) the low level of public
financing; (ii) the system of informal payments and the resultant reduction in access to health
services by the poor; (iii) inefficient expenditure allocations and poor primary health care
services; and (iv) excessive hospital facilities and inefficient tertiary level services.
5.41 The low level of public financing. Public expenditure on health in Azerbaijan is low
and is decreasing. Health care expenditure8 8 has dropped as a percentage of GDP and as a share
in total government spending since the country's independence in 1991 (Figure 5.2). In 1990
almost three percent of GDP or nine percent of total government spending was allocated to
health. By 2000 public spending on health was reduced to less than one percent of GDP and just
over five percent of Government spending. The Government's relative efforts toward financing
health care are much smaller than the regional average (one percent versus three percent). Even
88 Included are MOH expenditure (central and locally financed), State Railways, Ministry of Youth and Health Insurance
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poorer countries such as the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Georgia devote more resources (2-5
percent of GDP) for health care financing.
Fig. 5.2 Health Expenditure: Azerbaijan and Selected Countries in Europe and Central Asia
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Source: WHO, Regional Office for Europe Health for All Databases, 2002.
5.42 The low Revel of public expennditure devoted to bealth has increased the private costs
of these services over time. This trend has been exacerbated by the regulatory regime, including
normns for treatment by specialized doctors, and decrees such as that forbidding access of family
members into hospitals.8 Out-of-pocket payments for health services can become a high burden
for Azeri households, including direct fess paid to doctors and medical personnel for services as
well as cost of medicines and medical supplies.
5.43 In 1994 the Government also introduced official payments for medical services provided
in specialized institutions, with a view to facilitating urgent repairs of medical institutions,
purchases of medical equipment, and increases in the wages of certain medical workers. The
general thrust of the strategy is on increasing cost recovery for almost all health care services,
with exemptions for vulnerable social groups, including invalids, teachers, health workers, and
refugees.90 As about 75 percent of the population is classified as vulnerable and exempt from
fees, the MOH has found it impossible to provide the intended services under current budgetary
allocations.
5.44 In practice, therefore, nearly all of the services are paid for by the population, either
formally or informally, despite the exemption rules. The share of out-of-pocket expenditures in
total health care expenditures is estimated to have risen from about 49 percent in 1999 to about
57 percent in 2001. In relative terms, this burden is higher among the poor, to the point where
many poor households are reducing the use of these services-especially of preventive services
and are resorting to self-medication or to traditional but less efficient forms of treatment. In 2001
about 28 percent of the population did not seek treatment when ill, mostly because health
89 For example, Decree No 55 forbids families from visiting their relatives in hospitals. Given the current practice of family
members visiting and supplying food and other items on a daily basis, this can easily lead to informal fees for each visit.
90 Voluntary health insurance is legal in Azerbaijan; but, owing to its expense, it is usually purchased only by expatriates or those
in the oil industry (less than 0.1 percent of the total population is covered).
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services were too expensive. Among the poorest quintile, the fraction of individuals who did not
use health services when they were needed was 39 percent. While this may not show a short-
term impact on the current levels of morbidity and mortality, the impact may grow exponentially
with time.
Fig. 5.3 Ratio between Budget Execution and Planned Expenditures
(by type)
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5.45 Inefficient expenditure allocations and poor primary health care services. In addition
to the low level of public budgetary resources for the health sector, there has been a major
deviation between planned budgets and their execution (see Figure 5.3). During 1998-2001, the
ratio of budget execution to planned expenditure was between 69.6 percent (1998) and 94.5
percent (2001). In addition, a disproportionate share of public resources has been devoted to
hospital care and wage costs (Figure 5.4), compared with a number of other FSU countries. The
high share of hospital spending in total is crowding out other public health interventions with
high external benefits (immunization, health promotion, health education, etc.).
Fig. 5.4 Total Inpatient Expenditure as Percent of Total Health Expenditure
Inpatient expenditure as % of total health expenditure salaries as % of total public health expenditure
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5.46 Wage expenses increased to over 50 percent of the total health care budget during the
period 1997-2000 (see Table 5.7). The high and rising share of spending on wages also has a
negative impact on the cost-effectiveness of service delivery. This is because effective health
service delivery is determined not only by the overall level of spending but also by the mix of
spending (affecting the availability of drugs and medical equipment). The relatively high wage
bill in total public spending is due not to high wages but rather to the rigidity of the human
resources policy which does not allow for any reduction in the number of personnel in
accordance with other available inputs. The wages are essentially a fixed cost which needs to be
financed regardless of the amount of medical supplies or other health production factors. The
wages of health care personnel are among the lowest in the economy. With an average monthly
salary of about US$16 (in 2000) or 35 percent of the national average salary, 9 1 health care
personnel in the MOH network have a very low motivation to increase performance. The large
number of staff is due in part to the extensive network of health facilities set up in the Soviet era
and to the system of using set "norms" for determining the numbers of health staff that should be
provided per number of population. The norms typically call for large numbers of health
personnel, with a high number of specialists and little provision of family medicine type primary
care services.
Table 5.7 Budgetary Expenditures in the Health Sector, 1997-2000
Share of Total Expenditures in Health, % 1997 1998 1999 2000
Current 93.0 93.0 97.0 100.0
Wages 38.0 45.0 53.0 53.0
Goods and services 55.0 48.0 44.0 47.0
Capital 6.8 6.3 3.1 0.1
Health Expenditures as a share of GDP 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.9
Health Expenditures in US$ per capita 6.2 5.1 5.7 5.7
Sources: 1997: IMF Staff Country Report, September 2000, 1998-2000; Macro Policy Group.
5.47 The result of a relatively high proportion of the budget being allocated to wages is that
only about 13 percent of the health budget is spent on medicines and medical supplies.
Consequently, most health facilities lack adequate supplies of medicines, are unable to carry out
basic maintenance and renovation of buildings, and face serious difficulties in paying for public
utilities. Financing for the training of health personnel is similarly inadequate. While it is
evident that the declines in public expenditures have been severe, it is also clear that there is
much scope for improving the efficiency of the delivery of health care services.
5.48 Excessive hospital faciliftes asnd inefficient tertiary ReveD servnices. The present health
care system focuses on the provision of hospital care and is inappropriate to meeting the primary
care health needs of the population, as it is expensive and difficult to sustain. In addition, the
services are often fragmented, particularly between inpatient and ambulatory services, and
primary care services are provided by multiple physician specialists with low productivity.
Today, Azerbaijan has a relatively high number of hospital beds compared with the European
average. In 1999 Azerbaijan had 890 hospital beds per 100,000 population, compared with 778
in Europe as a whole and 674 in the EU. At the same time, bed occupancy rates have decreased
91 In 2000, the average monthly salary for a surgeon was US$17 or 43 percent of the average wage in the economy.
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dramatically over the last decade (see Figure 5.5). In the late 1980s, most hospitals had
occupancy rates of 70 to 80 percent. Today, with almost exactly the same number of beds and a
larger population, the overall occupancy rate for republican hospitals is only 33 percent.
Occupancy in adult tuberculosis facilities plummeted to 17 percent in 1999. Occupancy rates in
infectious disease hospitals for both adults and children are below 15 percent. This excessive
capacity is partly due to the heavy emphasis placed during Soviet times on hospital care. On the
demand side, access to hospital care has become beyond the financial reach of much of the
population, and the quality of services has deteriorated as non-wage inputs have been under-
funded. This is illustrated, in particular, by the low rates of use of maternity services by the
poorest population.
Fig. 5.5 Hospital Utilization Rate, 1988-2000
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Governmental Agenda
5.49 In response to these concerns, the Government has announced some important initiatives.
In particular, the reform strategy set out in the PRSP envisages an increase in expenditure on the
health sector, including wage increases. Health expenditures are projected to increase slightly to
1.2 percent of GDP by 2005. From its low base of only 3.8 percent of consolidated expenditure
in 2001, expenditure on the health sector is projected to be increased to six percent of total
expenditure by 2005. The allocations for personal emoluments will be sharply increased to 64
percent of the very much larger overall allocation by 2005. The budget for salaries and wages
will increase by about 32 percent in each of the next three years. The wage increase is justified
by a certain amount of downsizing in the number of employees. At the same time, a system of
flexible budgeting would be introduced to ensure that the rationalization efforts are not penalized
by subsequent reductions in budget allocations. The Government also recognizes that there is a
need to refocus health expenditure on providing improved primary health care. The system of
targeted exemptions for paid medical services will also be reviewed in order to improve the
targeting of the poor. The Government has also committed itself to gradually take over the
financing of the expanded program on immunization, and it plans to increase financing for
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important programs in malaria and tuberculosis reduction, child and maternal health, and healthy
lifestyles.
5.50 The main issue is whether the Government has the capacity and dedication to follow
through on these commitments. Some of these programs would depend largely on the availability
of additional resources, but others would require difficult policy decisions, especially involving
increased efficiency, better utilization of the available resources, and improved governance. It is
encouraging that the MOH is already piloting a number of health reform projects that are focused
on improving primary care in selected districts, and also that the MOH has formed important
partnerships with some of the extemal donors. However, to be successful the restructuring of the
health system and the strengthening of public health will require that these objectives are placed
at the center of the Government's development objectives.
IRecommendadons
5.51 Recommendations for the development of the health sector revolve around several key
areas: increasing the budget allocation for health; improving the efficiency of the use of public
resources and rationalizing spending; improving the public-private mix of services; ensuring
health care access for the poor, especially to primary health care services; and strengthening the
governance of the sector. These recommendations are not new: indeed, they have been suggested
many times before. While a start has been made in implementing some of these
recommendations, the challenge now is to accelerate the pace and deepen the efforts to complete
the process.
5.52 The first recommendation is that there is a clear need to increase governmental spending
on the health sector. The low level of public resources presently directed toward the health sector
had a negative impact negatively on the access to and utilization of services. The collapse of
public health spending during the last ten years has also had a negative effect on equity and has
reduced the impact of health services. Although the health sector provides only a fraction of the
inputs that affect health outcomes, public expenditure in health is potentially an important source
of equity-enhancing interventions. Without further Government expenditure on the health sector,
health service utilization across income groups will become even more unequal and skewed
toward the better off.
5.53 The second set of recommendations relates to the need to rationalize expenditures in the
sector and move to a more outpatient-oriented approach, with an emphasis on primary health
care. For this purpose, a major reallocation of staff within the health sector is needed, with a
substantial retraining program for health staff and a reduction in the number of medical
personnel. In addition, there should be a decrease in the number of facilities and hospital beds,
and an integration of specialist and general hospitals. To increase progress in this area, clear
targets for the number of hospitals and hospital beds should be set, as well as targets for
reductions in length of stay. Before decisions are made on downsizing the number of hospital
beds, however, the Government should investigate whether there are demand constraints that
prevent the population from using the hospital facilities. It would also be necessary to move
away from the current allocation of funds based on the number of hospital beds toward output-
based allocations, through providing financing based on actual services rendered.
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5.54 While there is a strong rationale for some interventions by the Government, as in the case
of public sector coverage of the cost of the extended program of immunization and public health
campaigns, the development of private sector participation in health care should also be
encouraged through the introduction of a carefully designed regulatory framework. Current plans
propose privatizing only unprofitable institutions, but consideration could also be given to
privatize other institutions in order to improve service delivery and to limit the size of informal
payments. As an initial step, the Government should refrain from building new hospitals and
should leave developments such as the new specialized hospitals in Baku to the private sector.
5.55 However, along with the proposed efficiency improvements, it is essential to improve the
access of the poor to, at very least, primary health care services. One way to accomplish this
would be to provide a basic package of medical services free to all citizens and to charge for
other services. This program would need to be combined with a more systematic monitoring of
user charges and wages in the public health care system. This would involve: (i) a merit-based
pay scheme for doctors; (ii) a review of the structure of formal fees to ensure that they do not
distort service supply; (iii) a review of the application of fees to ensure that proper controls are in
place to limit informal payments; and (iv) a review of the existing regulations to identify and
reform those that encourage informal payments.
5.56 Similarly, the accountability of health providers to the Azeri citizens and communities
needs to be strengthened considerably. This could be advanced by: (i) enhancing the self-
regulation of providers (through the setting up of professional associations and the provision of
technical standards, rules of ethics, and systems of accreditation and quality assurance); (ii)
strengthening the involvement of clients in monitoring performance (through patients'
associations, community-based services, and participatory approaches); and (iii) providing the
collective action of monitoring (through public expenditure tracking surveys, and information
and media campaigns). Unless such steps are taken, the poor, in particular, will continue to suffer
from the lack of essential services of an acceptable standard.
D. SOCIAL PROTECTION
Overview
5.57 The current social safety net system in Azerbaijan faces considerable problems. The
basic structure is still framed within the context of the FSU type of social programs, despite
the fact that the nature and structure of the economy has changed. Many safety net
programs are attempting to provide assistance to a large number of people, with the result that
benefit levels are very low and those most in need remain highly vulnerable. Program benefits
are thinly distributed among a large number of recipients with no real account of family need.
Some improvements in the level of public expenditures directed to social protection and social
provision could be seen during the second half of the past decade. During the period 1995-2000,
expenditures more than doubled in per capita terms, and expanded their share in total public
expenditures by nine percent in the same period (see Table 5.8). In 2000, social protection
expenditures of the consolidated government amounted to about 5.3 percent of GDP. Of this, 3.6
percent of GDP was allocated to pensions and 1.9 percent to a wide array of family allowances
and to other schemes such as disability and unemployment insurance.
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Table 5.8 Dynamics of Social Expenditures, 1995-2000
1995 1996 19971 1998 1999 2000
Social protection and social provision, AZM bln 468 701 917.2 1,049 1,046 1,237
Social protection and social provision as a share of 16.1 24.1 28.1 26.7 23.5 25.3
consolidated expenditures, %
Social protection and social provision as a share of 4.4 5.1 5.8 6.1 5.5 5.3
GDP, %
Social protection and social provision, US$ per 13.8 21.0 29.4 34.3 31.8 34.3
capita
Source: Macro-Policy Group of the Ministry of Finance.
5.58 T'he objectives of sociaR insurance and sociaR assist2nce has become obscured. Social
insurance is responsible for both labor (contributory) and social pensions, while social assistance
offers an array of supplements and allowances to both social and labor pensioners (not always
based on poverty criteria). As a result, the financing sources for labor and social pensions are
co-mingled. Labor pensions are relatively flat and increasingly de-linked from workers' wages,
and the difference between the social and labor pension has narrowed over time. Although the
flattening of labor pensions was an unavoidable response to the shrinking contribution base, it
weakens contribution incentives, thereby aggravating the system's collection problems and
creating an unfortunate vicious circle. The social insurance system faces a financial sustainability
problem owing to the collapse in the contribution base. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Protection of Population (MLSPP) is responsible for the implementation of social policy, the
analysis of the current social situation, and the preparation of new concepts. In addition, the
MLSPP carries out the administration of state homecare for the elderly, the disabled, and
children.
5.59 The bulk of social assistance in Azerbaijan is delivered thirough the off-budgetary
Social Protection Fund (SPIF), which pays social insurance benefits such as old age pensions as
and budget-financed social assistance in the form of allowances for groups of the population
considered to be vulnerable (see Table 5.9). The SPF is an independent agency, established
under the Cabinet of Ministers, responsible for the collection of mandatory state social security
contributions, the payment of pensions and social assistance allowances, and the financing of
employment actions and the resolution of social-communal problems of the disabled. It has 82
local offices in the rayons (districts). The local social protection branches are responsible for the
administration of social security privileges. In November 2001, the Parliament approved the Law
of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the "Amendments and Changes to the Social Insurance Law,"
intended to unify the collection of social security contributions for the Pension, Employrnent,
and Invalidity Funds. Since January 2002, the Government has brought the execution of SPF
funds under the Treasury. Together with the MLSPP, the SPF determines the funds required for
financing the pensions and allowances, employment actions, and resolutions of problems related
to the rehabilitation of the disabled.
Main Issues and Challenges
5.60 Most of the benefits are poorly targeted and the assistance does not vary according to the
needs. Furthermore, there are too many social safety net programs, providing assistance to a
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large number of people, which results in low replacement rates (as a percent of the average
wage) and has a limited impact on beneficiaries. 92
5.61 The most important family program is the benefit for low-income families, which
amounts to AZM 9,000 (3.5 percent of the average wage in 2001) per month per child under 16
(or under 18 if he/she is still in education) in cases where the average per capita household
monthly income is less than AZM 16,500 (roughly 6 percent of the average wage). Since roughly
60 percent of all children are under 18, there is the potential for a very high number of
beneficiaries. Despite the attempt to target low-income families, this program does not
properly link assistance to specific family needs. The allowance is financed with transfers
from the budget, and is income-tested. If income per family member in the previous quarter falls
short of AZM 16,500, the family receives an allowance of AZM 9,000 for each child under the
age of 16 (18 for students). The mother's employer performs the income test unless the mother
does not work, in which case the father's employer performs the test. Because the SPF only
considers officially recorded family income and transfers for the income test, families with
unrecorded income may benefit without being poor. Hence, the child allowance, although aimed
at poverty alleviation, gives rise to unequal treatment of similar households, and can discourage
work efforts.
5.62 Another major benefit program is the nonworking pensioner's allowance. The
pension system is highly compressed. About 35 percent of pensioners receive the minimum
pension and the average pension is close to AZM 80,000 compared with a minimum pension of
AZM 70,000. In addition to allowances for nonworking pensioners, the SPF pays the so-called
social pensions and guarantees a minimum level of pension income for those who do not have a
record of work history. Differentiation between the social pension benefit and the minimum
labor pension has been minimal in the past and at times the social pension benefit has been
higher than the minimum labor pension. The flat structure prevalent in the current system stems
from the dire financial straits experienced throughout the 1990s and from a conscious effort to
redistribute resources in order to guarantee a minimum subsistence level to all pensioners.
5.63 The nonworking pensioner's allowance and the allowance for single elderly persons
over 70 are not targeted toward the poorest elderly. Nonworking pensioners receive an
allowance in addition to their pension. Pensioners are presumed to be more vulnerable to
poverty, and the benefit is independent of the size of the old age pension and paid without regard
to other income by simply adding it to the regular pensions of nonworking pensioners. Similarly,
the allowance for the single elderly over 70 is granted indiscriminately.
5.64 Many other allowances are small and untargeted, and have similar objectives. These
benefits are financed by social insurance contributions. Employed mothers continue to receive
their previous wage from the SPF during maternity leave. After giving birth, mothers are entitled
to a monthly benefit of AZM 11,000 during the first 18 months and AZM 5,500 for the following
16 months for taking care of their children. Moreover, the SPF pays a one-time birth benefit of
92 Such low amounts are of limited assistance to a fanmly and mright not even justify their administrative costs if
they were properly accounted for. Adrmnistrative costs, however, are not adequately gauged since enterprise costs
for processmg and paying these allowances are not considered.
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AZM 50,000 to all new mothers independent of employment status. A one-time payment of
AZM 100,000 is also granted for funeral expenses. All of these benefits are relatively small and
indiscriminately reduce the income losses arising from maternity and death. The goal of the
maternity leave allowances and allowances to alleviate the cost of child-rearing seems to be
similar to the objectives of the one-time birth allowance. Table 5.9 presents a breakdown of SPF
expenditure.
Table 5.9 Social Protection Fund, 1995-2000
1995 1996 11997 1998 1999 2000
Total SPF Expenditures, AZM bln 533 795 844 947 1139 1330
Pensions 195 366 422 528 695 783
Allowances 325 393 404 400 418 471
child allowances 193 208 184 172 177 191
non-worlhngpensioners 99 131 141 117 136 142
Others 13 36 18 19 26 76
Memo
As a share of GDP, in percent
Total SPF expenditures as a share of GDP 5.0 5.8 5.3 5.5 6.0 5.6
Pensions 1.8 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.7 3.3
Allowances 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.2 1.9
Others 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
As a share of Total Expenditures of the SPF, in percent
Pensions 36.6 46.0 50.0 55.7 61.0 58.9
Allowances 61.0 49.4 47.9 42.3 36.7 35.4
child allowances as a share of total allowances 59.4 52.9 45.5 43.0 42.4 40.6
non-working pensioners as a share of total 30.5 33.3 34.9 29.3 32.7 30.1
allowances
Others 2.4 4.5 2.1 2.0 2.3 5.7
Sources: 1995-1999: IMF Country Report No. 00/121; 2000: IMF Country Report No. 02/41.
5.65 The SPIF also supports workers durGnig sickmess and pays for samatorium voueDners
out of social insurance contiributions. Incentives to keep expenditures for sick leave and
sanatorium vouchers in check are small. Sick leave benefits range from 60 to 100 percent of the
last wage depending on the length of the employee's tenure. Sanatorium vouchers finance 85
percent of a stay in a sanatorium, whatever the cost. The recipient of the voucher must finance
the 15 percent of the cost not covered by the voucher. Sanatorium voucher recipients are
generally selected through labor unions and not necessarily according to medical criteria, and
therefore the stays are more likely to amnount to subsidized vacations.
5.66 Spending on unemployment benefits or on active employment measures is not an
important budget item, despite widespread unemployment. In 2001 the expenditures of the
Employment Fund equaled AZM 20.7 billion or 0.08 percent of GDP (see Table 5.10). This is
one of the lowest ratios for employment programs among FSU states. The bulk of the
expenditures are spent on job creation programs, which mostly cover the creation of small
agricultural firms under the auspices of local employment offices. Participation in active labor
market programs is limited in scope. In 2001, 1,501 unemployed people participated in training
and retraining courses, and 2,950 individuals took part in public works programs. In some of the
cities, and especially in Baku, the Employment Department offers some other proactive job
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search measures, such as vacancy fairs, or labor exchanges in the form of matching short-term
job offers by private persons or firms with job applications.
Table 5.10 Budget of the General Employment Department, 2001
(AZM billion)
Unemployment benefits 2.0
Tramning and retraining 0.2
Public works 0.3
Job creation programs 12.7
Other programs (vacancy fairs, labor exchange, advertisements, etc.) 0.2
Administrative costs 5.3
Total 20.7
Source: General Employment Department.
5.67 The new Law on Employment enacted on August 9, 2001, establishes strict entitlement
and eligibility conditions for qualification for the status of an unemployed person, which may
partially explain the artificially low official unemployment rates. The requirements allowing
eligibility for the benefit are established according to the unemployment definition of the
International Labor Organization. At the end of 2001, 48,400 people were officially registered as
unemployed (3.7 million people were estimated as employed). In particular, any paid job,
including temporary work, is considered as a suitable job for the registered unemployed who are
seeking a job for the first time or after a long break (more than three years), or is without a
profession, or is long-term unemployed (unemployed over 18 months). According to the new
Law on Employment, in order to qualify for the benefit, paid work of 26 weeks in the last 12
months is required. The replacement rate of the benefit equals 70 percent of the amount of the
last wages and can be paid for 26 weeks in a 12-month period. In other cases, a minimum benefit
determined by local authorities is paid. Benefit sanctions are also rather strict. For example, for
the person who has refused two suitable job offers, or who did not register at the office once per
month, a temporary benefit stop of three months is implied. Only 6.4 percent of the registered
unemployed received unemployment benefits at the end of 2001; for the other registered
unemployed, the entitlement had expired or, as for graduates of educational establishments, they
were not eligible for the benefit. Nevertheless, the replacement rate of this benefit is high by
regional standards (37.1 percent of the average wage at the end of 2000).
Governmental Agenda
5.68 The Government of Azerbaijan fully recognizes the plight of pensioners and members of
poorer households and has stated its intent to provide a social safety net program that is fully
effective in alleviating poverty and that meets the needs of the most vulnerable. As reflected in
the draft PRSP and MTEF, the consolidated expenditures for social protection and social
security will increase over the coming three years, from 25.8 percent of consolidated budget
expenditures in 2002 to 26.9 percent in 2005.
5.69 In July 2001, the President approved a pension reform agenda that addresses both the
policy and the administrative problems of the current system. The Pension Reform Concept
Paper aims at: (i) enhancing the financial sustainability of the current pension system; (ii)
improving the contribution incentives by, inter alia, establishing closer links between
78
contributions and benefits; (iii) enhancing the pension system's transparency by eliminating
discretionary rules; and (iv) eliminating the existing inequities within the system by rationalizing
early retirement provisions and equalizing the male and female retirement age. The new system
will establish a greater distinction between labor and social pensions. As of January 2001, the
financing of social pensions had been fully transferred to the State Budget.
5.70 On the administration side of pension reform, the concept paper endorses the
introduction of individual records on workers' contributions and the unification under a single
institution of all pension administration functions-registration of workers, collection of
contributions, maintenance of records, and pension calculation and payment. The MLSPP has
prepared and submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers a draft Law on Pension Provision in
accordance with the principles of the Pension Concept Paper. The draft law transfers the
financing of all social and merit pensions to the state budget and the financing of labor pensions
to the SPF, increasing the system's transparency. The draft law also establishes a higher
retirement age (65 years) for social pensions relative to labor pensions, unifies the minimum
retirement age of men and women at 62; and significantly reduces the number of occupations
that benefit from early retirement provisions, raising in parallel the minimum retirement age of
these special groups. Pensions will gradually become based on entire length of service rather
than only on the last few contribution years.
5.71 As part of its strategy of strengthening the social safety net and simultaneously
developing financial discipline in the energy sector, the Government abolished preferential utility
tariffs in 2002. Rni SJanuary 2002, mumerrous social privileges to 25 categories of citizens were
abolished amd replaced with cash compensation to nine population groups. The privileges
had included a range of free or subsidized services and in-kind benefits, such as reduced
maintenance fees and tariffs for utilities, and discount fees on public transport; discounts on
phone tariffs; subsidized telecommunications services; free or subsidized pharmaceuticals and
medical service; and so on. Privileges were granted to both the poor and the rich through the
services consumed. Many low-income families were barred from access owing to unavailability
of services (e.g., communal services in most rural areas), which increased the regressive impact
of the subsidies.
5.72 The aboRition of privileges was complemented by the introduction of alternative
benelts. The minimum pension was increased by up to AZM 20,000, to AZM 70,000. The
highest compensation, AZM 90,000 per month, was allocated to people disabled in the Karabakh
conflict and other disabled war veterans, followed by a compensation level of AZM 85,000 to
participants in World War II, and AZM 60,000 to the widows of World War II participants.
These benefit levels to certain merit groups definitely exceed the actual loss of income due to the
abolishment of social privileges, predominantly in housing and public transport. Social privileges
can be highly distortionary and can result in wasteful consumption patterns, and this reform was
in geneieral an important step forwaird to impDrove thne reallocation of pubnic resoUrces t0
make the whole system more trransparent. As a result, since 2002 the number of social
assistance benefits to different categories of population was cut down to 32, of which only one is
pro formna means tested.
5.73 The authorities have acknowledged that there are targeting piroblems and are
committed to revising social assistance benefits and to improving the targeting. They are
79
committed to preparing a comprehensive social assistance reform strategy that will take into
account the complementarities of different social protection programs. Furthermore, they are
preparing a study assessing the targeting efficiency of social protection programs using data from
the revised household survey system. The next step would be to work out and approve a
medium-term strategy for enhancing the targeting of social assistance programs that is consistent
with a broader social protection framework. The planned improvements in poverty monitoring
and assessment capabilities will be a crucial tool in realizing this strategic intent.
Recommendations
5.74 There is an urgent need for a comprehensive reform of the social safety net system in
Azerbaijan. The impressive economic growth that has been recorded in the past few years, and
the expected larger growth rates in the future, have not been of benefit to all households and are
not likely to be beneficial to all households in the future. Furthermore, given the planned
adjustment to utilize tariffs in the energy sector, this will have a significant impact on the poorer
households. The creation of new employment opportunities will obviously help, but social
assistance will be needed for the most vulnerable, and such resources are scarce. Therefore, the
reformed systems must focus on the most vulnerable groups. Hence, the basic theme guiding
social assistance reform must be that eligibility is based on poverty criteria.
* Redirecting the social safety net toward well-targeted assistance
5.75 To better target the benefits to poor families and retirees, the income-tested child
allowance, the nonworking pensioner allowance, and the allowance for the single elderly could
be replaced by a unified cash benefit for families with children and pensioners. 93 This
benefit should be based on per capita family income, and it should pay a cash benefit for each
family member that is smaller for families with higher per capita incomes.
5.76 No cash benefit should be paid if the per capita family income exceeds a certain limit.94
The proposed benefit schedule should not have more than three discrete benefit levels designed
to preserve the relative income positions of the transfer recipients. This system would redirect
resources to the poorest families and pensioners and would mitigate the problem of work
disincentives at the income limit.95 The benefit could be designed to be cost neutral compared
with the current budgetary allocations for child and nonworking pensioner allowances. If desired,
the unified cash benefit could be expanded beyond families with children and pensioners later,
for example,- in the context of subsidy reform in the energy sector. Moreover, in the long term,
means testing should be improved through accounting for family assets and for informal sources
of income through appropriate proxies. The unified cash benefit could eventually become the
cornerstone of social assistance.
93 Families with children and retirees are considered to be the groups most vulnerable to poverty.
94 Such a system has been mtroduced m Ukraine to replace a variety of cash allowances.
95 The proposed schedule could still reverse the relative mcome levels of people above and below the cutoff level.
However, since people close to the cutoff would not receive the full per capita benefit as under the current rules, this
problem would be mitigated.
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5.77 Theere is a ineed to ireplace social pensions with budget-finameed social assistance and
to review the minimum pension. Social pensions should not be a separate form of social
assistance. Social assistance for the elderly without independent pension rights could be
combined with the unified cash benefit proposed above. The current minimum pension aims at
protecting those with small pensions from poverty and thus also fulfills a social assistance role.
Minimum pension provisions should be reviewed in the context of the proposed redesign of the
pension benefit formula.
5.78 There is a need to restructuire sick leave anad inc2rease the cost share of employees
and employers. Making at least the first three days of sick leave payments the employer's
responsibility would increase the incentive of employers to monitor the validity of sickness
claims. The employee's cost share for sanatorium vouchers should be raised to 50 percent. By
raising the employee's share from 15 to 50 percent, the incentive to take subsidized vacations at
the cost of the SPF would be reduced.
o Off-setfing thne impact onm the poor of thne efliminaion of preferentiaR tariffs
5.79 Following the experience of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and in the
FSU,9 6 Azerbaijan maay introducne several mitigating mechainisms to compensate for thne
elimination or redutnion of utility subsidies, or may fintroduce moore transparent and
monitorable forms of utility subsidies. Life-line tariffs can be one of the policy options for
utility services with metered or easily estimated consumption (i.e., for electricity, gas, and
district heat, especially as the metering of water supply becomes more widespread). This would
mean that the price subsidy would be restricted to the initial block of consumption (called the
basic need level). Starting in the early 1990s, most former Soviet states introduced subsidies to
limit the burden placed by utility expenditures on household budgets, with reference to either
actual utility expenditure or utility expenditure norms. The program compensated low-income
households for that portion of rent and public utilities, amounting to between 10 and 30 percent
of family income, depending on household size and income. Housing benefits are granted within
the social limit of total living space and utilities consumption standards, while any consumption
in excess of these standards will be paid according to the effective tariffs. Covering that part of
the utility bill that exceeds a given share of income thiroughn earmarked cash transfers is
another form of the utility subsidy mechanisms that provide selected households with cash
earmarked to pay part of their utility bills. A number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe
and the FSU have introduced general cash benefits targeding poor households. These non-
earmarked cash transfer mechanisms give complete freedom to households in deciding how to
use the money received to compensate for utility tariff increases.
o IDesigning unemploymenit pirograms
5.80 The cost effectiveness of active labor market programs (ALMPs) needs to be re-
assessed, and funds redirected from costly job creation programs to other programs. In areas with
frictional unemployment, counseling and job search assistance are more promising options.
Workers often lack information and confidence about how to look for a job. Also counseling can
96 "Maintaining Utility Services for the Poor. Policies and Practices in Central and Eastern Europe and the Forner
Soviet Union, " World Bank, 2000.
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be crucial in helping individual job seekers obtain information about education, training, and
alternative job opportunities, in making other employment services more demand-oriented, and
in better targeting expenditures for other employment services. In areas with structural
unemployment, displaced workers need to be re-skilled to compete and re-enter the labor market.
Different types of retraining, including on-the-job training and/or institutional training is needed
in these circumstances. In areas of high unemployment and in mono-enterprise communities
where many workers are laid off, different small business assistance services, as well as public
works programs can assist the workers and their families. However, based on an international
experience, there is a general consensus is that even under best scenarios, payoffs to ALMPs are
modest. It is difficult to address problems of large scale unemployment through these programs.
A better approach is to focus on labor market policies that eliminate obstacles to private job
creation.
E. MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT
5.81 The decentralization process was initiated in July 1999, when the Law on Municipal
Elections and the Law on the Status of Municipalities were passed by the Parliament. The first
local elections were held at the end of the same year. Municipalities have been created and
several key pieces of legislation have been passed, in particular those establishing the foundation
of municipal finance, and those on the transfer of assets to municipalities, on municipal finance,
and on municipal territory and lands.
5.82 Although this process has been implemented rapidly, major critical issues still need to be
addressed as responsibilities are being shifted at the local level. Thus, an incomplete and
confusing legal framework, municipal finance issues, economic development issues, questions
regarding the public participation issues, a lack of access to reliable basic urban services,
accountability and transparency of local governments, and public health concerns are tightly
intertwined in urban areas.
5.83 In considering the situation of municipalities, several key problems can be identified:
> The central government does not have a coordinated and systematic approach to
the municipal issues despite its genuine commitment to further decentralization.
This situation is a consequence of the following: (i) a lack of understanding of the
concepts of local government on the part of state officials; and (ii) the absence of a
central government body in charge of local issues and local governments.
> The role of the central government (through its local branches) is vaguely
defined in the laws, and this prevents municipalities from functioning normally.
In fact, the lack of clarity regarding the separation of the responsibilities of the central
government and the municipalities creates confusion in oversight, decisions, and
management in key areas such as taxes, municipal assets, local infrastructure, and
facilities. Furthermore, the lack of independence of the judicial and the legislative
branches in relation to the Government prevents the fair and equal treatment of
municipalities in cases of disputes or when decisions at the national or central level
are needed. This environment is worsened by the weak technical and managerial
capacity of these newly created municipalities. Therefore, the legal framnework needs
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to be further developed, and an adequate implementation plan should be defined and
followed by the Government, as laws would be worffiless if they were not
implemented after being adopted by the Parliament.
> The financial situation of the municipalnties is not secuored. Although the law
provides for identified sources of revenues for municipalities, including land and
property taxes, the application of this transfer remains incomplete and limited by the
municipalities' authority, ability, and willingness to coRllet thnese taxes. In any case,
the current revenues from these local taxes appears to be well below the minimum
needs of the municipalities to fulfill their increasing responsibilities. Even though the
central Government has the obligation to provide fiscal transfer under specific
conditions (i.e., when state decisions affect local budgets, or in cases of local budget
deficits), the scarcity of government funds and the lack of a transparent mechanism of
fiscal transfer would not constitute a reliable and stable source of revenues for
municipalities. A second major concern is the status of municipal propertnes. In
this case, also, the transfer of state properties to municipalities tends to be theoretical,
given the lack of clear procedures, and divergent or vested interests significantly
delay the transfer of highly profitable assets. The dispute resolution system currently
in place is not functioning well and does not allow for a foreseeable solution in the
near future.
> The accountability of the municipal elected bodies and emecutive branches is not
properly ensured from a flinanacial standpoint. Indeed, the law does not provide
clear rules and procedures in this regard. Although local budgets should be compliant
with the general standards of budget preparation in use, there are no minimum
financial safeguards determined transparently at the national level and no standard
local budget formats and reporting procedures.
> Rni view of the above, thelre is an urgenit nneed to clarify aind implement a coheDrennt
inter-governmental framework between the central Governmenit and the
municipalities, in order to tackEe the key issues identifled above. Such an
objective is even more critical considering the fact that both the incidence and
severity of poverty are greater in urban areas on average (and are even more severe if
Baku is excluded) than in rural areas, as described in the preliminary findings of the
draft Poverty Assessment Study and further acknowledged by the Government in its
state program on poverty reduction and economic growth.
5.84 Rn the irural areas, municipalities have considerable responsibilities in the
maintenance of ruoraD infrastructunre and the delivery of a range of essential services. As
noted earlier in this report, these municipalities have limited revenue-raising opportunities, with
the result that the quality of rural services has suffered. The Governnent is committed to
increase the flow of resources available to these municipalities. The State Budget and the Oil
Fund will have a role in this, but the Government is also investigating the possibilities of
alternative finance and delivery mechanisms for rural infrastructure. In this regard, the
Government is reviewing the necessary regulatory and legislative frameworks governing
municipal service partnerships that would include the private sector and community service
organizations.
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Recommendations
5.85 Municipal development and the issues of fiscal decentralization are important for the
successful development and implementation of the PRS and the PIP. Fiscal decentralization has
many benefits, especially when it brings beneficiaries much closer to service providers, thereby
improving accountability. However, this must occur within a framework in which
responsibilities are clearly and unambiguously defined and this is linked to a clear revenue
source. There is an urgent need to clarify and specify more rigorously the public
expenditure role of municipalities and districts and to ensure that the objectives and goals
set out in the MTEF, the PIP, and the PRS are not undermined by confusion over the
responsibilities for the achievement of these objectives. This would be particularly dangerous
with regard to future public investment activities, which might involve capital expenditure from
a line ministry but a maintenance and operational expenditure commitment from a different level
of public administration. Indeed, the Government should initiate a phased strategy consisting of
the following major tasks:
> Creating or appointing a government body in charge of municipal issues which
would define the governmental policy on decentralization and would coordinate and
address local matters.
> Defining and implementing the government policy and administrative action
plan for municipalities that would address: (i) the issues of clarification of the
functions and responsibilities between the local branches of the state administration
and the municipalities; (ii) the issues of adequate and homogeneous budgeting
systems for municipalities; and (iii) the establishment of transparent safeguards and
controls for municipal budgeting systems.
> Defining and implementing the intergovernmental fiscal framework between the
central Government and the municipalities, including the creation of a transparent
fiscal transfer mechanism and the finalization of the transfer of state properties to
municipalities.
> Strengthening the financial, technical, and managerial capacity of the newly
created municipalities, allowing them to: (i) preserve and invest in local
infrastructure and facilities, (ii) provide reliable access to basic infrastructure and
services, and (iii) foster economic development by removing the barriers to private
sector development.
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F. AGRiCULTURE AND RURAL IDEVELOPMENT'
Overview
5.86 Aggriculture has traditionally accounted for a sizable portion of GIDP and
empRoyment in Azerbai.an. In 1990 agriculture and forestry accounted for 27 percent of GDP
and 31 percent of employment. 98 By 2000, employment in agriculture and forestry (including
self-employment) had grown to 41 percent of total employment, and agriculture appeared to be
the overwhelmingly dominant employer in rural areas. The sector's portion in GDP fell to 18
percent, indicating a substantial income gap for those employed in agriculture. Indeed, despite
recent output growth, returns in agriculture are still low and are not able to incite investments in
the sector. Less than one percent of capital investments in Azerbaijan are targeted toward the
agriculture sector.
5.87 In the period from 1990 to 1995, agricuRture poRieces aimed at preserving the
collective and state farm system. However, the system broke down under the pressures of war,
loss of export demand, inflation, and falling state input supplies, which led to a drastic fall in
agricultural production The output decline can be attributed exclusively to state and collective
farms, whose output contracted by 70 percent during that period, while private and household
farm production fell by only 10 percent.
5.88 lin addition to policy concerns Azerbaijan faced a particuarly devastating negative
demand shock for food exports when the intra food trade arrangements of the FSU fell apart.
The breakup of the FSU meant that Azerbaijan lost its traditional markets for agricultural
products and processed food. In the late 1980s Azerbaijan exported one-third of its vegetable
production, about 40 percent of its fruit production, and between 20 and 30 percent of its
vegetable oil to other FSU republics, primarily to Russia. By 1995, exports of vegetables, fruits,
and vegetable oils accounted for less than 5 percent of production.9 9
5.89 AgriculturaD policies changed abruptRy in 1995 with the issuing of decrees om farm
and land reform, aimed at signnTicant privatization of agricultural land and assets. The
fann and land reform led to three important changes in Azerbaijan agriculture: first, there was
significant, though not total, privatization of agricultural land. Thus, the asset base of private
households increased, allowing agricultural production to recover to 65 percent of its level of
1990. Second, the privatization of land into small and fragmented land parcels changed the
nature of farming in Azerbaijan. Farming is now predominantly on small land holdings, many of
which are fragmented into smaller parcels. Land fragmentation has changed the technology of
97 The section is drawn from "Azerbaijan Continuing Public Expenditure Reform," IMF, June 2000, and
"Azerbaijan Rural Poverty Assessment," World Bank 2002, (draft).
98 Employment includes agncultural enterprises, private farms, and self-employment in household farms. State
Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan, "Agriculture of Azerbaijan 2001," pp. 4347.
99 Sources are: 1987-1989: Trade: Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agnculture
http:!/w, .ers. usda.ov/data/sdp/view .asp?f-inteniationaia/97003/, http://w -jyers.usda. dov/_ta/psd; 1987-1989:
Production: State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, "Azerbaijan in XX Xentury," Vol. 1, pp. 261,
270; 1995 data from food balances: Vol. 2, pp. 457-461.
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farming in Azerbaijan. Third, partly in response to the change in farm size and ownership, the
mix of production has changed.
5.90 Land reform resulted in a substantial growth in agricultural production by rural
households and contributed to poverty reduction among the rural population which accounts for
49 percent of the total Azeri population.10° Nevertheless, 42.5 percent of this rural population
are poor, and 13 percent are extremely poor.' 0 1 Rural households depend heavily on agriculture:
about 92 percent engage in agriculture production and 53 percent generate their income from
agriculture. Hence, reviving agriculture is an important element of any rural poverty
reduction strategy. This should include not only the quantitative expansion of production, but
also a focus on increasing the diversification of production and creating a stronger market
orientation.
Main Issues and Challenges
5.91 Although the successful farm and land reform was instrumental in stimulating
agricultural growth and although it contributed to poverty reduction among rural households,
there is a need to continue reforms in the sector in order to consolidate the poverty reduction
achievements by making growth in rural incomes sustainable.
5.92 The primary means of ensuring sustainable growth in agriculture is technological
change (i.e., increases in productivity). Despite a high output growth in agriculture over recent
years, in the medium term household farms will find that without an increase in productivity or
an expansion to new markets, net revenues from agricultural production will stagnate.
Stagnation in agriculture implies stagnation in a substantial portion of the non-oil sector of the
Azeri economy, because agriculture is the second largest economic sector by GDP and the
largest sector by employment.
5.93 Increasing productivity requires a knowledge of new technologies such as hybrid seeds or
cultivation techniques; investment in soil management, machinery, and business accounting
techniques; the application of fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides; a working irrigation system;
and perhaps increases in farm size. Investment and working capital often require seasonal or
longer-term credit. A second concern for ensuring sustainable growth in agriculture is that the
domestic demand for food should grow, despite inelastic demand. This can occur through
increasing domestic demand through providing more employment or by developing new
markets. The Azeri Government can play a pivotal role in supporting technological change
'°° The approaches used to compare the results of the 1995 and 2001 household surveys take into account changes
in the assets (increases in land and livestock herds) of rural households, and estimate changes in poverty from
functional relationships between agricultural assets and per capita expenditures m a base year. Using a poverty line
of 60 percent of median expenditures, from 1995 to 1998 real rural expenditures per capita increased by nearly 10
percent, lowering the poverty headcount by 3.9 percent; from 1998 to 2001 expenditures per capita mcreased by 5.7
percent and the poverty headcount decreased by 2.2 percent.
101 The absolute poverty line of AZM 120,000 is used for poverty classification. Individuals are classified as poor
when their monthly per capita consumption expenditure falls below this level. Individuals are denoted as extreme
poor, when their monthly per capita total consumption expenditure falls below 60 percent of the median of the entire
sample. This relative poverty line is AZM 72,366 per capita and per month.
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in agriculture and the expaunsioun of employment opportunities in rural areas. The following
paragraphs discuss key policy priorities that the Government needs to consider to maintain
positive developments in the sector.
5.94 I[ mpiroving public services in rural areas wiRl not only impirove irural lviing
conditions but will also create opportunities for investments ini the ru-ral econmoy.
Outcomes of the World Bank's Rural Infrastructure Survey in Azerbaijan, conducted in 2000,
show that the majority of respondents pointed to the pooor quaRity of Ainfrastrructure as
providing the main impediments to rural deveRopment. These impediments include, but are
not limited to: the high cost of transportation services imposed by intra-village and inter-village
road system; the availability and quality of drinking water; and, most important, shortages in
heating, gas, and electricity supply. Access to public services is worse in rural than in urban
areas. Not only does this create living conditions that discourage people and businesses from
locating in rural areas, but it also deprives the rural population of opportunities for developing
agriculture and other private sector enterprises. The perceived lack of opportunities and the gap
in living standards leads to substantial rural-urban migration. This could increase poverty in
Azerbaijan, since rural migrants may not be immediately employable and may end up in low-
paying jobs.
5.95 State support for advisory services and agricultural research is essenmtial to ensure
change in smaRl-scale private agriculture. Azerbaijan inherited the FSU's system of
agricultural services, which relied on an extensive system of research stations and teaching
institutions supporting agronomists and technical specialists who worked as employees of state
and collective farms. With the privatization of the state and collective farms and the emergence
of smallholder agriculture, and with the budgetary realities of post-Soviet rule, this system of
research and extension has essentially collapsed. Rather than continuing to fund the existing
unreformed research system or creating a state-funded advisory service, state support should
concentrate on those activities that cannot be supplied by markets. Small farmers do not have the
resources to perform research, or to test and develop new seed varieties, soil tilling techniques, or
pest control packages suitable for the country's environment. Moreover, large international seed
or chemical companies are probably less interested in developing particular products for
Azerbaijan than in supplying larger, more lucrative markets in developed countries. In order to
bring the fruits of research and information on productivity enhancing techniques to the farmers,
a system of applied agricultural research and testing institutes is needed, along with a system of
agricultural advisory services with private sector involvement.
5.96 There is currently no compnrehensive information aRnd advisory service system in
place. Expenditures on information by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) cover only media
activities and amount to US$44,000 or 0.1 percent of the budget of the three institutions
considered here. This level is far too low to establish an adequate advisory service system for
farmers. Applied agricultural research, including experimental farming, is part of a government
effort to advise farmers on farming techniques, seed technology, and other matters. The MOA
and the State Committee for Amelioration and Water Resources currently allocate US$121,000
and US$28,000, respectively, for fees for scientific and research services, and the institutions
allocate a so-called "scientific expenditure" of US$1.4 million. These expenditure items amount
to four percent of the agriculture budget, which is relatively high. Possibly, the Ministry's
allocation includes the allocation of resources to state farms that have not been privatized and
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that serve as research farms, but the exact amount of these allowances is not available. It is
therefore difficult to assess the spending on agricultural research. In 2001 the Veterinary and
Quarantine Committees were included in the MOA. In 2001, spending on veterinary quarantine
services amounted to US$2.3 million or 6 percent of the agriculture budget. This is a relative
high amount considering that farmers using these services can finance a considerable part of
veterinary services privately. Without a more detailed cost breakdown, it is impossible to assess
this cost item in more detail.
5.97 The development of a working rural land market in Azerbaijan depends on the
timely issue of titles to landowners, as well as the enforcement of land tenure rights. The
fact that many household farmers have not received their land titles is often blamed for the
underdevelopment of a land market in Azerbaijan. The state can be of assistance in developing a
rural land market by operating regional land registration offices that would better distribute land
titles to farmers. Many farmers have yet to receive land titles, although the State Land
Committee insists that nearly 100 percent of titles have been issued. The problem seems to lie in
the distribution of land titles through local authorities, who often delay distribution to farmers.
The Government is supposed to set up regional land registration centers under the World Bank
Agriculture and Rural Development Project. However, funds for this purpose could not be found
in the 2001 approved budget. The State Land and Cartography Committee assigns 85 percent of
its budget (US$2.5 million) to mapping, cartography, and geodesy services. This corresponds to
six percent of the agriculture budget.
5.98 Developing new marketing channels is important for increasing income in
agriculture. New markets could be found in Azerbaijan first by marketing more competitive
food products in urban areas. Increasing the competitiveness of food products could best be
achieved by forming agricultural marketing cooperatives to bring produce to urban markets and
by supporting a domestic food industry that can compete with imports. A domestic food industry
able to compete with foreign imports could expand to markets outside of Azerbaijan.
5.99 Agriculture in Azerbaijan is highly dependent on irrigation, with nearly 75 percent of
total cultivated area under irrigation. Yet, during the past decade, operations and maintenance
budgets have been far below the levels required to properly maintain the infrastructure. As a
result, the main and irrigation distribution systems and drainage channels have not been
maintained well and infrastructure facilities are deteriorating quickly. Two-thirds of the
respondents to the Rural Infrastructure Survey cited major problems with irrigation, mostly in the
form of inadequate supply and untimely water delivery from the main canals.,0 2 Moreover, the
existing on-farm irrigation systems are frequently not well suited to the needs of the new smaller
farms emerging from privatization.
5.100 A major institutional reform should go hand in hand with efforts to rehabilitate the
existing system. The Soviet structure was designed for a small number of large collective and
state farms without regard for economic viability based on market prices. In order to make the
irrigation system financially viable, the financing and operation of the system should be
rethought from the farm level up. Farm privatization means that farmers themselves are
responsible for the upkeep and control of the water distribution system through Water
102 Government of Azerbaijan, "Rural Infrastructure Services in Azerbaijan," Sector Note, January 2001.
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IUser Associations (WIAs). This makes the management and financing of irrigation system an
issue of a vital importance. Currently, the Government, represented by the State Committee for
Amelioration and Water Resources, owns and operates the irrigation system up to the farm gate,
and maintains extensive infrastructure and staff. User participation in investments and in
operations and maintenance is still low This applies to the on-farm irrigation distribution
infrastructure. Most farmers lack experience in managing irrigation systems and are still
unorganized. The Government started to develop a long-term strategy for the irrigation and
drainage sector. To date, it has adopted key legislation, including the Law on Amelioration and
Irrigation (1996), the Water Code (1997), and a resolution on the establishment of WUAs, cost
recovery mechanisms, and operations and maintenance at the farm level. According to the
Committee for Amelioration and Water Resources, a total of 574 WUAs existed by April 2002,
covering 621,965 hectares (44 percent of irrigated arable land). However, it is reported that the
WUAs do not yet function properly.
5.101 Expenditure for rehabilitating the irrigation system is shown in the budget of the
Committee for Amelioration and Water Resources. The Committee spends about US$21 million
on irrigation, and about 50 percent of its budget is spent on the purchase of equipment and fees
for reparation and on capital assets. While the overall share in total agriculture expenditure on
irrigation amounts to about 50 percent and represents the most important expenditure item, the
overall amount still falls short of the amount necessary to rehabilitate the irrigation system and to
support the formation of WUAs. It is not clear whether the budget of the Committee for
Amelioration and Water Resources includes allocations to WUAs.
5.102 The Back of runral financial services, particularly of credit for seasonalR fmancing and
for smaRl capital improvements, is a major constraint to expainded investment in
agricultuDre and ruiral enterprises. The Government's decision to close the State Agriculture
Bank has meant a move away from the direct provision of such financing. It is often suggested
that the Government could alleviate rural credit demand by extending small loans on
concessional terms. In general, the record of state-run credit facilities is poor. Therefore, the role
of the Government has shifted to providing a legal and regulatory environment conducive to the
development of a viable private rural financial system. Privately managed microcredit facilities
can be an important source for filling in the existing gap in seasonal financing.
5.103 Currently, the Government does not financially support the development of the rural
credit system, apart from the credit components of the World Bank-financed Farm Privatization
and Agriculture and Credit Development projects. Preparations are currently under way to fund
a rural credit system, but there were no outlays in 2001.
5.104 Another Major concern regardinmg rural development is the deveRopmenit of
nonagiricultunral employment inn runral areas. Nonagricultural employment ranges from retail
stores, to industrial food production, to trade and other industry. An important part of
nonagricultural employment is industrial food production. In Azerbaijan, this was an export
industry in Soviet times. Production fell further than that of agriculture, and the industry has
been very slow to recover. However, rural households are in many ways dependent on the
recovery of industrial food production, both as demand for agricultural production and for
employment. Thus, problems in the food industry have a direct impact on rural households.
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5.105 Strengthening the agricultural sector and reducing poverty in rural areas requires
the reform of Government services to the sector and a comprehensive investment program.
For this purpose, the Government needs to reform the sector's financing system. In 2001 the
agriculture budget amounted to AZM 196 billion (about US$40.6 million), about 6 percent of the
total central budget. The overall amount earmarked for agriculture is low in view of the sector's
challenges justifying public sector support. In addition, the composition of the budgets of the
institutions dealing with agriculture should be revised in order to bring the budget in line with the
defined priorities of the agriculture sector. The current agriculture budgets of the MOA, the State
Committee for Amelioration and Water Resources, and the State Land and Cartography
Committee do not provide the spending levels in the necessary priority areas. Table 5.11
attempts a breakdown of the agriculture's budget by major priority areas. Since the budgets do
not provide sufficiently detailed information on how the money is spent, the table is only
indicative.
Table 5.11 Breakdown of the Agriculture Budget by Major Priority Areas for Government Spending
2001 Percent
Priority Areas (US$'000) in total
Administrative expenditure 12,045 30.8
Advisory services 44 0.1
Agricultural research 1,507 3.9
Land registration 2,457 6.3
Veterinary services 2,340 6.0
Rural credit system 0 0.0
Rehabilitating the irrigation system and supporting the formation
of WUAs 20,687 52.9
Total 39,081 100.0
Sources: Year 2001 budgets of MOA, the State Committee for Amelioration and Water Resources, and the State Land and
Cartography Committee.
5.106 The agriculture budget given in Table 5.11 does not permit an analysis of-the levels
and structure of revenues generated by the sector. Yet it is clear that cost recovery principles
should be applied where feasible and to the extent possible (i.e. notably in irrigation, advisory
services, veterinary services, and micro-finance systems).
5.107 Administrative expenditures are extremely high at about 30 percent of the total
agriculture budget. The main contributors are communication and communal services (14
percent) and spending on salaries and pensions (eight percent). 103
5.108 At present, the overall budget share of agriculture spending is too low in view of the
sector's challenges justifying public sector support. Obviously, resources are restricted, and
policy decisions need to assign priorities to expenditure allocations. The current budget structure
suggests that higher expenditure shares on irrigation and support to rural credit are justified.
Expenditure on administration, agriculture research, land registration, and veterinary services
could be downsized in relative terms. Absolute amounts might still need to increase in some
103 It should be noted that major parts of the overall spending on wages/salaries/pensions and of the expenditure on transport
were attributed to veterinary services and irrigation rehabilitation.
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instances. The priority areas for Government spending in order to achieve sustainable increases
in agricultural incomes are given below.
Governmental Agenda
5.109 The Govenmmenmt of Azerbaijanm perceives gagrAniltuire a$s core nnon-onD sector and
recommends close attention to the sector Ani thne oungoing ?IRS? process. The Government has
expressed its commitment to continue institutional reforms related to the sector in particular, and
to rural development as a whole. As admitted in the PRS paper, the overlapping of
responsibilities between the MOA and numerous state conmmittees is one of the sources of
inefficiency. The PRS paper cites the following priorities, among others: (i) involving the private
sector in veterinary services, medical provision, and technical assistance; (ii) creating the
conditions for the establishment of credit unions and micro-credit banks, as well as increasing
state transfers to agriculture to improve the financial provision of farmers; (iii) increasing
productivity through the establishment of farmers' unions; and (iv) creating marketing channels
for farmers' products. As part of the effort to unify public sector wages, and as envisaged by the
MTEF, the wage bill for agriculture, fishing, and forestry will be increased. Additionally,
expenditures on the sector in proportion to GDP will increase from 3.1 percent of GDP in 2001
to 4.4 percent by 2005.
1Recommnendations
5.110 Given the high reliance on agriculture in rural areas and the potential of the sector, a rural
poverty reduction strategy that builds on agricultural growth is both essential and feasible in
Azerbaijan. There is much room for improving the capacity of central and local governments.
The Government also needs to envisage sufficient funds for investments in rural infrastructure
through the PIP.
IRehabilitating the iirrigation system and supporting tlhe formtadoni of WUAs
> Develop a feasible plan for restructuring and rehabilitating the irrigation system and
pursue irrigation rehabilitation on the basis of economic viability.
> Apply and extend user charges for irrigation systems.
> Conceive and carry out the institutional reform of irrigation management systems at
the community, district, regional, and central levels.
> Finance private specialized technical support for the formation of WUAs.
Supporting the development of the runrall eredit system
> Reform the financial sector.
> Review the performance of micro-finance schemes in Azerbaijan and in the region
and design a strategy for providing micro-finance services that are financially and
operationally feasible and are targeted to the poor.
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> If the above analysis justifies it, allocate state funds to a revolving fund that can
serve as a refunding source for privately implemented and financially feasible micro-
credit schemes such as credit cooperatives.
Providing land markets
> Ensure that land titles actually reach landowners, rather than local officials.
> Liquidate unprofitable agricultural enterprises and distribute the land and assets.
> Improve local pasture management and provide access for the poorest.
Develop and implement a strategy for land conservation and rehabilitation.
Improving the delivery of public services
> Implement large-scale investments in improving rural infrastructure (electricity,
heating, roads, drinking water, social infrastructure, communications).
> Ensure that large-scale investments in infrastructure networks (gas, power, main
roads, etc.) are continue with a clear priority setting and some coordination with
lower level entities to assure an impact on rural areas.
> Provide small-scale solutions to rural infrastructure problems, in addition to ongoing
large-scale infrastructure investments. Small-scale investments can improve living
conditions, even poor communities could afford some of these investments and would
benefit directly.
> Provide technical assistance to municipalities to improve the delivery of municipal
services and infrastructure (as defined in the Section E, above) in compliance with
economic principles and community priorities.
Establishing information and advisory services for the private farming sector
> Test service delivery schemes and a fee system that permits high cost recovery of
services and enables the poorest to benefit from services.
> Set up a market information system for farmers and disseminate the information
through the press and other outlets such as the advisory service system.
> Apart from technical training, include business training and marketing in the
spectrum of advisory services. Consider sponsoring trade promotion fairs and
seminars within and outside of Azerbaijan to introduce Azeri products to new
markets.
Establishing and strengthening veterinary disease control and veterinary services
> Define the veterinary services that are to be delivered publicly and downsize state
services accordingly.
> Finance one-time technical support to private providers of veterinary services.
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ProMotifng agricultural research
> Downsize and restructure agriculture research in Azerbaijan in accordance with the
needs of private farmers.
> Allocate public funding for agriculture research through a competitive research grant
system.
> Ensure the dissemination of agriculture research results through an extension system.
5.111 The legal and regulatory environment is to be adjusted to allow rural credit cooperatives
to emerge and thereby contribute to an improvement in the availability of finance in the rural
areas.
Providing off-farm employment
> Improve the business environment, for example, by simplifying the business licensing
process for agro-business, reducing the processing time and making the system more
transparent.
> Break the prevailing culture of individual rent-seeking at the local and central levels,
and reform the malfunctioning judiciary system.
> Introduce a regular policy dialogue that can serve as a forum to present agro-
processors' situations and needs to representatives from the Government, from banks,
and from other services suppliers as well as raw material suppliers, and clients.
> Business training programs should be instituted to increase non-farm employment in
areas such as handicrafts, wood products, rural tourism, etc. Such training programs
could involve grants for market studies for such products and services.
G. GENERAL WATER AND SAN]ITATION1"
Overview and Main Issues
5.112 Water supply and samitation systems througlhout the countnry have beein starved of
the appiropriate nevels of operating and i]mvestment expefditures. The deteriorating water
and sanitation infrastructure has resulted in a considerable drop in water quality, with obvious
dangers to health. The most severe consequences have been in rural areas. Close to 95 percent of
households in Baku and other primary cities are connected to a piped water supply as compared
to 83 percent in secondary cities and small towns. Only 11 percent of rural households are
connected to piped water, with the result that water quality is highly variable (although this
percentage may be an underestimate as services provided by collective farms and agricultural
enterprises from individual wells or irrigation canals are not included in the official statistics).
The wastewater network in Baku serves 78 percent of its population. However, only 50 percent
104 This section is drawn from "Azerbaijan: Continuing Public Expenditure Reformns," IMF, June 2000, and "Water
Supply and Sanitation Sector: Review and Strategy," Government of Azerbaijan.
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of the wastewater in Greater Baku receives treatment and the untreated surplus is discharged
primarily into the Caspian Sea. In other urban areas, coverage drops to 32 percent. The rural
population relies on on-site solutions, primarily latrines and drain fields.
5.113. Government subsidies and capital investments in the water sector have fallen, which
has resulted in an alarming deterioration of the existing infrastructure and in lowered
reliability. On average, water is available to individual households in Greater Baku about 22
days per month, four hours per day. These water shortages tend to affect lower income
households more adversely as they spend a higher proportion of their incomes on coping
strategies.
5.114 Similar to the energy sector, the country's water systems suffer from a low
collection of payments, an extremely low collection of revenues in cash, insufficient tariff rates
to cover operations, maintenance and replacement costs, and the high cross-subsidization of
residential consumers by other consumer categories. The sector's technical problems are tied to a
financial crisis resulting from the problems listed below.
> Low collection of water and wastewater bills. Utilities under supervision of the
Committee for Housing and Communal Property (CHCP) collect about 40 percent of
billings, and although the ARWC has made important improvements in collection, its
progress has stagnated in the last two years.
> Extremely low collection of revenues in cash. CHCP utilities collected only 14
percent of 1998 revenues in cash; ARWC collected only 24 percent.
> Insufficient tariffs to cover operations, maintenance, and replacement costs.
> High cross-subsidy of domestic consumers by other customer categories. Across-the-
board price subsidies place a heavy burden on the Government budget and industry,
fail to target the truly poor, and encourage wasteful water consumption.
Governmental Agenda
5.115 The Government has already undertaken initial institutional reforms in the water
supply and sanitation sector, including the recent approval of a National Water Supply and
Wastewater Law, the creation of an independent joint stock company, Abspheron Regional
Water Company (ARWC) for water supply services in Baku, the decentralization of
responsibility for municipal water and wastewater services to local government, and the merging
of the agency in charge of rural water supply into the CHCP.
5.116 The Government has stated that it will target public expenditures in three key areas
of water supply and sanitation. A high priority will be given to the extension of the water
supply and sanitation network to rural areas. However, given the current status of decay of the
existing network, this strategy appears arguable. It would be more reasonable to direct scarce
capital funds to preventing further collapse of the existing networks, which would serve the
majority of households, both in rural and urban areas. Support will also be given to municipal
wastewater treatment facilities, which either have fallen into disrepair or simply do not exist, and
which pose obvious health dangers. Finally, within the main urban centers, the Government will
seek a speedier installation of water meters to ensure that users are charged appropriately and
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that suppliers receive a more regular and adequate revenue flow to ensure the appropriate
maintenance of the existing infrastructure.
Recommendations
5.117 The magnitude of the required investment is difficult to determine accurately. Rough
estimates indicate more than US$1,500 million may be needed to provide water services on a par
with Western Europe but with only basic wastewater services. Clearly, improving sector services
in Azerbaijan to fully acceptable levels requires a timeframe measured in decades. The
immediate challenge is to prevent collapse and restore basic service levels. The pace at which
progress can be achieved depends largely on Azerbaijan's ability to undertake the following
measures.
> Increase resource mobilizaton from all sources. Because the Government will not be
able to contribute significantly, the only realistic financing source will be higher
payments from consumers augmented by borrowings and grant contributions.
Affordability and willingness-to-pay will be limiting factors, given the current low
collection of low tariffs.
> Ensure the cost-effective use of resources. hnproved productivity for the sector
agencies, more efficient operations, and the concentration of scarce resources on cost-
effective and high-priority investment opportunities are essential.
> Encourage the private sector's efforts in providing investment as well as in providing
operating expertise.
> Rationalize the tariff structure and complement this with targeted assistance, Within
the existing tariff structures there are many anomalies. While water is a basic human
need, there is no clear justification for the excessive cross-subsidization in water
provision supplies that presently occurs, especially since there is no targeting that
provides relief to poorer households. Actions must be taken to increase the collection
rates, bring tariffs closer to full cost-recovery and thus remove implicit and explicit
subsidies and cross-subsidies. As subsidies are phased out and tariffs rise, particular
attention must be given to protecting the most vulnerable segments of the population.
If there exists a rationale for some subsidies on water provision, then they should be
made explicit, and they should be targeted in a transparent and efficient manner.
> Attribute an appro,prate regional emphasis to the policies. For urban areas, there is
an urgent need for rigorous collection of bills in cash; setting of tariff levels for full
cost recovery; transparent, targeted and efficient subsidies; and improved financial
management and planning. The rural sector requires a fundamental shift of
responsibility. Communities should decide whether to participate and at what level of
service, based on the willingness to pay capital and operating costs. Communities
should set tariffs to meet a system's financial requirements. Government subsidies for
rural water supply should be transitional and targeted to communities on a one-time
basis. The Government should coordinate all sources of finance and should balance
urban and rural sector priorities.
ANNEXES
I
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ANNEX 1. ESTIMATION OF THE QUASI-FISCAL DEFICIT FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR IN 2001
1. This annex estimates the quasi-fiscal deficit for 2001 by the main components that
contribute to the overall quasi-fiscal deficit:
* Market Value of SOCAR's and AIOC's Domestic Oil and Gas Deliveries
2. In 2001 SOCAR supplied 45.7 million barrels of crude oil to its refineries. Of 43.6
million barrels of oil products that SOCAR's refineries produced, 16.2 million barrels were
exported. Given that 37 percent of oil products were exported, crude oil for the domestic market
can be calculated at approximately 28.8 (=45.7*0.63) million barrels in 2001. A flow chart for
SOCAR's oil is shown below. For the gas sector, SOCAR produced 4.4 bcm gas and imported
3.5 bcm gas in 2001. In addition, AIOC produced 0.9 bcm gas which was also delivered to the
domestic market. As shown in Table 1, the market value of oil and gas supplied to the domestic
market in 2001 is 3,957 billion manat. At a GDP of 26,500 billion manat, this is about 11.6
percent of GDP.
|Export of crude oil |8 (17.6 mln barrels) | Export of oil products
SOCAR's crude oil / _ (16.2 mln barrels)
production Oil products Fuel oil to Azerenergy
Crude oil to (43.6 rn149lnbares
refineries
Oil products to other
domestic users
(12.5 mn barrels)
Table 1. Market Value of Domestic Oil and Gas Supplies, 2001
Value Value
Quantity World Market Transport (in million (in billion)
Price in US$ Cost US$)
SOCAR crude oil 28.8 mnln 24.3 $2.9/barrel 615.6 2,864.9
barrels
SOCAR gas production 4.44 bcm 10.0 44.4 207.0
SOCAR gas import 3.53 bcm 51.4 181.3 844.0
AIOC gas 0.90 bcm 10.0 9.0 42.0
Total 8503 3,957.0
Sources: SOCAR and IMF staff estimates.
97
o Expenditures of Azerenergy. Azerigas and SOCAR Refineries in 2001
3. Table 2 shows Azerenergy's cost of producing and distributing' electricity, Azerigas's
cost of distributing gas and SOCAR's refining cost, excluding fuel cost and debt amortization.
Because 37 percent of SOCAR's oil products were exported in 2001, the calculation of domestic
energy subsidies includes only 63 percent of SOCAR's total refining cost, or 760.9 billion
manat.
Table 2. Expenditures of Azerenergy, Azerig2s and SOCAR Refineries, 2001
AZM billion Azerenergy* Azerigas SOCAR Refineries
Wages 69.0 17.4 30.7
Taxes 87.2 49.7 726.0
Social contributions 9.0 6.6 15.2
Maintenance and operational cost 101.7 19.4 435.9
Total cost 266.9 93.1 1207.7
* Preliminary
Sources: Azerenergy, Azengas, SOCAR, and IMF staff estimates.
O Subsidies Implicit in Domestic Energy Policies in 2001
4. The actual revenue from domestic energy deliveries in 2001 amounted to 2,004 billion
manat in total, comprised of 520 billion manat for Azerenergy, 120 billion for Azerigas, and
1,364 billion for SOCAR. SOCAR reported that Azerenergy and Azerigas paid nothing for fuel
and gas deliveries. Table 3 presents the staff estimate of the overall subsidies implicit in
domestic energy policies.
Table 3. Azerbaijan: Domestic Energy Subsidies
AZM biUion 2001
Market value of domestic oil and gas supplies 3,957.0
Plus: expenditures of Azerenergy and Azengas operations, and of SOCAR's 1,120.9
refining activities, excluding the cost of gas and fuel inputs
Minus: receipts from domestic energy sales & excise tax 2,003.8
Total subsidies 3,074.0
In percent of GDP (2001 GDP: 26,500 billion manat) 11.6
Source: IMF staff estimates.
o Breakdown of Subsidies into Non-Payment and Underpricing
5. Within the total framework of energy subsidies it is possible to determine the portions
that are attributable to non-payment and the proportion that results from misappropriate pricing.
This is itemized below.
l Starting from the second half of 2001 Azerenergy no longer distributes electricity directly to end-users. Instead, it
supplies electncity to four distribution network companies, which in turn distnbute electricity to end-users.
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e Azerigas (the gas sector)
6. Azerigas was supplied with 4.58 bcm gas in 2001.2 At the average gas price of US$26.5
per tcm,3 the market value of this gas supply is 564 billion manat. A meaningful breakdown of
subsidies between Azerigas and its customers shows that underpricing accounted for about 49
percent of quasi-fiscal subsidies in the gas sector in 2001.
Table 4. Quasi-Fiscal Subsidies in the Gas Sector: Underpricing and Nonpayment
AZM billion 2001
a. Market value of gas delivery to Azerigas 564
b. Azerigas non-fuel cost (Table 2) 93 1
c. Azerigas revenue assuming full collection 393.1
d. Azerigas actual revenue 120.3
e. Quasi-fiscal subsidies in the gas sector (=a+b-d) 536.7
f. o/w non-payment (=c-d) 272.8
g. o/w under-pricing (=a+b-c) 263.9
Sources Azengas and IMF staff estimates.
* Azerenergy (the electricity sector)
7. In 2001, of SOCAR's 27.4 million barrels of oil products delivered to the domestic
market, Azerenergy received 14.9 million barrels in the form of fuel oil. Given that the fuel oil
delivery to Azerenergy accounted for about 54 percent of total oil products delivered to the
domestic market in 2001, the crude content in the SOCAR fuel supply to Azerenergy can be
calculated approximately at 15.7 (=28.8*0.54) million barrels. In addition, Azerenergy was
supplied with 4.3 bcm of gas for electricity generation. Taking the same approach as in Table 1,
the market value of the crude oil that was used for producing fuel oil supplied to Azerenergy was
estimated at 1,557.4 billion manat, and the value of gas supplied to Azerenergy was 529.5 billion
manat.
8. The data available from SOCAR do not allow for a direct assessment on the refining cost
of fuel oil delivered to Azerenergy. However, as about 34 percent of SOCAR's crude oil was
refined into fuel oil delivered to Azerenergy, we can take 34 percent of SOCAR's total refining
cost, or 414 billion manat, as a reasonable approximation. As shown in Table 5, quasi-fiscal
subsidies in the electricity sector alone accounted for almost 67 percent of Azerbaijan's total
energy subsidies in 2001. Underpricing accounted for about 66 percent of quasi-fiscal subsidies
in the electricity sector in 2001, slightly higher than the 61 percent in 2000.
2 SOCAR claimed that its gas production (4.44 bcm) as well as AIOC's gas (0.9 bcm) was fully handed over to
Azengas and that the gas import (3.53 bcm) was fully handed over to Azerenergy. However, as SOCAR has no gas
pipeline and gas delivery to the domestic market has to go through Azerigas, the division of gas between Azerigas
and Azerenergy is often not carred out in the way that SOCAR mtends.
3 We value the gas deliveries at an average price of US$ 26.5 per bcm, calculated as the total value of gas supplies,
US$ 234.7 (Table 1), divided by the total volume of gas supplies, 8.9 bcm (Table 1).
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Table 5. Quasi-Fiscal Subsidies in the Electricity Sector: Underpricing and Nonpayment
AZM billion 2001
a. Market value of crude content in SOCAR fuel oil delivery to Azerenergy 1,557.4
b. Market value of gas supply to Azerenergy 529.5
c. Estimated SOCAR refining cost of fuel oil delivered to Azerenergy 413.6
d. Azerenergy non-fuel cost (Table 2) 266.9
e. Azerenergy revenue assuming full collection 1,446.9
f. Azerenergy actual revenue 519.5
g. Total quasi-fiscal subsidies in the electricity sector (=a+b+c+d-f) 2,247.9
h. o/w non-payment by customers (=e-f) 927.4
i. o/w under-pricing (=a+b+c+d-e) 1,320.5
Sources Azerenergy and IMF staff estimates.
O Deliveries of Oil Products to Other Domestic Users
9. The crude content in SOCAR's oil products delivered to other domestic users was 13.1
(=28.8-15.7) million barrels, which had a market value of 1,307.5 billion manat. SOCAR
received 1,364 billion manat for deliveries of oil products to other domestic users. As shown in
Table 6, deliveries of oil products to domestic users other than Azerenergy contain a relatively
small part of energy subsidies in Azerbaijan.
Table 6. Oil Products to Domestic Users Other than Azerenergy: Quasi-lFiscal Subsidies
AZM billion 2001
a. Market value of crude content in oil products delivered to domestic users 1,307.5
other than Azerenergy
b. Reflning cost 347.2
c. Actual revenue 1364
d. Quasi-fiscal subsidies (a+b-c) 290.7
Sources: SOCAR and IMF staff estimates.
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ANNEX 2. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NATURAL RESOURCE FUND'S FUNCTIONING 4
1. Natural Resource Funds' (NRF) best management practices, although different in their
institutional arrangements, are subject to certain common principles:
> Stronz governance, with prudent oversight provided by an independent public
supervisory body or multiple players, interlocked by a system of mutual
accountability.
' Clearly defined goals and transparency with public disclosure of operations and
audit reports, regular dissemination of information through the media and the internet;
enhancing transparency of the NRF and/or citizen's understanding is often set as an
explicit or implicit objective of the Fund.
;' Integration with the state budget which facilitates management and supervision of
the oil revenues, while purposes of establishment should be kept in mind (i.e. in case
of assets accumulation a good practice would be to monitor performance through
setting benchmarks).
> Sound assets management strategv namely, setting benchmarks for the desired
return, liquidity, and macroeconomic effects.
Supervision and Control
2. As a rule, supervision over the NRF is executed through a network of interlocked
internal and external agencies. It can represent a fairly sophisticated structure with dispersion
of the supervisory functions between executive and legislative agencies, as in the Alberta
Heritage Savings Trust Fund. An operational body exists at the bottom of the hierarchy.
Although this body (Investment Operations Committee) does not have explicit power to set
policy priorities, it can nevertheless be a de facto supervisory agency through its advice
contributions. In addition, the whole system is composed in a way that any component of the
reporting hierarchy has veto power options set by the government. A provincial parliamentary
committee (the Standing Committee of the Legislative Assembly) is an ultimate supervisory
body to the Alberta Heritage Fund. To ensure relevant representation of different political
segments of the society, Standing Committee consists of 6 members from the ruling party, and 3
members from the opposition.
3. Supervisory functions can be subject to a more simplistic vertical management
structure as in Alaska, where Board of Trustees, appointed by the Governor, is given a
supervisory role over the asset management entity - Alaska Permanent Fund (public)
Corporation (APFC). The Board of Trustees is managed by executive officers, namely a
chairman, vice-chairman, and treasurer, who are elected annually by the APFC. The majority of
4This section was adapted from the following papers: John R. Heilbrunn, "Govemance and Oil Funds" (mimeo), Fitch Ratings
"Oil Price Stabilization Funds," Special Report; Ugo Fasano, "Review of the Experience with Oil Stabilization and Savings
Funds in Selected Countries," IMF Working Paper WP/00/1 12; Jeffrey Davis, Ronaldo Ossowski, James Daniel, and Steven
Bamett, "Stabilization and Savings Funds for Nonrenewable Resources Experience and Fiscal Policy Implications," IMF
Occasional Paper 205, 2001.
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the Board members (four out of six) must not hold any governmental position and should have
recognizable competence in finance, investments, and other related fields. Although appointment
and dismissal of the members of the Board are at the full discretion of the Governor, he/she must
present a written explanation for any dismissal decision.
4. The Norway State Petroleum FuRnd does mot have a supervisory board as such.
However, supervisory functions are jointly performed by the Minister of Finance and the
Economic Policy Department (EPD) of the Ministry of Finance (both are responsible for the
overall assets management policy and for setting up benchmarks for performance measurement),
and the Central Bank. Norges Bank, the Central Bank of Norway, is delegated by the Ministry
of Finance with the power of operational management. Norges Bank's management activity is
accountable to the Economic Policy Department, which drafts reports to the Minister of Finance,
who presents them to the Storting (Norwegian Parliament).
5. The delegation of discretionary power through different levels of the supervisory
hierarchy provides transparency of the policymaking process, and ensures the proper
involvement of technocrats and proper weight to technocratic considerations as opposed to
political ones in the decision making process of NRF's asset management.
6. Contrary to this principle, supervision of the Venezuelan Investment Fund for
Macroeconomic Stabilization (which is not an impressive example of oil revenues management),
is entirely entrusted to the Central Bank of Venezuela. The Central Bank concentrates all assets
management power from deciding on operational rules and budget to setting investment policy,
and reporting and approving disbursement from the Fund. In addition, there is no separate
structure within the Central Bank (i.e. Board of the Central Bank of Venezuela is at the same
time the Supervisory Body for the Fund).5
Tramsparency, Accountability, Extermal Oversight (Audit)
7. Successful experiences with the NRF management suggest that transparent dissemination
of information on the size of the Fund and regular reports on the management of its assets are
prerequisites for legitimacy and public support.
8. Regular reports on the Funnd's performance, both amunna and inter-year, should be
submitted to the legislature and made available to the public through the printed media
and the internet. Performance reports should clearly state a comparison between the real and
the projected performance of the Fund to make the evaluation easier for the public, as in reports
of the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation. Furthermore, the public should be equipped with the
knowledge as to what are the sources and timing for this type of information. In Alberta, for
example, prior to the release of any report or plan, an announcement is made on the Ministry of
Revenue website and in the provincial media. This, along with the full publication of external
audit reports, should be a basic minimum for information disclosure. The NRF best practices go
far beyond this in expanding the degree of transparency, and the public is equally well-informed
about the performance criteria for the Fund's future activities, investment guidelines, sizes of and
5 Davis, Ossowski, Daniel, and Barnett, "Stabilization and Savings Funds for Nonrenewable Resources: Experience and Fiscal
Policy Implications," p.26.
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returns on the Fund's assets, flows into and out of the Fund, resource allocation, etc. Norges
Bank's site on Petroleum Fund, for instance, contains detailed information up to the
remuneration rules for the Petroleum Fund's managers.
9. This needs to be underpinned by unambiguous regulations on reporting by the
Fund's management. Fund managers usually submit their report for review to the supervisory
body, which in turn, presents it to the legislature. In Norway, it is a single individual, the
Minister of Finance, who presents the annual report on the Fund's performance to the
Parliament. In Alaska, the managers of Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation prepare a joint
report together with the Board of Trustees (the supervisory body), which is then submitted, to the
Govemor and the public. Certain reporting requirements can be specifically articulated by the
Fund's regulations, as in Norway, where any changes in the Fund's assets must be reported to the
Ministry of Finance.
10. Oversight of the Fund's operations is strengthened by governmental auditing
agencies, and is often further complemented by independent audit companies, which
perform both internal and external audits of the Fund's performance. Audit reports, as well
as management reports, are posted on the Internet and disseminated through the press.
Independent audit reports can be submitted to the legislature directly (Norway) or attached to the
management reports when submitted to the supervisory body or to the legislature (Alaska).
Governance of Revenue/Expenditure Rules
11. The NRF should be coherently integrated within the budgetary process. The
resources of the Fund can be maintained on an identified account within the overall budget. This
will ensure that spending decisions are taken within the budget. Integration within the
consolidated budget would allow for the resource allocation decisions to pass the Parliamentary
approval, thus, there would be no need to earmark expenditures from the Fund, since
expenditures would continue to be executed by the relevant ministries. Any drawdown of the
government's deposits (including the Fund's assets) would appear as deficit financing.
12. Poor integration of the Fund with the budget (or extrabudgetary fund) complicates
fiscal management, leading to an inefficient allocation of the government's total resources,
and contributes to lack of transparency and governance problems. When creating an
extrabudgetary entity, it is argued that a new body, outside of the "corrupted" or inefficient
system, can deliver better results. However, country experiences (Venezuela and Nigeria)
suggest that it is unlikely that a subsystem of a poor budget system can be free of corruption, or
of governance, or resource misallocation problems.6
13. In some cases, the use of the Fund's revenue is subject to certain limitations or rules.
For instance, reasons for the statutory limitation can exist in cases of conflicts of interest, as in
Alaska, or in cases of non-conformity with a certain policy priority, as in Norway, where
investments should be made only in environmentally sound projects and can be immediately
withdrawn if the project proves to be environmentally hazardous.
6 Davis, Ossowski, Daniel, and Barnett, "Stabilization and Savings Funds for Nonrenewable Resources Experience and Fiscal
Policy Implications," p.l6 -17.
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Investment Strategy and Operational Management of Assets
14. Allocatiom of the Fund's resources should be governed by a clear asset-management
strategy. As a common guideline, investment strategy should follow a "prudent investment"
rule. However, more specific guidelines should be established with regard to the composition of
the investment portfolio, which would also effectively reflect the purposes of the Fund. In other
words, the maturity and liquidity of the Fund's assets should be dictated by whether the Fund
primarily serves as a stabilization fund or a savings fund. In addition, as in the case of the
Norway State Petroleum Fund, investment decisions of the Fund can conform to more specific
rules, such as proportional shares for fixed and equity income instruments, and their geographic
distribution and currency composition, which are statutorily defined.
15. Once the asset allocation rules are set, their operational maDnagement can be
entrusted to an internalUy establshed operational department or the Fund can engage
externalR managers for the eniDre Fund portfolio or its specifin parts. Prudent oversight by the
supervisory body should be in place to ensure that investment decisions correspond to
established priorities and are economically beneficial. For instance, the Investment Operations
Committee (IOC) of the Alberta Heritage Fund has a very strong private sector representation (3
out of 5 members). Appointment and dismissal of the IOC members is merit-based with the usual
criteria as for any other professional service (i.e., experience, perforrnance, platforn, etc.). The
Investment Committee sends its technical recommendations to the Board of Trustees, which does
an initial evaluation of investment decisions and passes it further up to policymakers. A similar
system exists in Alaska, where a specially established public corporation - the Alaska Permanent
Fund Corporation - is entitled to manage and invest the assets of the Alaska Permanent Fund on
behalf of the State of Alaska.
16. luna Norway, the Ceuntral Bank was charged by the IParlliament with the responsibility
to achieve the highest return on the Fund's portfoRio. To perform this function, and within its
discretion over operational management of the Fund's assets, Norges Bank subcontracts the
management of certain parts of the Petroleum Fund's portfolio to international investment
banking companies. For instance, Deutscher Bank manages the bond portfolio, Merrill Lynch
has the Norges Bank's mandate for Europe, etc. To provide proper oversight of the operational
management of assets and to ensure that performance benchmarks are met, Norges Bank (with
the authorization of the Ministry of Finance) established within its existing umbrella two new
agencies: the Norges Bank Investment Management Agency and the Govermnent Petroleum
Insurance Fund. The first is responsible for overseeing investments and ensuring increases in the
overall portfolio, while the Insurance Fund protects against declines in the portfolio performance.
Both agencies are staffed by the employees of Norges Bank, who receive their appointments as
part of their positions at Norges Bank.
17. Whichever model is chosen, it is important that decisions over the management of the
investment portfolio are assigned to professional investment officers with proven expertise in
finance and investment, while a clear allocation of responsibilities should be in place to ensure
oversight over the investment decisions.
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ANNEX 3. METHODOLOGY FOR TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY (TFP)
1. Our macroeconomic projections for Azerbaijan are based on a simple growth
accounting model that decomposes growth in the non-oil sector.7 We assume a Cobb-
Douglas production function with only two factors of production: physical capital (K) and labor
input (L) employed in the non-oil sector:
=GDPNon-oil = AKa L 1-a
We also make an assumption about the capital share, a, of 30 percent, which results in the labor
share, I-a, equal to 70 percent. We also assume a 3 percent depreciation rate, y 8. Taking
logarithms and differentiating allow expressing the non-oil GDP growth rate as a sum of three
components: (i) the rate of growth of physical capital; (ii) the rate of growth of labor input, and
(iii) the rate of growth of total factor productivity.
Non-oilg, = %AGDP, - = a %AK, + (1 - a) %AL, + %ATFP,
2. We can predict the non-oil GDP growth rates of capital stock by using the perpetual
inventory method. This method uses a capital stock estimate in the base year, assumptions on
depreciation, and the flow of new investment so that the growth rate of capital can be represented
as:
%AKt = Inv, _ r
We approximate the growth rate of labor input by the population growth rate. 9 What is
more problematic is the link between gross investments and the capital growth rate, as it requires
knowledge about its stock in the base year. For a transition economy such as Azerbaijan, such
data are highly unreliable. Apart from the usual difficulties, official statistics tend not to account
for the fact that many of the capital assets dating from Soviet times are obsolete in the new
structure of the market economy. In addition, there is no available reliable breakup of fixed
assets between the resource extraction sector and the rest of the economy.
7 The dynamics of oil extraction are excluded from this analysis as they have ongms m oil and gas recoveries,
extraction strategies, market demand, and transport routes rather than in the accumulation of factors of production or
8productivity levels.
For a justification for using such a specification of the production function and the related analysis of the character
of growth and contraction in the FSU countnes, see De Broeck and Koen (2000b).
9 This assumption is appropriate as the oil sector accounts for only less than 1 percent of total employment.
However, this measure may underestimate substantially the growth rate of labor mput, as it does not account for
factors such as the miproved quality of the labor force. This in turn will lead to an overestimation of the total factor
productivity growth rate.
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3. The total factor productivity growth rate, however, is the most important
assumpioun for this growth accountinng exercise. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), and
Easterly and Levine (2000) report that cross-country differences in income levels and growth
rates are mostly due to differences in productivity. In particular, growth based on TFP
improvements rather than on rapid capital accumulation allows for consumption growth rate,
needed to reduce poverty in Azerbaijan. Without productivity gains, high rates of growth need to
be supported by heavy investments and savings. But growth strategies based on forcing factor
accumulation at the expense of consumption are usually not suitable for market economies and
especially not in a country with widespread poverty and underutilized productive capacities.
4. When projecting future growth rates for the non-oil sector in Azerbaijan, we
assume that the key factor behind this growth will be substantial TlFIP growth. The
experience of other transition economies shows that in the shorter term substantial productivity
gains are possible. In fact the V-shaped pattern of total factor productivity is one of stylized facts
about successful transition economies. TFP declined sharply during the reform-induced recession
but then it recorded considerable acceleration as shown by Table 1.10 For Poland the growth of
TFP was for some years in excess of the overall growth rate, which suggests that productivity
gains may fuel growth during the recovery period even when factor contribution is negative.
Overall, we were witnessing a transition from an extensive to an intensive growth pattern, with
TFP growth playing an increasingly important role in the Visegrad countries (Firdmuc at al.,
2001).
Table 1. TFP: Decline in Azerbaijan and V-Shaped Pattern in Advanced Transition Econornies
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic Azerbaijan
Transitory recession*
Average TFP decline 4.5% -7.1% -7.5% -6.8% -12.6%
Cumulative TFP decline -12.9% -13.7% -14.4% -24.6% -61.0%
Recovery period""
Average TFP growth 1.0% 2.2% 3.8% 4.2% NA
Cumulative TFP growth 5.9% 16.3% 29.6% 23.1% NA
tCzech Republic 1990-1992, Hungary 1990-1991, Poland 1990-1991, Slovak Republic 1990-1993, Azerbaijan 1990-1996.
"* Czech Republic 1993-1998, Hungary 1992-1998, Poland 1992-1998, Slovak Republic 1994-1998.
Sources: Own calculations based on De Broeck and Koen (2000a) and De Broeck and Koen (2000b).
5. Obviously the high rates of TFP inm transition countries shourld not be idenmffned with
technmological pirogress. Large total factor productivity gains result from a resource shift from
less productive to more productive firms, perhaps as a result of economic reforms or if more
productive firms simply grow faster, even in the absence of technical progress at the firm level
(World Bank, 2002). TFP increases may also be associated with increasing capacity utilization
that follows transitory recession. Furthermore, the non-oil sector is expected to benefit from the
oil-related FDI that will be invested to increase the economy's oil potential. These considerations
justify why the TFP growth rates in the non-oil sector of Azerbaijan may be substantial and
comparable to those recorded by more advanced transition economies. Azerbaijan experienced a
much deeper output and productivity losses during the first years of transition, which implies that
10 Annual TFP dynamics beyond 1998 are not readily available. We are also not aware of the study that analyzes
TFP improvements in the post-crisis growth m CIS countnes.
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even very high TFP growth rates are not likely to return the economy to its pre-transition
productivity level in the mediurn term. Meanwhile, this target is being achieved by advanced
transition economies relatively quickly. Capital and labor under-capitalization seems also to be
larger in Azerbaijan. Therefore, room for TFP improvement seems large even from a medium
term perspective. Indeed, our crude estimates suggest that the average TFP growth rate in
Azerbaijan between 1997 and 2001 was 6.0 percent and it is likely to accelerate to almost 8
percent in 2002.
Table 2. Decomposition of Growth in the Non-oil Sector in Azerbaijan
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Contnbution of growth of
emnployment 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
Contribution of growth of
capital* 0.7% 3.3% -6.6% 2.0% 2.8%
TFP 6.0% 1.1% 8.8% 10.8% 3.5%
Non-oil GDP growth rate 6.8% 4.6% 2.2% 12.8% 6.3%
Capital-output ratio 4.72 4.66 4.26 3.85 3.72
*The figure for the growth rate of capital employed in thenon-oil sector is highly speculative. First overall
figures of fixed assets in the economy mught misrepresent the total productive capital stock due to
measurement problems and in particular problems of valuation of obsolete capital stock that are
charactenstic for transition economies. Second, statistical data does not allow for the methodologically
reliable break-down of capital between oil and non-oil sector. To arrive at the reported figure assuming the
breakdown in line with structure of the overall GDP.
Source Own estimations based on Statistical Office and assumptions about production function as
described above.
6. The continuation of the TFP recovery, however, would only be possible if structural
reforms are further implemented, inducing the restructuring of existing enterprises and the
entry of de novo firms. In our framework we assume that the TFP growth rates would average
5.4 percent between 2002 and 2005 and would decline to average 3.4 percent between 2006 and
2010. Beyond 2010 we make a conservative assumption of either a flat or a slowly growing TFP.
While transition recovery provides a rationale for high initial TFP growth rates, these are
fundamental improvements in technology that underpin growth in the long run. For that reason
there are likely to be natural limits to the gains from structural change once resources have been
reallocated to the most productive use and excess capacity is eliminated. Although we choose not
to predict high TFP growth rates in the longer term, the successful implementation of structural
reform might lay the ground for long-term growth and help to change this conclusion.
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ANNEX 4. ODPTIMAL 1INTERTEMPORAL ALLOCATION OF OIL WINDFALL: IIMPLICATIONS
FOR PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ENVELOPE
1. During the seconnd half of this decade, the econiomy will experience a massive
windfall with a concomitant flscaR gain. This fiscal gain, however, is a result of the depletion
of country's oil and gas reserves. Long-term sustainability, therefore, requires that a part (or all)
of the resource rents have to be re-invested productively, to compensate this reduction in natural
resource capital by the accumulation of other forms of assets, such as physical capital or human
capital. Since oil rents are to a large extent concentrated in the public sector, the question of how
should the oil and gas revenue be spent and distributed across present and future generations
becomes a cornerstone to successful economic development. Furthermore a surge in natural
resource revenue may stimulate an inefficient domestic spending and waist of petroleum
resources. Too rapid domestic spending may give raise to excessive real appreciation and
structural shift towards non-tradable sectors. Finally, if the budgetary process is not transparent
and the institutional setting gives raise to severe governance and corruption problems, the budget
would not be an adequate fiscal policy instrument.
2. ThAs annex provides a theoretical framework amd illustrative caRculations for the
optdmal allocation of the ofl and gas fiscal revenues over dtme, based on an objectve
function, and subject to ann inter-temporal budget constraint. The methodology of derivation
is close in spirit to the framework presented by Engel and Valdes (2000). The authors argue that
while intergeneration transfers usually do not take place, policy makers have to make explicit
decisions about the intergenerational distribution of revenues related to the extraction of
exhaustible resources. The natural starting point for such a consideration is the permanent
income hypothesis. Under this hypothesis economic agents should spend only the permanent
component of their current income. As the immediate implication of the permanent income
framework for resource-rich country Liuksila, et al. (1994) recommends that a prudent
government should keep the value of total wealth constant over time. This can be achieved
through a full conversion of the oil-wealth into net financial assets, so that future interest
payments compensate future generation for depleted oil resources. Current government
consumption out of oil is therefore equal to the implicit interest earned on oil-wealth of the
country.
3. lPerrmanent income hypothesis is generally too restrictive as it rules out
intergenerational transfers of the oinl related wealth (Engel and Valdes (2000)). The correct
approach, therefore, is to spread the oil revenues "not by giving every generation the same
amount of public good... .but by choosing among all possible policies that are Pareto improving,
the one that increase SWF (social welfare function) the most." The model presented in this annex
fulfills these requirements." Furthermore, the model shows that the requirement of preserving
the oil wealth constant in per capita terms (permanent income hypothesis) can be strictly optimal
when the non-oil GDP per capita is expected to be flat in the long run. If the non-oil GDP per
capita is expected to increase over time, saving oil resources for future generations that will be
1 On the contrary extension to the permanent income hypothesis suggested by Davoodi (2002) in which oil wealth
is kept constant as a share of GDP implies that oil expenditures are benefiting more (in dollar terms) generations of
higher income, what clearly is not optimal.
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richer anyway need not to be justified on intergenerational equity grounds. On the contrary if the
decline in per capita non-oil GDP is expected to decline over time (for example due to rapid
growth of population) the optimal fiscal strategy requires an increasing rather than constant real
per capita net wealth over time. Although the recommendation of constant net wealth is only a
special case in the optimization problem, it is the most robust to assumptions, offers a simple rule
of thumb, and therefore might be attractive for actual policy-making.
4. The government's objective function is to maximize welfare of its citizens living
within the time horizon through smoothing the disposable income per capita. For the
purpose of this analysis, the disposable income is defined as the after-tax non-oil GDP per
capita12 plus oil-financed government expenditure per capita. Transfers to population increase
directly the disposable income, whereas public consumption is assumed to be equivalent to
private consumption. The focus on disposable income allows avoiding the explicit modeling of
private sector saving/consumption decision. This simplification is desired as almost all the
revenues from the oil extraction accrue to the government, and the problem of allocation of these
revenues dwarfs possible consumption smoothing undertaken by the individuals. In addition,
private opportunities for shifting consumption in time are constrained by the undeveloped
financial institutions and the lack of collateral.
5. It is assumed that oil-related expenditure is equivalent to public consumption or
transfers to population. Treating public investments as consumption reflects well-documented
skepticism about the efficiency of public investment programs. The risk of failed investments is
particularly high when a rapid surge in.the available financing due to oil extraction is not met by
an adequate institutional capacity to select and implement only the most profitable projects. The
resulting public expenditure ceiling, therefore, should not be binding for some particular
investment projects that yield a very high rate of return, because as those can be treated as
substitutes for investment in financial assets. Such projects, however, need to be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis. Only in the case of particularly profitable and reliable projects it is possible
to assume the rate of return is higher that the one earned on financial assets.
6. Formally, the optimal rule for public expenditure is derived from maximizing the
government's objective function, combined with the inter-temporal budget constraint.
Inter-temporal government utility function has the form:' 3
T GD,Non-oil ( E,Ofl
U = E ,8' In I, = ' In(GD, (-)+E,° 
where , is the time preference factor and I, is the proxy for the disposable income per capita
defined as a sum of after-tax non-oil GDP (GDP, N"-'il ) per capita and oil-financed government
12 In the empirical application of the framework to the case of Azerbaijan, after-tax non-oil GDP per capita accounts
also for non-oil related transfers (constant share of non-oil GDP at 8.4 percent) and workers remittances from abroad
(constant share of non-oil GDP at 1.7 percent).
13 Compare footnote 2. We do not show workers remittances and non-oil budgetary transfers for the sake of
transparency of the presentation.
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expenditure E °0" per capita. N, is the size of the population, r, is the effective tax rate on non-oil
GDP. This utility function is maximized subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint.
7. The inter-temporal goverrnment budget constraint implies that the net present value
of all futuire revemnues must be equal to the nmet piresent value of al futu re expendituires and
chamge in the net piresent vaRue of debt. This inter-temporal budget constraint is derived in the
following three steps: (i) we specify the government budget constraint in each period, (ii) we
specify the relation between the oil-related fiscal revenues and the rate of oil reserves depletion,
and (iii) we derive the inter-temporal budget constraint by iterative substitution across the time
horizon.'4 Fiscal sustainability implies that the inter-temporal budget constraint has to be
satisfied over the entire future, i.e. over the infinite number of years. In some scenarios it is also
allowed that the shortsighted government is planning to satisfy the constraint over explicitly
defined finite period of time. In such case it is imposed that deficit is equal to zero in every
period after the end of time horizon.'5 Such approach yields results that are virtually identical to
infinite budget constraint, if time horizon is very long.
8. The government budget constraint in each period simply states that the budget deficit has
to be covered by a decline in net government assets.
[E oil + E Non-oil + i .D [ - R oil + NR Mon-odl + i -FA , °=[D, -D,_]-[FA,Ol -FA, 1cl]
where E No-ol is non-oil-financed and non-interest government expenditure, R, ° stands for
revenues from oil extraction that are appropriated by the budget and Oil Fund,R, Non-l are
budgetary non-oil revenues. i is the real interest rate, D, is public debt, and FA Oi represents
financial assets accumulated out of oil-revenues. The distinction between debt and oil-based
financial assets is somehow artificial. However it is further assumed that debt to GDP is hold
constant as a share of non-oil GDP, while the path of oil-based assets is optimized, therefore this
distinction is useful.
9. The relation between thne oil-related fiscal revenues and the rate of oil reserves
depiletion is given by the change of the (current) value of future oil revenues from extraction to
be appropriated by the budget and Oil Fund V,° " from period t-1 to period t:
oilOi OilVI = (I + i) * V, -R°
It is also possible to define total oil-related wealth W,°) as the sum of value of remaining oil
revenues to be appropriated by the budget and Oil Fund and accumulated oil related assets.
14 Similar derivation is given by Davoodi (2002).
15 Only if time honzon is shorter than time necessary for the full depletion of oil resources we allow the government
to spend net present value of remaining oil resources. In the following periods govermnent is still assumed to have
zero non-oil deficit, however it runs overall budget surplus equal to current oil revenues.
110
oil oil OilWI =V, 1 +FA
Which allows rewriting the budget constraint in every period as:
[E i E Non-oil +i D ]-|R Non-oil A [D - D, ]-[W oil Wi ,
This identity shows that the non-oil deficits (that is overall budget deficits without revenues
related to oil - extraction or interest earned on oil-related assets) are financed by interest earned
on total oil wealth (permanent income out of the oil wealth) and changes in oil wealth and public
debt.
10. The inter-temporal budget constraint is then derived by iterative substitution for
fmancial assets in identity from paragraph 8 across the entire time horizon. However, it is
necessary to make a few simplifying assumptions about non-oil revenues, expenditures and debt.
Specifically, it is assumed that non-oil expenditures (including public debt service) in each
period are equal to non-oil revenues and are a constant share of non-oil GDP. This assumption
would imply that the government can only shift its oil related fiscal revenues across generations
to increase the income of the generations that are worse off.' 6 Furthermore, public debt is
assumed to remain constant -as a share of the non-oil GDP.17 With these assumptions it is
possible to show that:' 8
16 Too much redistribution across time, including the non-oil tax revenues seem to give results that are of less
Practical Importance.
It is possible to include some debt dynamics in the analysis, m particular to analyze the situation when the
government decides to redeem all or part of public debt using the oil revenues or use oil revenues for debt service.
However, since we take the net asset view, it is actually irrelevant whether one is borrowing to finance its
expenditures, or depleting its oil wealth. It should be also noted that public debt constitutes only a small fraction of
value of oil assets in Azerbaijan.
is With simplifying assumption stated in paragraph 10, the identity form paragraph 8 can be expressed as:
oil O"l OilE, -R, -g,D,,1 +FA, = FA, °I
(I+ i)
Forwarding this identity forward by one period we get (again assuming debt at a constant share of non-oil GDP) we
get:
Et oil R+1 ig ,+1(I+g,)D,, +FA,+,1 Oil
(+ i) =
We use this result to eliminate FA, from the first identity:
E i- R oi g, D,, E,+1 -o R ,+RI+ g,1+ (1 + g, )D,1 + FA,+,°I Oil
(I + i) + (1 i) 2 -
By forwarding the original identity by two periods we can similarly eliminate FA,+, in the last equation. By
Oil Oil
repeating the substitution successively we can eliminate FA,+2 , FA,+3 and so on. This sequence of steps
leads us to constraint:
T T =(1+i)g Do = WI + NPV(AD)
t=£ (I + i)' = E (I + i' (1 + )()g)
This equation states that the net present vale of oil-financed expenditure must be equal to the
sum of net present value of all oil-revenues and present value of future increases in nominal
debt. This is the inter-temporal budget constraint that government faces in its optimization
decision about allocation of oil spending.
11. Optimization of the utility function of the govermmenDt subject to the Dinter-temporall
budget constraint yields the fol]owing optimal path of disposable income:
(1+i)
(1 + OJ
By substituting the It in the equation, we obtain the following recursive rule for expenditure
financed out of the oil wealth as a share of the non-oil GDP:
E,+1 °il (+ i)(l + n) El 1i l
GDP,,Non-oil (1 + /)(1 + g,+,) L GDP+ Non-oil - + t+1
where g, is rate of growth of non-oil GDP and n, is rate of growth of population. The path of oil-
financed expenditures consistent with this rule and with budget constraint is derived numerically. It
should be noted that with permanent non-oil per capita growth the optimal rule that implies constant
disposable income per capita can be supported only for the finite number of years. In this case we follow
the algorithm suggested by Engel and Valdes (2000). Oil wealth is used to raise the income of the poorest
generation until it equals the second poorest. If it does not exhaust oil wealth, the income of two poorest
generations is raised until it equals that of third poorest. We repeat this algonthm until oil wealth is fully
exhausted. Afterwards disposable income is raising at the rate of growth of non-oil GDP per capita.
12. Based described methoodology, the optimal total expeunditure, the optDmal
consolidated budget defieit and the optimal nomon-oil budget defiiet as ratios to nonm-oil G1DP
are derived. Results are highly sensitive to two main sets of parameters:
(i) parameters that characterize government preferences: time horizon and time
preference factor; and
(Oil E, Oil T(l +g (I ) - FA +Oil FATOl
_ tIE A- (I + )T
__1 (l-+ i)Y t= (1 +i)t I 
Since we assume that initial stock of oil related assets is equal to zero and from terminal (or tranversality) condition
we know the same is true about last element of the last equation, the nght hand side of the constraint disappears,
what leads us to the constraint as shown in the paragraph 10 (for simplicity of exhibition it is further assumed that
growth rate is constant throughout time).
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(ii) parameters beyond direct control of the government: population growth,
international interest rates, growth rates of non-oil GDP, and oil price changes.
13. Intuitively, the first set of parameters, time horizon together with time preference
factor represents the impatience of the government and its willingness to expatriate all
rents from oil extraction (and to smaller degree also non-oil revenues) for nearer periods of
time. If interest rate were equal to the time preference factor, government would ensure that
disposable income per capita is constant throughout targeted time horizon. However, if interest
rate were lower, the government would tend to shift consumption forward. Similarly, if the rate
of growth of the non-oil GDP is the same as the rate of growth of population, the non-oil part of
disposable income is constant throughout time, which implies that it is optimal for the
government to distribute the oil revenues equally in each period. When the rate of growth of the
non-oil GDP is faster, however, it would be optimal to also shift the oil revenues forward.
14. Adjustment costs. Optimal public spending path derived above does not take into
account the difficulties in rapid adjustments in expenditures and the limited capacity of
economy to absorb such adjustments. In the extension to basic model above these adjustment
costs are accounted for in line with methodology suggested by Engel and Valdes (2000). More
specifically the modified utility function is:
U = E p [ln I, - k (In I, IT-lIn I,-, ) 2
.=,
where I ,PT is optimal disposable income per capital as derived in the basic model. Engel and
Valdes (2000) prove that the maximization of this utility function subject to the original
intertemporal budget constraint can be approximated by the simple rule:
In I, - In I,-, = a l (In I, OPT - In I,-l,)
where a is the speed of adjustment towards optimal path of income and it is derived as a function of
parameters of utility function:
1-k(1- 3)+ 1+2k(1+/6)+k 2 (1-fi) 2
a-
1+k(l-J+ 1+2k(1+/)+k2 (1-I) 2
15. Intuitively, the government that in the absence of adjustment costs would immediately
increase spending to the optimal level, would introduce increases more gradually and converge
to optimal path only after several years of adjustment in the presence of these costs. Parameters
that underlie presented results imply the speed of adjustment a equal to 25 percent, which
means that a quarter of the gap between actual and optimal path of disposable income is covered
in each year. As path of after-tax non-oil GDP is exogenous this rule allows for the derivation for
modified path of government oil-financed expenditures. In practical exercises we sometimes
introduce simple limit to annual growth of government as a share of non-oil GDP.
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16. All presented scenarios are sustainable as they satisfy ex-ante the inter-temporal budget
constraint. It should be noted, however, that too optimistic assumptions would lead to the choice
of path that ultimately can prove to be unsustainable when less favorable outcomes would
undermine fiscal stance of the government.
17. IHiowever, the political irisk is a major limitatAon Rin the application of this approach.
While large deficits in next few years are consistent with optimal (and sustainable) fiscal path of
relatively impatient government, the optimality of this path requires very substantial surpluses in
longer-term perspective. This, however, may not be feasible, as the ability of the current
government to commit future government to actually run such large surpluses is very low. In
particular the fiscal path that is optimal (and sustainable) ex ante may prove to be unsustainable
ex post, when future governments would be systematically avoiding fiscal adjustment. Scenarios
reported below present optimal path that would be chosen by relatively conservative government
with infinite time horizon and time preference discount equal to the interest rate. Scenarios differ
with respect to the assumed non-oil growth rates. Results of sensitivity analysis in respect to oil
prices and interest rates are also reported.
18. We first consideir two basic scenearios that correspond to constant and inecreasinig
non-oil GID per capita to ilRustirate the character of choices that governmmeient meeds to
make. The first basic scenario is the most conservative as it assumes that the non-oil GDP per
capita is constant over time and the government is assumed to care for current and all future
generations. Results reproduce the Pernanent Income Hypothesis. The second basic scenario
shows the optimal fiscal strategy when non-oil GDP per capita is increasing over time. Tables 1
and 4 as well as Figures 1 and 2 summarize the following fiscal sustainability implications for
these illustrative scenarios: (i) the path of the disposable income per capita reported at constant
US dollar prices; (ii) associated public spending, the non-oil fiscal deficit and overall budget
deficits as a share of the non-oil GDP; (iii) the time path of financial asset accumulation in the
Oil Fund as a share of the non-oil GDP. Note that those scenarios should only be seen as an
illustration of how the optimal inter-temporal allocation of oil revenues should be made and what
are the issues that need to be considered when designing a fiscal framework for public
expenditure. Scenarios that are exactly in line with our macro projections presented in Section A
of Chapter 4 are more complex in character and account for varying growth rates and
expenditure adjustment costs. Results of these scenarios are presented in detail further below.
19. The first sceneario, or the case of flat non-oil GDI? per capita implAes optimal path of
spending that is identical to the peermanent income hypothesis, assumimg an infinite tdme
horizon. To construct this scenario, we assume that the real non-oil GDP growth is equal to the
population growth rate (one percent) over the infinite time horizon. Furthermore, we assume that
the real annual interest rate is equal to the rate of time preference (4 percent), and the underlying
oil price, including transport and other costs is equal to US$18 per bbl after 2006. Finally, we
assume that the effective tax rate on the non-oil economy is constant as a share of the non-oil
GDP and equal to 23 percent of the non-oil GDP. The results shown in Table 1 suggest, that
given the projected extraction rates and the amount of fiscal revenues accruing to the
government, the optimal non-oil deficit that can sustain a constant disposable income per capita
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over the entire time horizon is 13.5 percent of the non-oil GDP per annum.19 This allows for
keeping disposable income constant infinitely at its highest viable level just above US$570 per
capita.
20. The total expenditure that the government can sustain over the time horizon is
therefore equal to 36.5 percent of the non-oil GDP. Under this scenario, the government can
consume only the annuity fraction of its net wealth, thus keeping the net wealth constant at about
450 percent of the non-oil GDP forever. This implies that during the first four years (2002-2005)
the government can increase the overall deficit that will peak at 8.2 percent of the non-oil GDP
in 2004, in order to allow the current generations to consume the permanent income fraction out
of the future oil wealth, financing this excess consumption by borrowing. Afterwards, as the
large production volumes would materialize, the government needs to save a larger fraction of its
oil proceeds thus returning to a balanced budget in 2006 and then running a large surplus, which
will peak at slightly around 47 percent of the non-oil GDP in 2013. As soon as the oil reserves
are depleted, in 2024, the government needs to run a permanent budget surplus that allows
keeping financial assets per capita constant (population growth requires continuing asset
accumulation). Although this condition might seem restrictive, interest earned on accumulated
financial assets still allows financing the non-oil deficit at 13.5 percent of the non-oil GDP
forever.
21. Permanent income hypothesis is not optimal if the non-oil GDP per capita is
increasing. To illustrate this point we present a second and more optimistic basic scenario, in
which the real non-oil GDP is growing faster than the population. This scenario is presented in
Table 4 We keep all the assumptions the same as in our base case, except for the non-oil GDP
growth rate, which is assumed at two percent per annum forever. Under these assumptions it is
optimal to spend faster the oil wealth in order to increase the welfare of the current generations,
as future generations will be benefited by the non-oil growth. This allows keeping the disposable
income just above US$690 per capita until 2035, when the accumulated effects of non-oil GDP
growth compensates the depletion of oil revenues, and thereafter the disposable income per
capita can increase forever. This is as much income smoothing that the government can achieve
unless it is allowed to perform intergenerational transfers of the non-oil income.
22. The share of public expenditure in total non-oil GDP in scenario of increasing per
capita non-oil GDP increases up to above 50 percent during the initial period and is
declining gradually to 23 percent in 2035. Expenditures will stay at this level permanently. As
a result, the sustainable non-oil deficit will be now much higher in the initial period, reaching 33
percent of GDP in 2003, which implies that the overall deficit to the non-oil GDP will reach 28
percent. Later on, when the rapid oil production takes place and the non-oil growth benefits the
population, the non-oil deficit will decline gradually to zero in 2036. This path implies
substantial surplus on the overall budget, reaching 25 percent in 2013, which turns into a deficit
when oil resources are depleted'before finally converging to zero percent in 2036. By this time
oil-related financial assets will also be fully depleted.
'9 This ratio is not directly comparable to budgetary figures presented m the PER. This is because the denominator
(non-oil GDP) in the latter case is much larger due to higher growth before 2010. As it is shown below the
correspondmg figure under hlgh non-oil GDP is just below 10 percent of non-oil GDP.
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23. IDescnribed below are two scenarios that are based on growth rates as projected in
ounr macro framework in Section A. Accordingly, both scenarios assume higher non-oil GDP
growth rate, on average 5.9 percent during 2003 -2010. The two projections, however, differ in
their expectations about the non-oil GDP growth rate in the long-run (beyond 2010). The first
scenario assumes flat non-oil GDP per capita after 2010, whereas the second scenario assumes
per capita growth rate of 0.5 percent.20 As initial growth is averaged 5.9 percent during 2003-
2010, the optimal shift of resources would be large even if per capita non-oil GDP is expected to
be flat in the long run. In the case of permanent per capita non-oil GDP growth after 2010, the
optimal oil-financed consumption shifting would be very substantial. However, a dramatic
increase of public expenditure for a brief period of time may lower their efficiency and have
important political and economic risks. To take these adjustment costs into account, we introduce
explicitly barriers to annual growth of government expenditures. 1 The results suggest that due to
adjustment costs, the non-oil deficit and public expenditure are much lower during 2003-2010
and slightly higher in the rest of the time horizon as compared to results under the absence of
adjustment costs.2 2
24. In analyzing these results it must be understood that optimistic assumptions about future
growth and oil prices lead to the choice of more expansionary path of expenditures that
ultimately might prove to be unsustainable when underlying predictions are not realized. In such
a situation, the shaip adjustment in the fiscal policy would be necessary in the future in order to
regain sustainability. It is therefore argued that government should tend to adopt conservative
assumptions in order to avoid risks of major policy reversals. Accordingly, the scenario with
rapid growth projected in medium term but with flat non-oil GDP per capita in the long run is
picked as a base for fiscal sustainability analysis underlying this PER.
20 As it was illustrated above, growth implies that the government should choose to shift some oil-financed
consumption forward as ten years of fast non-oil growth reduces the need for oil spending in the future.
21 We usually assume a quadratic loss function for changes in public expenditure levels. For more details on the
denvation procedure, see Engel and Valdes (2000). Results presented here are based on the limit to annual increases
in public expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP of 1 percent before 2008. Given high initial rates of growth of non-
oil GDP this restriction still allows for substantial increases m expenditures m absolute terms.
22 In the absence of adjustment costs the average non-oil fiscal deficit between 2002 and 2007 would equal 31.1
percent of non-oil GDP in case of flat non-oil GDP per capita after 2006 and 39.6 percent in case with permanent
growth. Consequently the expenditures would average 54.1 and 62.6 percent of non-oil GDP, respectively. Details
can be found in Tables 19 and 20.
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Table 1. Constant Non-oil GDP per Capita
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable income per capita, USD 573 573 573 573 constant
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -13.5 -13.5 -13.5 -13.5% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -2.7 33.8 22.8 4.5% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP -19 170 410 454% constant
Assumptions: Annual population growth rate: 1%, non-oil GDP growth rate: 1%, time preference rate: 4%, interest
rate: 4%, effective tax rate on non-oil GDP: 23%. International oil price is US$18 per bbl after 2006.
Table 2. Constant Non-oil GDP per Capita
(Low oil prices)
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable income per capita, USD 551 551 551 551 constant
Public spendmg, share of non-oil GDP 32.5 32.5 32.5 32.5% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -9.5 -9.5 -9.5 -9.5% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -0.4 22.9 16.3 3.2% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP -7 124 288 320 % constant
Assumptions: International oil prices lower by 20% (US$14.4 per barrel), all other assumptions as in the base
scenario.
Table 3. Constant Non-oil GDP per Capita
(High oil prices)
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable mcome per capita, USD 596 596 596 596 constant
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 40.4 40.4 40.4 40.4% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -17.4 -17.4 -17.4 -17.4% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -5.1 45.4 27.9 5.8% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP -31 228 533 587% constant
Assumptions: International oil prices higher by 20% (US$21.6 per barrel), all other assumptions as in the base
scenano.
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Table 4. Permanently llncreasing Non-oil GDP penr Capita
2002-2007 20082018 2019-2024 After 2025
constant at 693
Disposable income per capita, USD 657 657 657 increasing at .5% after 2058
declining
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 49.4% 44.7% 40.2% 23% after 2058
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil declining
GDP -26.4% -21.7% -17.2% 0% after 2058
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil declining
GDP -16.5% 20.3% 9.9% 0% after 2058
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil declining
GDP -56% 24% 168% 0% after 2058
Assumptions: Annual non-oil GDP growth rate: 1%, all other assumptions as in base scenario.
Table 5. Permanently linereasing Nonm-oil GDP penr Capita
(Low oil prnices)
2002-2007 200&2018 2019-2024 After 2025
constant at 625
Disposable income per capita, USD 625 625 625 increasing at .5% after 2048
declining
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 43.8% 39.4% 35.1% 23% after 2048
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil declming
GDP -20.8% -16.4% -12.1% 0% after 2048
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil declining
GDP -12.5% 11.5% 6.0% 0% after 2048
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil declining
GDP -38% 0% 84% 0% after 2048
Assumptions: Annual non-oil GDP growth rate: 1%, international oil prices lower by 20% (US$14.4 per barrel),all
other assumptions as in base scenario.
Table 6. Permanently lincreasing Non-oil GDP per Capita
(EIHIglh oil prices)
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
constant at 687
Disposable income per capita, USD 687 687 687 increasing at .5% after 2067
declining
Public spendmg, share of non-oil GDP 54.6% 49.7% 45.0% 23% after 2067
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil declining
GDP -31.6% -26.7% -22.0% 0% after 2067
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil declining
GDP -20.4% 30.3% 13.0% 0% after 2067
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil declinmng
GDP -73% 66% 261% 0% after 2067
Assumptions: Annual non-oil GDP growth rate: 1 %, international oil prices higher by 20% (US$21.6 per barrel),all
other assumptions as in base scenario.
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Table 7. Fiscal Envelope I
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and Stabilization of Non-oil GDP per Capita Thereafter in
the Presence of adjustment Costs
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable income per capita, USD 627 791 799 799 constant
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 31.6% 34.9% 35.0% 35.0% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -8.6% -11.9% -12.0% -12.0% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP 1.3% 23.1% 15.4% 1.7% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP 9% 141% 310% 343% constant
Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5%
afterwards, maximum annual increase in govermnent expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP 0.7%, all other
assumptions as in the base scenano.
Table 8. Fiscal Envelope I (Low Oil Prices)
Growth Rates from PER until 2010 and Stabilization of Non-oil GDP per Capita Thereafter
in the Presence of Adjustment Costs
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable mcome per capita, USD 627 767 764 764 constant
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 31.6% 32.0% 30.6% 30.6% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -8.6% -9.0% -7.6% -7.6% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -0.4% 14.2% 10.9% 1.1% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP 6% 80% 193% 217% constant
Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0 5%
afterwards, maximum annual increase in govemment expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP 0.7%, international oil
prices lower by 20% (US$14.4 per barrel), all other assumptions as in the base scenano.
Table 9. Fiscal Envelope I (High Oil Prices)
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and Stabilization of Non-oil GDP per Capita Thereafter in
the Presence of Adjustment Costs
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable income per capita, USD 627 811 836 836 constant
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 31.6% 37.3% 39.5% 39.5% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -8.6% -14.3% -16.56/. -16.5% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP 2.8% 33.0% 18.8%. 2.4% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP 11% 214% 434% 474% constant
Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5%
afterwards, maximum annual mcrease in government expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP 0.7%, intemational oil
prices higher by 20% (US$21.6 per barrel), all other assumptions as in the base scenario.
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Table 10. Fiscal Enmvelope H1I
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 amd 0.5 percent Growth of Non-oi GDP per Capita
Thnereafter inn the Presence of AdQnstmeat Costs
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Constant at 910
Disposable income per capita, USD 627 826 906 Increasing at 0.5% after 2063
Declining
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 31.6% 37.6% 41.9% 23% after 2063
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil Declming
GDP -8.6% -14.6% -18.9% 0% after 2063
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil Declining
GDP 1.3% 19.4% 4.6% 0% after 2063
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil Declining
GDP 9% 126% 226% 0% after 2063
Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5% and 1%
afterwards, respectively. Maximum annual increase in government expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP 0.7%, all
other assumptions as in the base scenario.
Table 11. Fiscal Envelope IEI (Low Uil Prices)
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and 0.5 percent Growth of Non-oil GDP per Capita
Thereafter in the 1Presence of Ad.lustmaent Costs
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Constant at 849
Disposable income per capita, USD 627 819 849 Increasing at 0.5% after 2049
Declining
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 31.6% 36.7% 35.2% 23% after 2049
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil Declining
GDP -8.6% -13.7% -12.2% 0% after 2049
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil Declining
GDP -0.4% 8.3% 2.1% 0% after 2049
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil Declining
GDP 6% 55% 96% 0% after 2049
Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5% and 1%
afterwards, respectively. Maximum annual increase in government expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP 0.7%,
international oil prices lower by 20% (US$14.4 per barrel), all other assumptions as in the base scenario.
Table 12. Fiscal Envelope 1111 (ligh il lPrices)
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and 0.5 percent G;rowth of Non-oil GDP? per Capita
Thereafter inm the Presence of Adnustment (Costs
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Constant at 978
Disposable income per capita, USD 627 826 920 Increasing at 0.5% after 2077
Declining
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 31.6% 37.6% 43.5% 23% after 2077
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil Declining
GDP -8.6% -14.6% -20.5% 0% after 2077
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil Declining
GDP 2.8% 32.0% 12.2% 0% after 2077
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil Declming
GDP 11% 208% 388% 0% after 2077
Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5% and 1%
afterwards, respectively. Maximum annual increase in government expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP 0.7%,
international oil prices higher by 20% (US$21.6 per barrel), all other assumptions as in the base scenario.
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Table 13. Constant Non-oil GDP per Capita
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable income per capita, USD 591 591 591 591 constant
Public spendmg, share of non-oil GDP 39.1% 39.1% 39.1% 39.1% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -16.1% -16.1% -16.1% -16.1% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP 4.9% 33.3% 22.5% 2.3% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP -16% 164% 414% 463% constant
Assumptions: Annual population growth rate: 0.5%, non-oil GDP growth rate: 0.5%, tume preference rate: 4%,
interest rate: 4%, effective tax rate on non-oil GDP: 23%. International oil price is US$18 per bbl after 2006.
Table 14. Constant Non-oil GDP per Capita
(Low interest rates)
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable income per capita, USD 572 572 572 572 constant
Public spendmg, share of non-oil GDP 35.9% 35.9% 35.9% 35.9% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -12.9% -12.9% -12.9% -12.9% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -1.4% 36.3% 23.4% 2.6% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP -4% 205% 470% 520% constant
Assumptions: Interest rates and time preference at 3%, all other assumptions as in the base scenario. The time
preference is modified for illustrative purposes in order to maintain the optimality of a fiscal strategy consistent with
the permanent income hypothesis.
Table 15. Constant Non-oil GDP per capita
(High interest rates)
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable income per capita, USD 604 604 604 604 constant
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 41.6% 41.6% 41.6% 41.6% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -18.6% -18.6% -18.6% -18.6% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -7.8% 30.6% 21.6% 2.1 % constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP -26% 129% 367% 414% constant
Assumptions: Interest rates and time preference at 5%, all other assumptions as in the base scenario. The time
preference is modified for illustrative purposes in order to maintain the optimality of a fiscal strategy consistent with
the permanent income hypothesis.
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Table 16. Fiscal Envelope 11
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and Stabilization of Non-oil GD? per Capita Thereafteir in
the Presence of Adjustment Costs
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable income per capita, USD 627 791 799 799 constant
Public spendmg, share of non-oil GDP 31.6% 34.9% 35.0% 35.0% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -8.6% -11.9% -12.0% -12.0% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP 1.3% 23.1% 15.4% 1.7% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP 9% 141% 310% 343% constant
Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5%
afterwards, maximum annual increase in government expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP 0.7%, all other
assumptions as in the base scenario.
Table 17. Fiscal Envelope I1 (Low limterest Rates)
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and Stabilization of Non-oil GDlP per Capita Thereafter inm
the Presence of Adjustmenat Costs
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable income per capita, USD 627 774 774 774 constant
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 31.6% 32.8% 31.9% 31.9% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -8.6% -9.8% -8.9% -8.9% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP 1.2% 24.1% 15.9% 1.8% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP 8% 145% 323% 357% constant
Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5%
afterwards, maximum annual increase in government expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP 0.7%, interest rates
and time preference at 3%, all other assumptions as m the base scenario. The time preference is modified for
illustrative purposes in order to maintain the optimality of a fiscal strategy consistent with permanent income
hypothesis.
Table 18. Fiscal Envelope I (Hligh linterest Rates)
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and Stabilization of Non-ofil G1DP per capita Thereafter in
the Presence of Adjustment Costs
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Disposable income per capita, USD 627 806 823 823 constant
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 31.6% 36.8% 37.9% 37.9% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -8.6% -13.8% -14.9% -14.9% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP 1.4% 22.2% 14.9% 1.7% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP 9% 137% 300% 332% constant
Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5%
afterwards, maximum annual increase in government expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP 0.7%, interest rates
and time preference at 5%, all other assumptions as in the base scenario. The time preference is modified for
illustrative purposes in order to maintain the optimality of a fiscal strategy consistent with the permanent income
hypothesis.
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Table 19. Fiscal Envelope I
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and Stabilization of Non-oil GDP per Capita Thereafter in
the Absence of Adjustment Costs
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 after 2025
Disposable income per capita, USD 765 765 765 765 constant
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 53.5% 31.7% 30.7% 30.7% constant
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -30.5% -8.7% -7.7% -7.7% constant
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -23.3% 21.4% 14.8% 1. I% constant
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP -83% 17% 188% 221% constant
Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5%
afterwards, all other assumptions as in the base scenario.
Table 20. Fiscal Envelope H
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and 0.5 percent Growth of Non-oil GDP per Capita
Thereafter in the Absence of Adjustment Costs
2002-2007 2008-2018 2019-2024 After 2025
Constant at 840
Disposable mcome per capita, USD 818 818 818 Increasing at 0.5% after 2041
Declining
Public spending, share of non-oil GDP 61.7% 36.7% 31.6% 23% after 2041
Declning
Non-oil budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -38.7% -13.7% -8.6% 0% after 2041
Declimng
Overall budget balance, share of non-oil GDP -32.2% 12.6% 7.1% 0% after 2041
Decluiing
Average Oil Fund assets, share of non-oil GDP -112% -74% 33% 0% after 2041
Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5% and 1%
afterwards, respectively, all other assumptions as in the base scenario.
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Figure 1. Counstant Non-oil G1D1P per Capita
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Assumptiens: Annual population growth rate: 0.5%, non-oil GDP growth rate: 0.5%, tine preference rate: 4%,
interest rate: 4%, effective tax rate on non-oil GDP: 23%. International oil price is US$18 per bbl after 2006.
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Figure 2. Permanently Increasing Non-Oil GDP per Capita
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Assumptions: Annual non-oil GDP growth rate: 1%, all other assumptions as in the base scenano.
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Figure 3. Fiscal Envelope 1[
Growth Rates from the PER untEl 2010 and Stabilization of Non-oil GD? per capita Thereafter in
the Presence of Adjustment Costs
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Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5%
afterwards, maximum annual increase in government expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP 0.7%, all! other
assumptions as in the base scenario.
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Figure 4. Fiscal Envelope II
Growth Rates from the PER until 2010 and 0.5 percent Growth of Non-oil GDP per Capita
Thereafter in the Presence of Adjustment Costs
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Assumptions: Annual population and non-oil GDP growth rate: taken from the PER before 2010 and 0.5% and 1%
afterwards, respectively. Maximum annual increase in government expenditures as a share of non-oil GDP 0.7%, all
other assumptions as in the base scenario.
127
ANNEX S. STATISTIICAL IINDICATORS FOR AZERBAIJAN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW
1997 1998 19991 20001 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 20071 20081 2009 2010
GDP Growth -Overall 6% 1 00/ 7% 11% 9 9% 7.9% 7.3% 5.4% 151% 31.3% 25 9%o 14.5%1 7.5% 5.3%
GDP Growth -Oil/gas sector 0% 42% 31% 2% 20.5% 3.4% 4 0% 2.8% 38 0% 84.5% 49 3% 22 3% 9.3% 5.5%
GDP Growth - Non-oil sector 7% 5% 2% 13% 3.6% 9.0% 8 3% 7 0% 6 3% 3.3% 3.6% 4 7% 4 8% 5 1%
GDP Deflator Growth 9% -1% 2% 12% 2 7% 2 6% 18% 2 0% 11% -I 000/o -6.7% -1 6% 0 7% 16%
Oil Pnce (US$/bbl) -- IMF assumption 19 3 131 18 0 28 3 24.3 23.0 22.0 21 0 21.0 18 0 18 0 18.0 18 0 18.0
Exchange rate, av. AZM per US$ 3985 3869 4120 4472 4768 4917 4942 4942 4942 4943 4943 4943 4943 4943
GDP by Sources 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP at market pnces 100% 100%/ 1000/a 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 1OO%l 100% 100%/0
Net indirect Taxes 7% 4% 4% 6% 8% 9% 9% 9% 8% 7% 7% 7%1 6%/c 60/o
Agriculture 20% 18% 18% 16% 16% 16% 17% 17% 16% 14% 13% 12% 12% 12%
Industry 37% 35% 390/o 43% 42% 41% 40% 390/a 42% 48% 53% 55% 55% 55%1
o/w oil and gas 15% 11% 190/0 28% 27% 27% 25% 23% 28% 35% 41% 44% 45% 44%
Services 36% 43% 390/o 35% 34% 33% 34% 36% 34% 30% 27% 26% 26% 27%
GDP by Uses 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Domestic Absorption 124% 132% 114%/ 98% 96% 114% 129% 130% 115% 93% 83% 74% 690/a 67%/
Total Consumption 900/a 98% 87% 78% 75% 700/a 72% 72% 67% 590/o 53% 490/a 48% 47%
Gross Domestic Investments 34% 33%1 26%1 21% 21% 44% 57% 58% 490/o 34%° 300/a 24%/o 21% 20%1
Resource Balance -24% -32% -14% 2% 4% -14% -290/o -300/o -15% 7% 17% 26% 31% 33%
Exports GNFS 290/% 23%1 28% 400/ 42% 390/o 35% 32% 36% 45% 52% 56% 57% 56%
Imports GNFS 53% 55% 42% 38% 38% 53% 64% 62% 51% 37% 35% 290/a 26% 23%
Real Non-oil Sector 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 206 2007 2008 2009 2010
NO GDP 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 1000/a 100%
Consumption 100% 110% 109% 110% 105%1 98% 990/a 96% 94% 93% 92% 900/a 88% 87%
Pnvate Consumption 86% 93% 91% 88% 87% 790/o 78% 76% 74% 74% 73% 72% 700/o 690/a
Public Consunption 14% 17% 190/0 15% 14% 15% 15% 15% 15% 14% 14% 14%/o 13% 13%
Investment 12% 13% 17% 22% 24% 300/o 32% 34% 34% 32% 31% 31%1 32% 32%
Non-oil Pnvate Investment 10% 11% 16% 18% 190/a 21% 27% 27% 27% 24% 23% 23% 23% 23%
Public Investment 2% 2% 1% 4% 5% 90/a 5% 6% 7% 8% 8% 90/a 9% 9%
Non-oil Resource Balance -11% -23% -26% -32% -290/o -28% -31% -300/o -28% -24% -23% -2 1% -20°/c -18%
Non-oil Exports 200/o 14% 13% 14% 12%1 14% 13% 12% 12% 15% 17% 18% 18% 18%
Non-oil Imports 31% 37% 390/o 46% 42% 42% 44% 42% 41% 40% 400/a 390/o 38% 36%
Memorandum Items 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Private consumption growth per capita -4.0% 13.0% 0.1% 7.9% 2.0% 0 1% 7.3% 3 2% 2 9% 3.3% 4.1% 1 9% 2 4% 2.4%
Non-oil GDP per capita in US$ 455 503 459 491 492 522 577 633 687 722 761 809 861 916
GNP per capita in US$ 497 560 568 612 644 689 753 811 919 1038 1177 1296 1390 1480
GNP adjusted per capita in US$ 497 486 417 421 572 622 688 751 822 875 936 994 1063 1138
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Balance of payments, US$ min 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20041 2005 20061 2007 2008 2009 2010
I Current Account -971 -1356 -601 -124 -73 -1088 -2119 -2275 -1603 -371 768 1930 2662 3227
Trade Balance -567 -1038 -406 338 581 -167 -829 -1042 -299 loll1 2221 3405 3905 4291
Service Balance -384 -369 -228 -225 -375 -670 -1077 -1067 -963 -3201 -327 -36 319 56
Income (net) -66 -17 -48 -310 -356 -344 -291 -241 -416 .8101 -1210 -1524 -1649 -1717
Current Transfers (net) 46 69 81 73 76 94 78 75 75 83 84 86 87 __ 89
II Capital Account 11141 1297 753 182 1661 1059 2169 2325 1715 101 -640 -19011 -26-19 -32031
FDI (net) 1093 1024 5501 119 265 1134 20621 2170 1638 307 -193 -1151 -1740 -2256
Public Sector M&LT bon-owing (net) 11 49 207 239 140 145 127 129 131 100 95 90 87 100OtherSTeapital ~~ ~~~~ ~~~~9 224 -4 -176 -19 -79 101 70 62 100 100 100 10 10
Oil Fund outfiow 0 0 0 0 -221 -141 -121 -44 -116 -406 -641 -941 -1066 -11471
Ill Overall balance 143. -59 152 58 93 -29 49 50 112 641 129 29 43 24
IV Financing, -143. 59 -152 -58 -74 19 -50 -111 -133 -64 -129 -29 -43 -24
Change in NFA (incrcase- -143 59 -152 -58 -741 19 -50 -III -133 -64 -129 -291 -43 -24
V. Financing Gap 0 0 0 __ 0 -191 10 01 60 21 0 0 0 ___0 0
Memorandum Items 1997 1998 1999 2000 20011 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Gross official res in months of imports 2 3 2 8 4 0 3 8 3.51 2 3 1 9 2 0 2.3 2 4 2 3 2.3 2 4 2.5
Cunrent account balance to GDP ratio -25%. -30% -13% -2% -lO/o-l8% 33% -32% -20% 0%, 7% 15% 1 9%/ 22%
External debt to GDP ratio 13% 16% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 24% 22% 1 90/0 17% 15%1 15% 15%
Consolidated Budget, AZM bin 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20021 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total Revenues mnc. Gr-ants 3023 3370 3487 5007 5713 6748 7249 7727 8865 11349 13905 16296 17856 19229
o/w Oil Fund revenues 0 0 0 655 1001 850 800 804 1255 2816 4095 5123 5756 6221
Oil tax revenues 184, 367 400 506 499 754 880 933 926 1554 2389 3209 35631 3833
Non-oil revenues 2839 2991 3026 3846 4213 5143 5568 59901 6684 69791 7421 7965 8537 9176
Total Expenditure 3280 4082 4447 5160 5403 7398 7431 8403 9471 10515 11351 12266 13209 14185
Current 2988 3767 37541 4224 44601 5581 6133 6708 7481 8170 8719 9317 9966 10662
o w consumption 2846 2846 3324 2478 2603 3165 3645 3973 4324 4377 4414 4674 4969 5255
o.w transfers 984 1093 1349 1598 1665 2155 2259 2511 2924 3556 4047 4357 4713 5112
Capital 293 316 693 936 943 1817 1298 1695 1990 2345 2632 2949, 3243 3523
Consolidated Deficit -2571 -675 -895 -153 310 -651 -1821 -676 -606 834 2554 4030 4647 5044
Financing 257 675 895 162 -310 651 182 676 606 -8341 -2554 -4030 -4647 -5044
Foreig 318 443 1329 838 675 775 703 558 805 1171 616 619 622 624
Domestic 
-61 233 -4341 -676 -984 -124 -521 118 -198 -2006 -3170 -4650 -5269 -5668
Oil Fund 0 0 -103 -1134 -1107 -705 -599 -215 -573 -2006 -3170 -4650 -5269 -5668
Banking system -81 124 -308 438 74 479 26 26 28 0 0 0 0 0
Non-bank 0 0 0 50 19 133 150 250 250 0 0 01 0 01
Oilher 211 108 -23 -30 30 -31 -981 57 97 0 0 0 0 0
Memorandum Items 199 1998 1999 2000 20011 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Defi'cit excl Oil Fund revenues, AZM billion- -257 0 ---675 2 -894 8 -808 9 -691 1 -1501 -982 -1480 -1861 -1982 -1540 -1093 -1109 -1176
Oil Fund assets, US$ million 0 0 0 0 23 5 270 0 490 5 631 5 752.7 796 3 912 3 1318.1 1959 4 2900 0 3966.0 5112 5
External debt (P&PG), US$ million 235 9 313.1 493.3 463 0 609 0 735 806 843 852 843 823 788 750 711-
GDP, nominal AZM billion 15791 4 17203 1 18875.4 23591.0 26620 29480 32218 34636 40304 47603 55873 629521 681441 729241
GDP, US$ million 396231 4446 4 4581 1 5269 5 5583.7 5996 65191 7008 8155 9631 11304 12736 13785 14752
Exchange rate, av AZM per USS 3985 4 3869 0 4120 2 4 5 4 8 4 9 4 9 4 9 4 9 491 4 9 4.9 4 9 4 9
iNon-oil deficit -441.4 -1091 6 -1420 9 -13141 -11901 -2255 -18631 -2413 -27871 -35361 -3930 -43011 4672 -50
INon-oil GDP, AZM billion 142171 15392 1508 -64 93 14 30 61 88 00 26 48 73 3 96
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Consolidated Budget, as a share to non-oil GDP 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total Revenues mcl Grants 213% 21 90/o 23.1% 30.1% 30 0%/c 32 1% 30 7% 29 6% 31.0% 37.4% 431% 47.1% 48 1% 48 2%
o/w Oil Fund revenues 0.0% 0.0% 00% 3 9% 5 3% 4 0 % 3.4% 3.1% 4 4% 9.3% 12.7% 14 8% 15 5% 15 6%
State budget Oi revenues 13% 2 4% 2.6% 3 0% 2 6% 3 6% 3 7% 3 6% 3 2% 5 1% 7.4% 9 3% 9 6% 96%
Non-oil revenues 20.00/o 19.4% 20 1% 23 1% 22.1% 24 4%T 23 6% 22 9% 23 4% 23 0% 23 0% 23 0% 23 0% 23 0%
Total Expenditure 23.1% 26 5% 29 5% 31 0% 28 4% 35.2% 31 5% 32 2% 33 1% 34.7% 35 2% 35.5% 35.6% 35 6%
Current 21 0% 24 5% 24 90/ 25 4% 23 4% 26 5% 26 0% 25 7% 26 2% 27.0% 27 00/ 26.90/% 26 8% 26 7%
o w consumption 20.0%/ 18 5% 22 0% 14 90/o 13 7% 15 00G 154% 15.2% 15 1%1 14 4% 13 7% 13 5% 13 4% 13 2%
transfers 6.9% 7.1% 8 90/a 9 6% 8.7% 10.2% 96% 9 6% 10 2% 11 7% 12 5% 12.6% 12 7% 12 8%
Capital 21% 21% 4.6% 56o 5.0% 8.6% 5 5% 6.5% 7.0% 7.7% 8 2% 8 5% 8 7% 8 8%
Projected Deficit excl SOF revenues 0 0% 00% 00% -0 90/a 16% -3 1% -08% -2.6% -2 1% 2 8% 7.90/o 11.7% 12 5% 12.7%
Financing (1+11) 18% 4 4% 5.9% 10% -1.6% 31% 0.8% 2 6% 21% -2.8% -7 9% -11.7% -12.5° -12.7°
I Foreign 2 2% 2.9% 8 8% 5.0% 3 5% 3.7% 3 0% 21% 2 8% 3 9% 1.9% 1.8% 17% 16%
11 Domestic 
-0.4% 1 5% -2 90/ -4 1% -5 2% -0.6%° -2 2% 0 5% -0.7% -6.6% -9 8% -13 4% -14 2% -14 2%
Oil Fund 0.0% 0.0% -07% -6.8% -5.8% -3 4% -2 5% -0 8% -2 0%/o -6.6% -9 8% -13 4% -14 2% -14 2%
Banking system -0 6% 0 8% -2.00/a 2.6% 04% 2 3% 01% 0.1% 0 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Non-bank borrowing 0 00% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0 6% 0.6% 10% 09% 00% 00% 0 0% 0.0% 0 0%
Other 01% 0 7% -0 2% -0.2% 0 2% -0 1% -04% 0.2% 0 3% 0 0% 00% 0.0% 0 0% 0 0%
Memorandum Items 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Oil Fund revenues toGDP non-oil ratio 00% 00% 0.0% 3 9% 5 3% 4.0% 3.4% 31% 44% 9.3% 12 7% 1488% 15 5% 15.6%
Non-oil deficit tonon-oil GDPratio -3 1% -7.1% -94% -7 90/o -6 3%1-10.7% -79%/o -9.2% -9.8% -11 7% -12 2% -12 4% -12.6% -12 6%
Non-oil revenues to non-oil GDP 200N 194N 20 1% 23 1% 22 1% 244% 23 6% 22 9% 23.4% 23 00/ 23.0% 23 0% 23.0%/c 23 0%
Oil revenues to GDP non-oil 13 3 13% 1 5% 3 0% 7.9 7 6% 7 1%° 6 7% 7 6% 14.4% 201% 24 1% 25.1% 25 2%
Consolidated deficit to non-oil GDP -1 -59c -09/a 1 6 -3 1% 8 -2 6% -2.1% 2 8% 7 9% 11 7% 12 5% 12 7%
130
Oil and Gas BOP, US$ 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
/ Current account 565 377 843 957 1012 49 -716 -793 -47 1381 2167 3323 4064 4618
Exports 1150 1009 1282 1598 1841 1743 1667 1551 2209 3375 4770 5843 6458 6812
Imports GNFS -566 -602 -384 -301 468 -1361 -2102 -2096 -1833 -1183 -1391 -993 -742 -473
Interest Eamings on SOF 0 0 0 0 0 14 33 45 49 36 53 78 116 159
Profit Repatnation -19 -30 -54 -340 -361 -348 -314 -293 -472 -848 -1265 -1607 -1768 -1879
If Capital account 1115 1023 487 -127 45 877 1815 1992 1380 -266 -1028 -2314 -3059 -3689
FDI 1115 1156 843 688 844 1574 2474 2532 2312 1527 1682 1242 868 474
Capital repatriation 0 -133 -333 -569 -579 -555 -538 -497 -816 -1387 -2069 -2616 -2861 -3017
SOF assets invested abroad 0 0 -24 -247 -221 -141 -121 -44 -116 -406 -641 -941 -1066 -1147
III Overall balance 1680 1400 1330 829 1057 926 1098 1199 1332 1115 1139 1008 1005 929
Memorandum Items 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Oil CAB to GDP ratio 14 3% 8 5% 18 4% 18 2% 18 1% 0 8% -I 1.00/o -11 3% -0.6% 14.3% 19 2% 26.1% 29 5% 313%
Oil BOP contibution to GDP ratio 47.1% 35.2% 36 3% 15 7% 18 9%1 21.00/% 22 90/o 22 7% 23 00/o 18 2% 17 4% 14.4% 13 4% 11.5%
Total CAB to GDP ratio -24 5% -30 5% -13 1% -2 4% -1 3% -18 1% -32.5% -32.5% -19 7% -0 4% 6 8% 15.2% 19 3% 21 90/o
Non-oil CAB/GDP ratio -38 8% -39 0 -31.5% -20 5% -19 4% -19 00 -21 5% -21 1% -19 1% -147% -12 4% 10 9% -10.2% -9.4%
Non-oil CAB -1535 9 -1732 8 -1444 5 -1080 9 -1085 1 -1136 6 -1403.1 -1481 7 -1555 7 -1417 4 -1398 2 -1392 5 -1401 9 -1391 4
Total CAB to no-GDP ratio -27.2% -34.1% -16 4% -3 3% -1 8% -25 4% -44.4% 0 43 1% -27.7% -0 6% 11 8% 27.6% 35 4% 40.00/%
Oil CAB to no-GDP ratio 15 8% 9 5% 23 00/% 25 7% 25.3% 1 1% -15 0% -15.0% -0 8% 22 5% 33 2% 47.5% 54 1% 57 3%
Non-oil CAB/non-oil GDP -43 1% 43 6% -39 5%1 -29 0 -27 2% -26 6 -2934% -28.0% -26.9% -23 1% -21 4% - 19 90/o -18.7° -17 3%
S - Ipr Non-oil /non-oi GDP -40 0% -365% -30.00 -21 2% -20 90/o -15 8° -21 5%7 -18 8% -17.2% -11 4% -9%2% -7.5° -6 1° 47%
S-l g, non-oil /non-oil GDP -3 1% -7 1% -9.4% -7.90/o -6 3% -10.7° -7 90/o -9 2% -9.8% -11 7% -12 2% -12.4° -12 6° -12 6%
Capital repatration to non-oil GDP 00% -3 3% 91% -15.3% -14 59 13 00 _1 3% -9 4% -14 1% -22 6% -31 79 37.4% -38.1% -37 4%
Oil & Gas Fiscal Revenues, US$ million 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
I Oil Fund revenues 0 0 0 147 221 173 162 163 304 695 878 1086 1214 1308
11. Oil Fund expenditure 0 0 0 0 1 15 34 46 50 37 53 79 117 159
IlI Oil fund net inflow 0 0 0 147 221 158 128 116 254 658 825 1007 1098 1149
Memorandum Items 
_Ol Fund assets 0 0 24 270 491 632 753 796 912 1318 1959 2900 3966 5113
[Oil Fund assets to non-oil GDP 0%1 0% 1%1 7%1 12%1 15% 16% 15% 160% 21% 3 0%/ 41% 53%1 63%
Memorandum Items 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Money supply growth 34% -9% 9% 27% 31% 11% 16% 14% 16% 15%1 18% 12% 10% 10%
NFA growth 42% -31% 42% 12% 13% -6% 7% 11% 12% 4% 11% 2% 4% 2%
NDA growth -8% 22% -33% 16% 27% 22% 13% 2% 5% 18% 15% 18% 12% 14%
NFA contibution to MS growth 25% -10%0/ 28% 7% 14% -4% 7% 13% 14% 5% 10% 1% 2% 1%
NDA contibution to MS growth -3% 15% -11% 6% 171% 16% 9%1 1%| 3%1 10%1 8% 1l%l 7%1 9%1
M2 to GDP ratio 13% 11% 11% 11% 13% 13% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 15%
M2 to non GDP 15% 12% 15% 22% 18% 18% 19% 19% 2 0%0 22% 24%1 26% 26%0/ 27%
Credit to the economy growth 8% 6% 4% -2% 24% 0% 16%1 1% 6%1 23% 18%1 22% 14% 16%
Credit to the economy/non-oil GDP 14% 14% 13% 13% 1% 100/ 10/ol 9% 9%] 10%| 11%j 13% 14% 15%
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